Narrative:

On apr/xx/96 at approximately XA40Z, I was working all radar position in the yng TRACON. Channel 'a' of the radar failed. The supervisor, who was the only other available person in the building and who was working the only other position staffed in the TRACON, managed to get channel 'B' on line within 2-3 mins. At the time of the failure, I had 2 aircraft in the airspace. Aircraft a, a C130 transport which was departing yng direct aco climbing to ZOB altitudes and a single engine aircraft en route along V6 toward yng-djb. After radar contact was lost, vertical non radar separation was established. The C130 reported out of 5200 ft MSL, the other aircraft was at 5000 ft MSL. Both aircraft were 15 NM apart laterally. Shortly thereafter, the area supervisor advised he was departing the building and going to open the doors to the radar site for cooling. After the area supervisor returned to the TRACON and called ohio mcc, he explained the situation. Earlier in the day, him, the atm, and an af representative discussed the radar problems. Apparently, the air conditioning system at the radar site was not on-line. The only af personnel qualified to work on the air conditioning equipment was off work, and no other qualified persons were available. The outside air temperature was 75 degrees, thunderstorms were forecast, and the cooling system was needed. The af representative discussed possible alarms, of which no audio alarms activated, but no radar failure. He instructed the manager, 'that if an alarm activated, to have someone open the doors at the radar site for cooling.' this in my opinion leaves the radar site unsecured and violates security practices. In addition, I believe that the fact that it was friday afternoon influenced this decision. Any time equipment is in a state of possible need of repair, af qualified personnel should be available at the tower. A radar qualified af person arrived on site by XD00 and the equipment was returned to service at XD15. This left ATC working on backup equipment with forecast severe thunderstorm and squalls to 54 KTS for almost 3 hours. Needless to say, I was a little 'gun shy' in approving WX deviations. The radar also failed a second time that night during the repair, channel 'B' this time. My questions are not necessarily about the quality of the equipment, but the quality of the decision making process exercised. Procedures should be established to require immediate restoration of any radar or communications equipment without question to time of day, WX conditions, or use of overtime used in the decision making process. This is a major safety item and should not happen again. In addition, any time equipment is not 100 percent, af personnel should be already on location.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RADAR CHANNEL FAILURE DURING TSTM WX CONDITIONS CAUSED RPTR APPREHENSION FOR THE REMAINING OPERATIONAL CHANNEL BECAUSE AF PERSONNEL DID NOT RESPOND IN A TIMELY MANNER. THE FACILITY OPERATED WITH NO STANDBY CHANNEL FOR ALMOST 3 HRS WITH WX SQUALL CONDITIONS AND WINDS TO 54 KTS.

Narrative: ON APR/XX/96 AT APPROX XA40Z, I WAS WORKING ALL RADAR POS IN THE YNG TRACON. CHANNEL 'A' OF THE RADAR FAILED. THE SUPVR, WHO WAS THE ONLY OTHER AVAILABLE PERSON IN THE BUILDING AND WHO WAS WORKING THE ONLY OTHER POS STAFFED IN THE TRACON, MANAGED TO GET CHANNEL 'B' ON LINE WITHIN 2-3 MINS. AT THE TIME OF THE FAILURE, I HAD 2 ACFT IN THE AIRSPACE. ACFT A, A C130 TRANSPORT WHICH WAS DEPARTING YNG DIRECT ACO CLBING TO ZOB ALTS AND A SINGLE ENG ACFT ENRTE ALONG V6 TOWARD YNG-DJB. AFTER RADAR CONTACT WAS LOST, VERT NON RADAR SEPARATION WAS ESTABLISHED. THE C130 RPTED OUT OF 5200 FT MSL, THE OTHER ACFT WAS AT 5000 FT MSL. BOTH ACFT WERE 15 NM APART LATERALLY. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, THE AREA SUPVR ADVISED HE WAS DEPARTING THE BUILDING AND GOING TO OPEN THE DOORS TO THE RADAR SITE FOR COOLING. AFTER THE AREA SUPVR RETURNED TO THE TRACON AND CALLED OHIO MCC, HE EXPLAINED THE SIT. EARLIER IN THE DAY, HIM, THE ATM, AND AN AF REPRESENTATIVE DISCUSSED THE RADAR PROBS. APPARENTLY, THE AIR CONDITIONING SYS AT THE RADAR SITE WAS NOT ON-LINE. THE ONLY AF PERSONNEL QUALIFIED TO WORK ON THE AIR CONDITIONING EQUIP WAS OFF WORK, AND NO OTHER QUALIFIED PERSONS WERE AVAILABLE. THE OUTSIDE AIR TEMP WAS 75 DEGS, TSTMS WERE FORECAST, AND THE COOLING SYS WAS NEEDED. THE AF REPRESENTATIVE DISCUSSED POSSIBLE ALARMS, OF WHICH NO AUDIO ALARMS ACTIVATED, BUT NO RADAR FAILURE. HE INSTRUCTED THE MANAGER, 'THAT IF AN ALARM ACTIVATED, TO HAVE SOMEONE OPEN THE DOORS AT THE RADAR SITE FOR COOLING.' THIS IN MY OPINION LEAVES THE RADAR SITE UNSECURED AND VIOLATES SECURITY PRACTICES. IN ADDITION, I BELIEVE THAT THE FACT THAT IT WAS FRIDAY AFTERNOON INFLUENCED THIS DECISION. ANY TIME EQUIP IS IN A STATE OF POSSIBLE NEED OF REPAIR, AF QUALIFIED PERSONNEL SHOULD BE AVAILABLE AT THE TWR. A RADAR QUALIFIED AF PERSON ARRIVED ON SITE BY XD00 AND THE EQUIP WAS RETURNED TO SVC AT XD15. THIS LEFT ATC WORKING ON BACKUP EQUIP WITH FORECAST SEVERE TSTM AND SQUALLS TO 54 KTS FOR ALMOST 3 HRS. NEEDLESS TO SAY, I WAS A LITTLE 'GUN SHY' IN APPROVING WX DEVS. THE RADAR ALSO FAILED A SECOND TIME THAT NIGHT DURING THE REPAIR, CHANNEL 'B' THIS TIME. MY QUESTIONS ARE NOT NECESSARILY ABOUT THE QUALITY OF THE EQUIP, BUT THE QUALITY OF THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS EXERCISED. PROCS SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED TO REQUIRE IMMEDIATE RESTORATION OF ANY RADAR OR COMS EQUIP WITHOUT QUESTION TO TIME OF DAY, WX CONDITIONS, OR USE OF OVERTIME USED IN THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS. THIS IS A MAJOR SAFETY ITEM AND SHOULD NOT HAPPEN AGAIN. IN ADDITION, ANY TIME EQUIP IS NOT 100 PERCENT, AF PERSONNEL SHOULD BE ALREADY ON LOCATION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.