Narrative:

I was operating as captain on a DC10 departing from hnl, arriving lax. Apparently the flight attendants were not prepared for the landing. The required chime from the cockpit was provided. The profile of the aircraft which included descending, flap extension, and the landing gear extension, indicated landing was imminent. The lead flight attendant gave the announcement that we had been cleared to land. No one from the cabin crew of 8 flight attendants alerted the cockpit that they were not prepared. All of the operations in the cockpit were completed in accordance with our company's SOP's. A passenger was in a lavatory and some flight attendants were standing on landing. Some of the passenger emergency exits were not covered by flight attendants. We (the 3 pilots) did not learn of the cabin situation until we were at the gate and the aircraft had been officially parked. The problem was caused by the flight attendants not performing their duties on schedule. This incident could have been prevented had the flight attendants notified the flight deck advising us that the cabin was not prepared for landing. No one from the cabin crew alerted the cockpit. Had we known we would have abandoned the approach and been vectored until the cabin was legally prepared. Supplemental information from acn 332979: we were 11 mins early into lax because we were cleared directly to lax VOR for arrival, instead of flying the normal sadde 6 arrival. We provided the normal prelndg signal (a double chime 18 mi out). Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: after arrival at the gate and the passenger had deplaned, a highly inflammatory conversation developed between one of the flight attendants and the captain. A company investigation ensued, and this reporter was required to comply with company lawyers during a related deposition. Reporter believes that this incident involved individual performance, and not company policy, procedures, or training. He feels that the airline's CRM programs are excellent, and although he did not witness the captain's preflight briefing, he feels that the captain would have promoted a good cabin and cockpit crew relationship. During the descent, the so had monitored the PA system and heard the flight attendant giving the landing preparation briefing. It was at that time that the flight attendants must have recognized that the cabin would not be prepared for landing, but failed to tell the cockpit. This reporter states that had the cabin crew conveyed their predicament, the cockpit crew certainly would not have minded flying around -- 'we get paid by the min, so there was no pressure to operate in conflict to safety,' and the controllers would not have minded giving vectors to the air carrier with the low traffic volume at that time of day. This first officer guesses that the flight attendants simply mistimed their breakfast service, and that they were further cut short when the air carrier was cleared direct and given a landing to the east.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A DC10 FLC LANDED WITH SEVERAL PAX AND FLT ATTENDANTS STILL STANDING. THE DSCNT AND APCH HAD BEEN SHORTENED BECAUSE THE FLC WAS CLRED DIRECT TO THE VOR AND THEN CLRED TO LAND E, AT LAX. THE FLC WAS UNAWARE THAT THE CABIN ATTENDANTS WERE EXPERIENCING ANY DIFFICULTY PREPARING THE CABIN FOR LNDG.

Narrative: I WAS OPERATING AS CAPT ON A DC10 DEPARTING FROM HNL, ARRIVING LAX. APPARENTLY THE FLT ATTENDANTS WERE NOT PREPARED FOR THE LNDG. THE REQUIRED CHIME FROM THE COCKPIT WAS PROVIDED. THE PROFILE OF THE ACFT WHICH INCLUDED DSNDING, FLAP EXTENSION, AND THE LNDG GEAR EXTENSION, INDICATED LNDG WAS IMMINENT. THE LEAD FLT ATTENDANT GAVE THE ANNOUNCEMENT THAT WE HAD BEEN CLRED TO LAND. NO ONE FROM THE CABIN CREW OF 8 FLT ATTENDANTS ALERTED THE COCKPIT THAT THEY WERE NOT PREPARED. ALL OF THE OPS IN THE COCKPIT WERE COMPLETED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR COMPANY'S SOP'S. A PAX WAS IN A LAVATORY AND SOME FLT ATTENDANTS WERE STANDING ON LNDG. SOME OF THE PAX EMER EXITS WERE NOT COVERED BY FLT ATTENDANTS. WE (THE 3 PLTS) DID NOT LEARN OF THE CABIN SIT UNTIL WE WERE AT THE GATE AND THE ACFT HAD BEEN OFFICIALLY PARKED. THE PROB WAS CAUSED BY THE FLT ATTENDANTS NOT PERFORMING THEIR DUTIES ON SCHEDULE. THIS INCIDENT COULD HAVE BEEN PREVENTED HAD THE FLT ATTENDANTS NOTIFIED THE FLT DECK ADVISING US THAT THE CABIN WAS NOT PREPARED FOR LNDG. NO ONE FROM THE CABIN CREW ALERTED THE COCKPIT. HAD WE KNOWN WE WOULD HAVE ABANDONED THE APCH AND BEEN VECTORED UNTIL THE CABIN WAS LEGALLY PREPARED. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 332979: WE WERE 11 MINS EARLY INTO LAX BECAUSE WE WERE CLRED DIRECTLY TO LAX VOR FOR ARR, INSTEAD OF FLYING THE NORMAL SADDE 6 ARR. WE PROVIDED THE NORMAL PRELNDG SIGNAL (A DOUBLE CHIME 18 MI OUT). CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: AFTER ARR AT THE GATE AND THE PAX HAD DEPLANED, A HIGHLY INFLAMMATORY CONVERSATION DEVELOPED BTWN ONE OF THE FLT ATTENDANTS AND THE CAPT. A COMPANY INVESTIGATION ENSUED, AND THIS RPTR WAS REQUIRED TO COMPLY WITH COMPANY LAWYERS DURING A RELATED DEPOSITION. RPTR BELIEVES THAT THIS INCIDENT INVOLVED INDIVIDUAL PERFORMANCE, AND NOT COMPANY POLICY, PROCS, OR TRAINING. HE FEELS THAT THE AIRLINE'S CRM PROGRAMS ARE EXCELLENT, AND ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT WITNESS THE CAPT'S PREFLT BRIEFING, HE FEELS THAT THE CAPT WOULD HAVE PROMOTED A GOOD CABIN AND COCKPIT CREW RELATIONSHIP. DURING THE DSCNT, THE SO HAD MONITORED THE PA SYS AND HEARD THE FLT ATTENDANT GIVING THE LNDG PREPARATION BRIEFING. IT WAS AT THAT TIME THAT THE FLT ATTENDANTS MUST HAVE RECOGNIZED THAT THE CABIN WOULD NOT BE PREPARED FOR LNDG, BUT FAILED TO TELL THE COCKPIT. THIS RPTR STATES THAT HAD THE CABIN CREW CONVEYED THEIR PREDICAMENT, THE COCKPIT CREW CERTAINLY WOULD NOT HAVE MINDED FLYING AROUND -- 'WE GET PAID BY THE MIN, SO THERE WAS NO PRESSURE TO OPERATE IN CONFLICT TO SAFETY,' AND THE CTLRS WOULD NOT HAVE MINDED GIVING VECTORS TO THE ACR WITH THE LOW TFC VOLUME AT THAT TIME OF DAY. THIS FO GUESSES THAT THE FLT ATTENDANTS SIMPLY MISTIMED THEIR BREAKFAST SVC, AND THAT THEY WERE FURTHER CUT SHORT WHEN THE ACR WAS CLRED DIRECT AND GIVEN A LNDG TO THE E.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.