Narrative:

On departure from mci climbing, a KC135 tanker inbound and descending to mci was told to maintain visual separation from us after he reported us in sight. The traffic was not pointed out to us, however, we did have the KC135 in sight. We were northbound and the KC135 was swbound so he was on my side. I closely monitored the closing distance of the KC135 who did not seem to make any deviations to maintain his visual separation. Our flight paths were appearing to conflict so I continued to accelerate our aircraft to 350 KTS to pass ahead of the descending KC135, in case our altitude also converged. We did not know the altitude of the KC135 nor the altitude he was descending to. Soon we realized the KC135 had been cleared through our altitude,as we were climbing to 15000 ft. At around 11000 ft, the KC135 passed by close to our rear. Added to the dynamics of this situation was the difficulty in determining proper perspective of the KC135 with reference only of its landing lights. This is another prime example of where TCASII could have helped us determine the direction, distance, altitude and closure between us and the KC135. TCASII needs to be required in all cargo as well as military aircraft. Is the FAA going to wait again until lives are lost when a non-TCASII cargo aircraft collides with another, perhaps passenger, aircraft before they require TCASII is on these aircraft?

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OF A B727 INCREASED THEIR SPD IN DEP CLB IN ORDER TO ASSURE VISUAL SEPARATION WITH A KC135 DSNDING.

Narrative: ON DEP FROM MCI CLBING, A KC135 TANKER INBOUND AND DSNDING TO MCI WAS TOLD TO MAINTAIN VISUAL SEPARATION FROM US AFTER HE RPTED US IN SIGHT. THE TFC WAS NOT POINTED OUT TO US, HOWEVER, WE DID HAVE THE KC135 IN SIGHT. WE WERE NBOUND AND THE KC135 WAS SWBOUND SO HE WAS ON MY SIDE. I CLOSELY MONITORED THE CLOSING DISTANCE OF THE KC135 WHO DID NOT SEEM TO MAKE ANY DEVS TO MAINTAIN HIS VISUAL SEPARATION. OUR FLT PATHS WERE APPEARING TO CONFLICT SO I CONTINUED TO ACCELERATE OUR ACFT TO 350 KTS TO PASS AHEAD OF THE DSNDING KC135, IN CASE OUR ALT ALSO CONVERGED. WE DID NOT KNOW THE ALT OF THE KC135 NOR THE ALT HE WAS DSNDING TO. SOON WE REALIZED THE KC135 HAD BEEN CLRED THROUGH OUR ALT,AS WE WERE CLBING TO 15000 FT. AT AROUND 11000 FT, THE KC135 PASSED BY CLOSE TO OUR REAR. ADDED TO THE DYNAMICS OF THIS SIT WAS THE DIFFICULTY IN DETERMINING PROPER PERSPECTIVE OF THE KC135 WITH REF ONLY OF ITS LNDG LIGHTS. THIS IS ANOTHER PRIME EXAMPLE OF WHERE TCASII COULD HAVE HELPED US DETERMINE THE DIRECTION, DISTANCE, ALT AND CLOSURE BTWN US AND THE KC135. TCASII NEEDS TO BE REQUIRED IN ALL CARGO AS WELL AS MIL ACFT. IS THE FAA GOING TO WAIT AGAIN UNTIL LIVES ARE LOST WHEN A NON-TCASII CARGO ACFT COLLIDES WITH ANOTHER, PERHAPS PAX, ACFT BEFORE THEY REQUIRE TCASII IS ON THESE ACFT?

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.