Narrative:

Approach to a runway incursion whilst taxiing to runway 33L on taxiway C -- we had crossed runway 22L and runway 22R and I had verbalized that I was about to stop short of runway 27. I allowed myself to divert my attention momentarily thinking I had some distance to cover to the runway 27 hold short. The jump seat rider then said you are going to stop aren't you. I stopped and noticed we were getting close to a line of tiny red flags. An aircraft in position stated that we looked too close to the runway. The tower said we were ok. Due to the jump seat rider and the perception being in conflict with my own, I then stated that maybe we were too close. There was no clearly defined runway edge visible in the white out. What we had was a possible distraction coupled with loss of visual cues. I had briefed and verbalized stopping prior to runway 27 just moments before diverting my attention. I really don't know if my perceptions and tower's were correct or if we were really too close to the runway. In any case, had we ventured out on the edge it could have been a serious deviation. I want to make sure other crews are warned to be extremely cautious taxiing over completely snow covered runways and txwys. Visual cues that normally trigger stop responses are simply not there. My brand new first officer was heads down and I should have known better. Load/tps can wait until land navigation is complete and all runways have been closed.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR FLC CROSSED THE HOLD LINE FOR RWY 27 AFTER BEING TOLD TO HOLD SHORT OF THE RWY.

Narrative: APCH TO A RWY INCURSION WHILST TAXIING TO RWY 33L ON TXWY C -- WE HAD CROSSED RWY 22L AND RWY 22R AND I HAD VERBALIZED THAT I WAS ABOUT TO STOP SHORT OF RWY 27. I ALLOWED MYSELF TO DIVERT MY ATTN MOMENTARILY THINKING I HAD SOME DISTANCE TO COVER TO THE RWY 27 HOLD SHORT. THE JUMP SEAT RIDER THEN SAID YOU ARE GOING TO STOP AREN'T YOU. I STOPPED AND NOTICED WE WERE GETTING CLOSE TO A LINE OF TINY RED FLAGS. AN ACFT IN POS STATED THAT WE LOOKED TOO CLOSE TO THE RWY. THE TWR SAID WE WERE OK. DUE TO THE JUMP SEAT RIDER AND THE PERCEPTION BEING IN CONFLICT WITH MY OWN, I THEN STATED THAT MAYBE WE WERE TOO CLOSE. THERE WAS NO CLRLY DEFINED RWY EDGE VISIBLE IN THE WHITE OUT. WHAT WE HAD WAS A POSSIBLE DISTR COUPLED WITH LOSS OF VISUAL CUES. I HAD BRIEFED AND VERBALIZED STOPPING PRIOR TO RWY 27 JUST MOMENTS BEFORE DIVERTING MY ATTN. I REALLY DON'T KNOW IF MY PERCEPTIONS AND TWR'S WERE CORRECT OR IF WE WERE REALLY TOO CLOSE TO THE RWY. IN ANY CASE, HAD WE VENTURED OUT ON THE EDGE IT COULD HAVE BEEN A SERIOUS DEV. I WANT TO MAKE SURE OTHER CREWS ARE WARNED TO BE EXTREMELY CAUTIOUS TAXIING OVER COMPLETELY SNOW COVERED RWYS AND TXWYS. VISUAL CUES THAT NORMALLY TRIGGER STOP RESPONSES ARE SIMPLY NOT THERE. MY BRAND NEW FO WAS HEADS DOWN AND I SHOULD HAVE KNOWN BETTER. LOAD/TPS CAN WAIT UNTIL LAND NAV IS COMPLETE AND ALL RWYS HAVE BEEN CLOSED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.