Narrative:

We brought the airplane from our operations base in houston to long beach for some work. We held the airplane to show to employees, then departed for lax. On predep briefing I alerted the crew that we would be approaching lax to the west and with the haze in the air and the sun on the horizon, it would be like an instrument approach and to be particularly aware of traffic. The takeoff was on runway 30 with clearance to climb to 1500 ft, turn right to 345 degrees to sli, maintain 2000 ft. The takeoff was normal with standard procedures except I stated I would not accelerate beyond clean maneuvering speed. Just at the point of retracting slats we were given a westerly heading, a speed reduction to 185 KTS (as I recall) then descent to 1900 ft. This was all accomplished as we got slats and flaps out in a very fast transition from after takeoff to approach confign. At this point we were just in the tops of the heavy haze with the sun directly ahead of us. Also at this point we had reasonable visibility ahead and above us, it would have been impossible to know our exact location from landmarks below us. We were now given traffic to follow to runway 25 and a left turn to get behind the B737. Things had been happening so fast that we had not completed an after takeoff checklist and still had a 15 degree bank limit on our flight guidance system. The result was a slower turn than actually required. At this same time there appeared in front of us an aircraft that appeared to be turning into us from the north. I chose to avoid the greater of the dangers and started a right turn to pass behind the aircraft that was coming into conflict. Very shortly then I saw that I was looking at the bottom of the aircraft and that he was turning away from us instead of into us. I then turned back to the left, passed behind the B737 which at this time I determined was landing on runway 25R, and we had been cleared visual approach to runway 25L following the B737 with what I thought was less than normal spacing. We were now a little high and had to use full flap and a rather steep approach to land on the left runway, and chose that approach and landing rather than get back into the crowded sky with the setting sun and haze. With everything that was happening and the speed it was happening along with the fact of everyone's attention outside the aircraft due to visibility and very tight spacing, there was a breakdown in crew coordination and we never got onto tower frequency until after landing. I think the problem arose from the fact that we had to go into approach confign and mode before we completed the takeoff. The biggest contributing factor was the visibility conditions in the lax area to the west into the setting sun. I think another contributing factor is a crew accustomed to flying rather long legs with adequate time to review, brief, and function as a team, being thrown into a high speed rapidly changing situation in an area with which there had been no recent experience and unfamiliar with the area for a visual approach. I believe another contributing factor is the attempt by controllers to do the best job they can do and take care of the traffic in the most expeditious way. In this case, with the heavy haze and setting sun, they should revert to greater spacing. In looking at factors affecting human performance, I believe there were no negative factors, the crew was rested, it was still daylight and everyone should have been in a normal performance mode. I did perceive an aircraft that was going to conflict with us and the decision I made to turn right to avoid the greater danger I believe to be a correct decision. In retrospect the thing I would do differently and the thing I would recommend to any other pilot in high speed aircraft flying this short of a leg would be to request ahead of time radar vectors to intercept an ILS at least 5 mi outside the FAF, especially with any kind of visibility restr. This would allow the crew to work all procedures and checklists in a normal manner and not be distracted by things happening too fast to keep up with their own responsibilities and provide the advice, information, and feedback as we are taught in CRM. The other thing I would like to suggest is that ATC take a look at procedures, especially in the lax basin, in spring and summer months when heavy haze is a common event, and slow the flow when the visibility to the west drops to some preselected distance, I would choose 5 mi.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OF A WDB OVERSHOT FINAL DURING A VISUAL APCH TO A PARALLEL RWY AND FAILED TO CONTACT THE TWR FOR LNDG APPROVAL.

Narrative: WE BROUGHT THE AIRPLANE FROM OUR OPS BASE IN HOUSTON TO LONG BEACH FOR SOME WORK. WE HELD THE AIRPLANE TO SHOW TO EMPLOYEES, THEN DEPARTED FOR LAX. ON PREDEP BRIEFING I ALERTED THE CREW THAT WE WOULD BE APCHING LAX TO THE W AND WITH THE HAZE IN THE AIR AND THE SUN ON THE HORIZON, IT WOULD BE LIKE AN INST APCH AND TO BE PARTICULARLY AWARE OF TFC. THE TKOF WAS ON RWY 30 WITH CLRNC TO CLB TO 1500 FT, TURN R TO 345 DEGS TO SLI, MAINTAIN 2000 FT. THE TKOF WAS NORMAL WITH STANDARD PROCS EXCEPT I STATED I WOULD NOT ACCELERATE BEYOND CLEAN MANEUVERING SPD. JUST AT THE POINT OF RETRACTING SLATS WE WERE GIVEN A WESTERLY HDG, A SPD REDUCTION TO 185 KTS (AS I RECALL) THEN DSCNT TO 1900 FT. THIS WAS ALL ACCOMPLISHED AS WE GOT SLATS AND FLAPS OUT IN A VERY FAST TRANSITION FROM AFTER TKOF TO APCH CONFIGN. AT THIS POINT WE WERE JUST IN THE TOPS OF THE HVY HAZE WITH THE SUN DIRECTLY AHEAD OF US. ALSO AT THIS POINT WE HAD REASONABLE VISIBILITY AHEAD AND ABOVE US, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN IMPOSSIBLE TO KNOW OUR EXACT LOCATION FROM LANDMARKS BELOW US. WE WERE NOW GIVEN TFC TO FOLLOW TO RWY 25 AND A L TURN TO GET BEHIND THE B737. THINGS HAD BEEN HAPPENING SO FAST THAT WE HAD NOT COMPLETED AN AFTER TKOF CHKLIST AND STILL HAD A 15 DEG BANK LIMIT ON OUR FLT GUIDANCE SYS. THE RESULT WAS A SLOWER TURN THAN ACTUALLY REQUIRED. AT THIS SAME TIME THERE APPEARED IN FRONT OF US AN ACFT THAT APPEARED TO BE TURNING INTO US FROM THE N. I CHOSE TO AVOID THE GREATER OF THE DANGERS AND STARTED A R TURN TO PASS BEHIND THE ACFT THAT WAS COMING INTO CONFLICT. VERY SHORTLY THEN I SAW THAT I WAS LOOKING AT THE BOTTOM OF THE ACFT AND THAT HE WAS TURNING AWAY FROM US INSTEAD OF INTO US. I THEN TURNED BACK TO THE L, PASSED BEHIND THE B737 WHICH AT THIS TIME I DETERMINED WAS LNDG ON RWY 25R, AND WE HAD BEEN CLRED VISUAL APCH TO RWY 25L FOLLOWING THE B737 WITH WHAT I THOUGHT WAS LESS THAN NORMAL SPACING. WE WERE NOW A LITTLE HIGH AND HAD TO USE FULL FLAP AND A RATHER STEEP APCH TO LAND ON THE L RWY, AND CHOSE THAT APCH AND LNDG RATHER THAN GET BACK INTO THE CROWDED SKY WITH THE SETTING SUN AND HAZE. WITH EVERYTHING THAT WAS HAPPENING AND THE SPD IT WAS HAPPENING ALONG WITH THE FACT OF EVERYONE'S ATTN OUTSIDE THE ACFT DUE TO VISIBILITY AND VERY TIGHT SPACING, THERE WAS A BREAKDOWN IN CREW COORD AND WE NEVER GOT ONTO TWR FREQ UNTIL AFTER LNDG. I THINK THE PROB AROSE FROM THE FACT THAT WE HAD TO GO INTO APCH CONFIGN AND MODE BEFORE WE COMPLETED THE TKOF. THE BIGGEST CONTRIBUTING FACTOR WAS THE VISIBILITY CONDITIONS IN THE LAX AREA TO THE W INTO THE SETTING SUN. I THINK ANOTHER CONTRIBUTING FACTOR IS A CREW ACCUSTOMED TO FLYING RATHER LONG LEGS WITH ADEQUATE TIME TO REVIEW, BRIEF, AND FUNCTION AS A TEAM, BEING THROWN INTO A HIGH SPD RAPIDLY CHANGING SIT IN AN AREA WITH WHICH THERE HAD BEEN NO RECENT EXPERIENCE AND UNFAMILIAR WITH THE AREA FOR A VISUAL APCH. I BELIEVE ANOTHER CONTRIBUTING FACTOR IS THE ATTEMPT BY CTLRS TO DO THE BEST JOB THEY CAN DO AND TAKE CARE OF THE TFC IN THE MOST EXPEDITIOUS WAY. IN THIS CASE, WITH THE HVY HAZE AND SETTING SUN, THEY SHOULD REVERT TO GREATER SPACING. IN LOOKING AT FACTORS AFFECTING HUMAN PERFORMANCE, I BELIEVE THERE WERE NO NEGATIVE FACTORS, THE CREW WAS RESTED, IT WAS STILL DAYLIGHT AND EVERYONE SHOULD HAVE BEEN IN A NORMAL PERFORMANCE MODE. I DID PERCEIVE AN ACFT THAT WAS GOING TO CONFLICT WITH US AND THE DECISION I MADE TO TURN R TO AVOID THE GREATER DANGER I BELIEVE TO BE A CORRECT DECISION. IN RETROSPECT THE THING I WOULD DO DIFFERENTLY AND THE THING I WOULD RECOMMEND TO ANY OTHER PLT IN HIGH SPD ACFT FLYING THIS SHORT OF A LEG WOULD BE TO REQUEST AHEAD OF TIME RADAR VECTORS TO INTERCEPT AN ILS AT LEAST 5 MI OUTSIDE THE FAF, ESPECIALLY WITH ANY KIND OF VISIBILITY RESTR. THIS WOULD ALLOW THE CREW TO WORK ALL PROCS AND CHKLISTS IN A NORMAL MANNER AND NOT BE DISTRACTED BY THINGS HAPPENING TOO FAST TO KEEP UP WITH THEIR OWN RESPONSIBILITIES AND PROVIDE THE ADVICE, INFO, AND FEEDBACK AS WE ARE TAUGHT IN CRM. THE OTHER THING I WOULD LIKE TO SUGGEST IS THAT ATC TAKE A LOOK AT PROCS, ESPECIALLY IN THE LAX BASIN, IN SPRING AND SUMMER MONTHS WHEN HVY HAZE IS A COMMON EVENT, AND SLOW THE FLOW WHEN THE VISIBILITY TO THE W DROPS TO SOME PRESELECTED DISTANCE, I WOULD CHOOSE 5 MI.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.