Narrative:

While on an ILS approach to runway 3L at dtw apr/sat/96, we received a split flap needle indication after I selected flaps 30 degrees. There was no EICAS message of this problem nor was there any leading edge or trailing edge flap light illuminated. Lastly, there was no rolling moment. One flap needle was at 15 degrees, the other was at 30 degrees. This indication was observed by me prior to the FAF and before the landing check. We were in IMC conditions. I directed the captain's attention to this indication. I then noticed the airspeed declining rapidly and I announced, 'airspeed' to the captain. He advanced the throttles and we received a stall warning as the recovery was started. What I believe happened was that the captain had left the speed brake lever up too long trying to descend and slow causing the airspeed to decline rapidly. He then, I believe, activated the stabilizer trim switch during the missed approach which caused the autoplt to disconnect giving us the aural warning of the disconnect. I tried to cancel the aural warning by using the autoplt disconnect switch, but because the yoke was moving forward and back so much during his stall recovery, I could not. Eliminating the aural warning during the stall recovery would have helped reduce the stress of the situation, but doing so was delayed. I informed tower that we were executing a missed approach. Tower gave us a frequency change for arrival. Arrival told us to level at 3000 ft but we were climbing too fast to do that. I asked for 4000 ft for a level off so that we would be out of the clouds to look at the problem. Arrival said 'negative, maintain 3000 ft.' at this time, we were closer to 4000 ft than 3000 ft. Before we could descend, we were cleared to 4000 ft. I then asked for a heading west so we could analyze the situation. Arrival complied with the request. We raised the flaps to 15 degrees and still no rolling moment. I had referred to the cockpit manual for abnormals but there were no abnormal procedure for this situation. We had no EICAS message or leading edge or trailing edge light. We raised the flaps to 5 degrees, then 1 degree, then up. I requested vectors for another approach and lowered the flaps to 1 degree, then 5 degrees, 15 degrees, 20 degrees, 25 degrees, and 30 degrees and observed the flap needles at each setting. Nothing unusual occurred. We returned for an uneventful landing. I feel that the airspeed got dangerously low because the captain was slow to descend and the spdbrake was extended too long, just prior to the FAF. It was necessary for me to remind the captain that the spdbrakes were extended. This caused the rapid decline in airspeed and the stall warning. While recovering from the stall I feel the captain over-controled the aircraft. I feel that this entire situation was the result of a minor flap indicating problem consuming too much of the captain's attention. After the stall recovery he became silent and was not communicating to me, requiring me to be more assertive. I feel that because the captain was new to the aircraft and had spent the last 6 yrs flying as a first officer on the B747-400 that his hands on flying skills were less than ideal.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: WHILE ON APCH, FLAP INDICATION SHOWED A SLIP FLAP, BUT NO OTHER INDICATORS NOR ANY UNUSUAL ROLL. SPD BRAKE WAS UP FOR SLOWING AND DSNDING, BUT FORGOTTEN, AND AIRSPD DECREASED TO STICK SHAKER. GAR WAS EXECUTED AND BY THE TIME DEP CTL ASSIGNED AN ALT, THE ACFT WAS ALREADY PAST IT DUE TO FAST CLB RATE ON GAR. NEXT APCH ALL INDICATIONS WERE NORMAL AND AN UNEVENTFUL LNDG ENSUED.

Narrative: WHILE ON AN ILS APCH TO RWY 3L AT DTW APR/SAT/96, WE RECEIVED A SPLIT FLAP NEEDLE INDICATION AFTER I SELECTED FLAPS 30 DEGS. THERE WAS NO EICAS MESSAGE OF THIS PROB NOR WAS THERE ANY LEADING EDGE OR TRAILING EDGE FLAP LIGHT ILLUMINATED. LASTLY, THERE WAS NO ROLLING MOMENT. ONE FLAP NEEDLE WAS AT 15 DEGS, THE OTHER WAS AT 30 DEGS. THIS INDICATION WAS OBSERVED BY ME PRIOR TO THE FAF AND BEFORE THE LNDG CHK. WE WERE IN IMC CONDITIONS. I DIRECTED THE CAPT'S ATTN TO THIS INDICATION. I THEN NOTICED THE AIRSPD DECLINING RAPIDLY AND I ANNOUNCED, 'AIRSPD' TO THE CAPT. HE ADVANCED THE THROTTLES AND WE RECEIVED A STALL WARNING AS THE RECOVERY WAS STARTED. WHAT I BELIEVE HAPPENED WAS THAT THE CAPT HAD LEFT THE SPD BRAKE LEVER UP TOO LONG TRYING TO DSND AND SLOW CAUSING THE AIRSPD TO DECLINE RAPIDLY. HE THEN, I BELIEVE, ACTIVATED THE STABILIZER TRIM SWITCH DURING THE MISSED APCH WHICH CAUSED THE AUTOPLT TO DISCONNECT GIVING US THE AURAL WARNING OF THE DISCONNECT. I TRIED TO CANCEL THE AURAL WARNING BY USING THE AUTOPLT DISCONNECT SWITCH, BUT BECAUSE THE YOKE WAS MOVING FORWARD AND BACK SO MUCH DURING HIS STALL RECOVERY, I COULD NOT. ELIMINATING THE AURAL WARNING DURING THE STALL RECOVERY WOULD HAVE HELPED REDUCE THE STRESS OF THE SIT, BUT DOING SO WAS DELAYED. I INFORMED TWR THAT WE WERE EXECUTING A MISSED APCH. TWR GAVE US A FREQ CHANGE FOR ARR. ARR TOLD US TO LEVEL AT 3000 FT BUT WE WERE CLBING TOO FAST TO DO THAT. I ASKED FOR 4000 FT FOR A LEVEL OFF SO THAT WE WOULD BE OUT OF THE CLOUDS TO LOOK AT THE PROB. ARR SAID 'NEGATIVE, MAINTAIN 3000 FT.' AT THIS TIME, WE WERE CLOSER TO 4000 FT THAN 3000 FT. BEFORE WE COULD DSND, WE WERE CLRED TO 4000 FT. I THEN ASKED FOR A HDG W SO WE COULD ANALYZE THE SIT. ARR COMPLIED WITH THE REQUEST. WE RAISED THE FLAPS TO 15 DEGS AND STILL NO ROLLING MOMENT. I HAD REFERRED TO THE COCKPIT MANUAL FOR ABNORMALS BUT THERE WERE NO ABNORMAL PROC FOR THIS SIT. WE HAD NO EICAS MESSAGE OR LEADING EDGE OR TRAILING EDGE LIGHT. WE RAISED THE FLAPS TO 5 DEGS, THEN 1 DEG, THEN UP. I REQUESTED VECTORS FOR ANOTHER APCH AND LOWERED THE FLAPS TO 1 DEG, THEN 5 DEGS, 15 DEGS, 20 DEGS, 25 DEGS, AND 30 DEGS AND OBSERVED THE FLAP NEEDLES AT EACH SETTING. NOTHING UNUSUAL OCCURRED. WE RETURNED FOR AN UNEVENTFUL LNDG. I FEEL THAT THE AIRSPD GOT DANGEROUSLY LOW BECAUSE THE CAPT WAS SLOW TO DSND AND THE SPDBRAKE WAS EXTENDED TOO LONG, JUST PRIOR TO THE FAF. IT WAS NECESSARY FOR ME TO REMIND THE CAPT THAT THE SPDBRAKES WERE EXTENDED. THIS CAUSED THE RAPID DECLINE IN AIRSPD AND THE STALL WARNING. WHILE RECOVERING FROM THE STALL I FEEL THE CAPT OVER-CTLED THE ACFT. I FEEL THAT THIS ENTIRE SIT WAS THE RESULT OF A MINOR FLAP INDICATING PROB CONSUMING TOO MUCH OF THE CAPT'S ATTN. AFTER THE STALL RECOVERY HE BECAME SILENT AND WAS NOT COMMUNICATING TO ME, REQUIRING ME TO BE MORE ASSERTIVE. I FEEL THAT BECAUSE THE CAPT WAS NEW TO THE ACFT AND HAD SPENT THE LAST 6 YRS FLYING AS A FO ON THE B747-400 THAT HIS HANDS ON FLYING SKILLS WERE LESS THAN IDEAL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.