Narrative:

Advancing from our #2 position for takeoff, I as first officer initiated the before takeoff checklist by advising flight attendants to be seated, arming autothrottles, start switches-on, etc, etc. As the #1 aircraft ahead of us accelerated down the runway, there were several radio calls made by the tower. After glancing at the SID, I looked up to see an aircraft on short final. Our aircraft was still advancing slowly forward. I called this approaching aircraft to the captain's attention and he halted our aircraft. The aircraft on final made a precautionary missed approach/go around. Our aircraft was positioned approximately 10 ft over the hold line but not onto the runway. My before takeoff actions apparently lulled the captain into thinking we had been cleared into position on the runway. The landing aircraft confirmed that we had not entered the runway but that he went around as a precaution. The tower supervisor informed us that no safety 'incident' had technically occurred. My relative newness to this aircraft, I feel, contributed to the captain's actions. Though both of us felt we had been cleared 'into position' on the runway it is apparent that we were mistaken. My proceeding with the numerous items on the checklist prior to the actual calling for the checklist by the captain I think was a major contributing factor in this hold line excursion. Though being rushed with several checklist items prior to my taking the controls for my takeoff, I should have restrained my activities/actions until the actual checklist was called for. A lesson learned. Though encouraged by a previous captain to initiate and complete appropriate checklists when required, the better discipline of the appropriate call for checklists by the designated person in control (captain on ground, PF in the air) under the guidance of the captain, is still best.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: THE CAPT (PF) TAXIED BEYOND THE RWY HOLD LINE ON THE BASIS OF A HEARD CLRNC OF 'TAXI UP TO AND HOLD.' THE FO COMPLETING THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST PRIOR TO THE CAPT CALLING FOR THE CHKLIST THE CAPT FEELS CONTRIBUTED TO THE ERROR. THE FO STOPPED THE CAPT BEFORE HE GOT ON THE RWY. HOWEVER, AN ACFT ON FINAL ELECTED TO GAR.

Narrative: ADVANCING FROM OUR #2 POS FOR TKOF, I AS FO INITIATED THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST BY ADVISING FLT ATTENDANTS TO BE SEATED, ARMING AUTOTHROTTLES, START SWITCHES-ON, ETC, ETC. AS THE #1 ACFT AHEAD OF US ACCELERATED DOWN THE RWY, THERE WERE SEVERAL RADIO CALLS MADE BY THE TWR. AFTER GLANCING AT THE SID, I LOOKED UP TO SEE AN ACFT ON SHORT FINAL. OUR ACFT WAS STILL ADVANCING SLOWLY FORWARD. I CALLED THIS APCHING ACFT TO THE CAPT'S ATTN AND HE HALTED OUR ACFT. THE ACFT ON FINAL MADE A PRECAUTIONARY MISSED APCH/GAR. OUR ACFT WAS POSITIONED APPROX 10 FT OVER THE HOLD LINE BUT NOT ONTO THE RWY. MY BEFORE TKOF ACTIONS APPARENTLY LULLED THE CAPT INTO THINKING WE HAD BEEN CLRED INTO POS ON THE RWY. THE LNDG ACFT CONFIRMED THAT WE HAD NOT ENTERED THE RWY BUT THAT HE WENT AROUND AS A PRECAUTION. THE TWR SUPVR INFORMED US THAT NO SAFETY 'INCIDENT' HAD TECHNICALLY OCCURRED. MY RELATIVE NEWNESS TO THIS ACFT, I FEEL, CONTRIBUTED TO THE CAPT'S ACTIONS. THOUGH BOTH OF US FELT WE HAD BEEN CLRED 'INTO POS' ON THE RWY IT IS APPARENT THAT WE WERE MISTAKEN. MY PROCEEDING WITH THE NUMEROUS ITEMS ON THE CHKLIST PRIOR TO THE ACTUAL CALLING FOR THE CHKLIST BY THE CAPT I THINK WAS A MAJOR CONTRIBUTING FACTOR IN THIS HOLD LINE EXCURSION. THOUGH BEING RUSHED WITH SEVERAL CHKLIST ITEMS PRIOR TO MY TAKING THE CTLS FOR MY TKOF, I SHOULD HAVE RESTRAINED MY ACTIVITIES/ACTIONS UNTIL THE ACTUAL CHKLIST WAS CALLED FOR. A LESSON LEARNED. THOUGH ENCOURAGED BY A PREVIOUS CAPT TO INITIATE AND COMPLETE APPROPRIATE CHKLISTS WHEN REQUIRED, THE BETTER DISCIPLINE OF THE APPROPRIATE CALL FOR CHKLISTS BY THE DESIGNATED PERSON IN CTL (CAPT ON GND, PF IN THE AIR) UNDER THE GUIDANCE OF THE CAPT, IS STILL BEST.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.