Narrative:

The problem is that a falcon 20 with deactivated parachute and thrust reversers has to rely on only anti-skid to stop. We departed yip to pick up cargo in lck after a long discussion about severe WX along the route and wet runways. We told customer service that while the numbers work, and they want us to pick up at a 5400 ft runway, we prefer the nearby 12000 ft at lck. 20 mins out of lck, dispatch called and told us the cargo was on the ramp at rzt could we try to get in there and get it? Our company has had 2 aircraft go off the end at srb and when a captain refused to go in there he got 3 days off without pay. The pressure is on us to make the trip work. Our first landing at rzt went well but the firm landing caused our brakes to jump into #2 system with no anti-skid. We hydroplaned and decided to go around. On downwind we found our brake problem, selected #1 system and tested anti-skid. On the second landing we came in low and slow and when the captain thought he had the runway made he pulled off the power. The aircraft went from vref to vref -5 and settled immediately. The main gear touched down 20-25 ft short of the runway. It was not noticed by the captain but I suspected we were short. I decided that the flare was not the time for me to intercede with power or pitch not knowing how he would react. His mindset was that he had made the runway. The WX was MVFR and we had canceled IFR so we wanted to get down. If we had taken more time to discuss the results of the first landing, we may have decided to go to lck. We did not consider the condition of our tires after the hydroplane (scuffed but serviceable) or the fact that we had gotten ourselves into a 'make it work' mindset.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A DA20 CARGO FLC ALLOWED THEMSELVES TO BE PRESSURED BY THEIR COMPANY TO PICK UP CARGO AT AN ARPT WITH ONLY A 5400 FT RWY THAT WAS WET. ON THE FIRST ATTEMPT TO LAND, THE ACFT HYDROPLANED AND THE FLC HAD TO GAR. THEY ATTEMPTED A LNDG AGAIN, AND THE PF LANDED SHORT.

Narrative: THE PROB IS THAT A FALCON 20 WITH DEACTIVATED PARACHUTE AND THRUST REVERSERS HAS TO RELY ON ONLY ANTI-SKID TO STOP. WE DEPARTED YIP TO PICK UP CARGO IN LCK AFTER A LONG DISCUSSION ABOUT SEVERE WX ALONG THE RTE AND WET RWYS. WE TOLD CUSTOMER SVC THAT WHILE THE NUMBERS WORK, AND THEY WANT US TO PICK UP AT A 5400 FT RWY, WE PREFER THE NEARBY 12000 FT AT LCK. 20 MINS OUT OF LCK, DISPATCH CALLED AND TOLD US THE CARGO WAS ON THE RAMP AT RZT COULD WE TRY TO GET IN THERE AND GET IT? OUR COMPANY HAS HAD 2 ACFT GO OFF THE END AT SRB AND WHEN A CAPT REFUSED TO GO IN THERE HE GOT 3 DAYS OFF WITHOUT PAY. THE PRESSURE IS ON US TO MAKE THE TRIP WORK. OUR FIRST LNDG AT RZT WENT WELL BUT THE FIRM LNDG CAUSED OUR BRAKES TO JUMP INTO #2 SYS WITH NO ANTI-SKID. WE HYDROPLANED AND DECIDED TO GAR. ON DOWNWIND WE FOUND OUR BRAKE PROB, SELECTED #1 SYS AND TESTED ANTI-SKID. ON THE SECOND LNDG WE CAME IN LOW AND SLOW AND WHEN THE CAPT THOUGHT HE HAD THE RWY MADE HE PULLED OFF THE PWR. THE ACFT WENT FROM VREF TO VREF -5 AND SETTLED IMMEDIATELY. THE MAIN GEAR TOUCHED DOWN 20-25 FT SHORT OF THE RWY. IT WAS NOT NOTICED BY THE CAPT BUT I SUSPECTED WE WERE SHORT. I DECIDED THAT THE FLARE WAS NOT THE TIME FOR ME TO INTERCEDE WITH PWR OR PITCH NOT KNOWING HOW HE WOULD REACT. HIS MINDSET WAS THAT HE HAD MADE THE RWY. THE WX WAS MVFR AND WE HAD CANCELED IFR SO WE WANTED TO GET DOWN. IF WE HAD TAKEN MORE TIME TO DISCUSS THE RESULTS OF THE FIRST LNDG, WE MAY HAVE DECIDED TO GO TO LCK. WE DID NOT CONSIDER THE CONDITION OF OUR TIRES AFTER THE HYDROPLANE (SCUFFED BUT SERVICEABLE) OR THE FACT THAT WE HAD GOTTEN OURSELVES INTO A 'MAKE IT WORK' MINDSET.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.