Narrative:

On a flight from bos to teb, our assigned routing took us approximately 100 NM out of the way, well north and west of our destination. The highest altitude that we were allowed to attain was 16000 ft MSL (highly inefficient in a jet, needless to say). Shortly after passing the baf VOR, it was apparent that we were headed straight for a building line of thunderstorms that we might or might not be able to top at our assigned altitude of 16000 ft. ZBW instructed us to begin descent to 14000 ft. We replied that we either needed a 'higher' altitude, or we needed to 'cut the corner' and parallel the line on a southwesterly heading in the direction of the coates intersection. The controller then asked us how far left of course we needed to deviate. We replied, 'about 15 degrees, for 5 or 10 mi.' he instructed us to deviate as requested, but to descend to 10000 ft. As we completed our descent, in the clear but closely paralleling the thunderstorms, we were handed off to the next ZBW controller. We advised her of our heading, and that we needed to continue our deviation. She cleared us to do so, but instructed us to descend to 8000 ft. Also at about this time, I stated to the co-captain that if the center controller absolutely 'insisted' that we penetrate the line of thunderstorms, since we were presently in the clear and could see the hudson river and west point off our left wing, we could -- if we absolutely had to -- cancel IFR, descend to 1000 ft MSL, and proceed VFR down the center of the hudson to teb. Shortly after leveling, the controller asked if we could now proceed northwesterly to hugenot VOR. When we replied that we could not, due to the fact that that heading would drive us directly into the thunderstorms, she instructed us to turn left to a heading of 360 degrees (a 210 degree turn). We again replied that we could not do so, because that heading also would drive us directly into the WX. I began the requested left turn, but since we were just enough in the clear to make a legal VFR descent, and would not remain so for very much longer, I instructed the co-captain to cancel IFR 'now,' and proceeded to descend toward the hudson, so as to pass south of the west point restr area. The co-captain hesitated, and the controller began talking to other traffic. By the time he finally got the message to the controller that we were canceling IFR, we were already passing 4000 ft in a rapid descent, (necessary to keep us in VFR conditions). The controller asked for verification that we were, in fact, canceling IFR, and when we replied in the affirmative, and asked if she could coordinate a flight following type of handoff, she instructed us to retain our current transponder code, and contact new york approach control. The delay in communicating to her our intentions was definitely much longer than we would have liked. We continued our descent to 1000 ft, slowed to 160 KIAS, and proceeded down the center of a very wide section of the hudson -- keeping a close lookout for other VFR traffic that might be using this busy corridor. The air was generally unstable and turbulent, but not much worse than what we had been experiencing at 8000 ft, so our passenger stayed reasonably comfortable. The nyc approach control frequency we were told to try was 'so' congested that we couldn't get in a word edgewise. When we finally did get through, the controller asked us what code we were 'squawking,' but after we responded with this information, he never called us back again. Since we were uncertain of exactly where we would penetrate the TCA at our altitude and position (about 14 NM northeast of teb), we began a series of (ultimately) 3 l-hand orbits that were kept slow and tight enough to keep us mostly over the river at all times. We saw 'several' aircraft buzzing about in various directions. Since we were not able to break into the radio traffic on that frequency, we finally called the teb tower, which gave us a new transponder code, and cleared us to proceed southwest to teb runway 19, while remaining below 1500 ft MSL. The visibility and ceiling were still quite good (although the line of showers was now approaching the airport from the west), and we proceeded uneventfully to an approach and landing on runway 19. Flying a transport category jet at 1000 ft over the hudson in high traffic, uncontrolled VFR conditions, does seem a trifle extreme. However, given the alternatives and the risks, I would rather fight it out down there 'in the trenches.' note: a follow-up telephone call to one of ZBW's quality assurance program mgrs, mr. X, revealed that the controller who had been handling us was a trainee, and in addition confirmed that no traffic conflict or other problem had been created by our sudden 'punt' from their airspace. Mr. X apologized profusely for their having put us into such a 'box,' and said that actions would be taken to prevent the same thing from happening in the future. Also, a close postflt review of the VFR chart for the hudson river area that we had transited confirmed that we had indeed remained well clear of protected or otherwise controled airspace, until such time as we had been properly cleared to enter the airspace 'owned' by teb tower.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CORP ACFT HAS DIFFICULTY WITH ROUTING IN WX RELATED AREA. CANCELS IFR DSNDS TO VFR FLT.

Narrative: ON A FLT FROM BOS TO TEB, OUR ASSIGNED ROUTING TOOK US APPROX 100 NM OUT OF THE WAY, WELL N AND W OF OUR DEST. THE HIGHEST ALT THAT WE WERE ALLOWED TO ATTAIN WAS 16000 FT MSL (HIGHLY INEFFICIENT IN A JET, NEEDLESS TO SAY). SHORTLY AFTER PASSING THE BAF VOR, IT WAS APPARENT THAT WE WERE HEADED STRAIGHT FOR A BUILDING LINE OF TSTMS THAT WE MIGHT OR MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO TOP AT OUR ASSIGNED ALT OF 16000 FT. ZBW INSTRUCTED US TO BEGIN DSCNT TO 14000 FT. WE REPLIED THAT WE EITHER NEEDED A 'HIGHER' ALT, OR WE NEEDED TO 'CUT THE CORNER' AND PARALLEL THE LINE ON A SOUTHWESTERLY HDG IN THE DIRECTION OF THE COATES INTXN. THE CTLR THEN ASKED US HOW FAR L OF COURSE WE NEEDED TO DEVIATE. WE REPLIED, 'ABOUT 15 DEGS, FOR 5 OR 10 MI.' HE INSTRUCTED US TO DEVIATE AS REQUESTED, BUT TO DSND TO 10000 FT. AS WE COMPLETED OUR DSCNT, IN THE CLR BUT CLOSELY PARALLELING THE TSTMS, WE WERE HANDED OFF TO THE NEXT ZBW CTLR. WE ADVISED HER OF OUR HDG, AND THAT WE NEEDED TO CONTINUE OUR DEV. SHE CLRED US TO DO SO, BUT INSTRUCTED US TO DSND TO 8000 FT. ALSO AT ABOUT THIS TIME, I STATED TO THE CO-CAPT THAT IF THE CTR CTLR ABSOLUTELY 'INSISTED' THAT WE PENETRATE THE LINE OF TSTMS, SINCE WE WERE PRESENTLY IN THE CLR AND COULD SEE THE HUDSON RIVER AND WEST POINT OFF OUR L WING, WE COULD -- IF WE ABSOLUTELY HAD TO -- CANCEL IFR, DSND TO 1000 FT MSL, AND PROCEED VFR DOWN THE CTR OF THE HUDSON TO TEB. SHORTLY AFTER LEVELING, THE CTLR ASKED IF WE COULD NOW PROCEED NORTHWESTERLY TO HUGENOT VOR. WHEN WE REPLIED THAT WE COULD NOT, DUE TO THE FACT THAT THAT HDG WOULD DRIVE US DIRECTLY INTO THE TSTMS, SHE INSTRUCTED US TO TURN L TO A HDG OF 360 DEGS (A 210 DEG TURN). WE AGAIN REPLIED THAT WE COULD NOT DO SO, BECAUSE THAT HDG ALSO WOULD DRIVE US DIRECTLY INTO THE WX. I BEGAN THE REQUESTED L TURN, BUT SINCE WE WERE JUST ENOUGH IN THE CLR TO MAKE A LEGAL VFR DSCNT, AND WOULD NOT REMAIN SO FOR VERY MUCH LONGER, I INSTRUCTED THE CO-CAPT TO CANCEL IFR 'NOW,' AND PROCEEDED TO DSND TOWARD THE HUDSON, SO AS TO PASS S OF THE WEST POINT RESTR AREA. THE CO-CAPT HESITATED, AND THE CTLR BEGAN TALKING TO OTHER TFC. BY THE TIME HE FINALLY GOT THE MESSAGE TO THE CTLR THAT WE WERE CANCELING IFR, WE WERE ALREADY PASSING 4000 FT IN A RAPID DSCNT, (NECESSARY TO KEEP US IN VFR CONDITIONS). THE CTLR ASKED FOR VERIFICATION THAT WE WERE, IN FACT, CANCELING IFR, AND WHEN WE REPLIED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE, AND ASKED IF SHE COULD COORDINATE A FLT FOLLOWING TYPE OF HDOF, SHE INSTRUCTED US TO RETAIN OUR CURRENT XPONDER CODE, AND CONTACT NEW YORK APCH CTL. THE DELAY IN COMMUNICATING TO HER OUR INTENTIONS WAS DEFINITELY MUCH LONGER THAN WE WOULD HAVE LIKED. WE CONTINUED OUR DSCNT TO 1000 FT, SLOWED TO 160 KIAS, AND PROCEEDED DOWN THE CTR OF A VERY WIDE SECTION OF THE HUDSON -- KEEPING A CLOSE LOOKOUT FOR OTHER VFR TFC THAT MIGHT BE USING THIS BUSY CORRIDOR. THE AIR WAS GENERALLY UNSTABLE AND TURBULENT, BUT NOT MUCH WORSE THAN WHAT WE HAD BEEN EXPERIENCING AT 8000 FT, SO OUR PAX STAYED REASONABLY COMFORTABLE. THE NYC APCH CTL FREQ WE WERE TOLD TO TRY WAS 'SO' CONGESTED THAT WE COULDN'T GET IN A WORD EDGEWISE. WHEN WE FINALLY DID GET THROUGH, THE CTLR ASKED US WHAT CODE WE WERE 'SQUAWKING,' BUT AFTER WE RESPONDED WITH THIS INFO, HE NEVER CALLED US BACK AGAIN. SINCE WE WERE UNCERTAIN OF EXACTLY WHERE WE WOULD PENETRATE THE TCA AT OUR ALT AND POS (ABOUT 14 NM NE OF TEB), WE BEGAN A SERIES OF (ULTIMATELY) 3 L-HAND ORBITS THAT WERE KEPT SLOW AND TIGHT ENOUGH TO KEEP US MOSTLY OVER THE RIVER AT ALL TIMES. WE SAW 'SEVERAL' ACFT BUZZING ABOUT IN VARIOUS DIRECTIONS. SINCE WE WERE NOT ABLE TO BREAK INTO THE RADIO TFC ON THAT FREQ, WE FINALLY CALLED THE TEB TWR, WHICH GAVE US A NEW XPONDER CODE, AND CLRED US TO PROCEED SW TO TEB RWY 19, WHILE REMAINING BELOW 1500 FT MSL. THE VISIBILITY AND CEILING WERE STILL QUITE GOOD (ALTHOUGH THE LINE OF SHOWERS WAS NOW APCHING THE ARPT FROM THE W), AND WE PROCEEDED UNEVENTFULLY TO AN APCH AND LNDG ON RWY 19. FLYING A TRANSPORT CATEGORY JET AT 1000 FT OVER THE HUDSON IN HIGH TFC, UNCTLED VFR CONDITIONS, DOES SEEM A TRIFLE EXTREME. HOWEVER, GIVEN THE ALTERNATIVES AND THE RISKS, I WOULD RATHER FIGHT IT OUT DOWN THERE 'IN THE TRENCHES.' NOTE: A FOLLOW-UP TELEPHONE CALL TO ONE OF ZBW'S QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM MGRS, MR. X, REVEALED THAT THE CTLR WHO HAD BEEN HANDLING US WAS A TRAINEE, AND IN ADDITION CONFIRMED THAT NO TFC CONFLICT OR OTHER PROB HAD BEEN CREATED BY OUR SUDDEN 'PUNT' FROM THEIR AIRSPACE. MR. X APOLOGIZED PROFUSELY FOR THEIR HAVING PUT US INTO SUCH A 'BOX,' AND SAID THAT ACTIONS WOULD BE TAKEN TO PREVENT THE SAME THING FROM HAPPENING IN THE FUTURE. ALSO, A CLOSE POSTFLT REVIEW OF THE VFR CHART FOR THE HUDSON RIVER AREA THAT WE HAD TRANSITED CONFIRMED THAT WE HAD INDEED REMAINED WELL CLR OF PROTECTED OR OTHERWISE CTLED AIRSPACE, UNTIL SUCH TIME AS WE HAD BEEN PROPERLY CLRED TO ENTER THE AIRSPACE 'OWNED' BY TEB TWR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.