37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 336171 |
Time | |
Date | 199605 |
Day | Fri |
Local Time Of Day | 1801 To 2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : gdl |
State Reference | FO |
Altitude | agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 0 |
Environment | |
Light | Night |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | MD-80 Super 80 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Navigation In Use | Other |
Flight Phase | ground : preflight |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
ASRS Report | 336171 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : commercial pilot : instrument |
Events | |
Anomaly | other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | none taken : detected after the fact |
Consequence | Other |
Supplementary | |
Air Traffic Incident | other |
Narrative:
Release fuel 25.3, requested ferry fuel 11.5 -- actual ferry fuel 11.3 -- total fuel 36.6. Aircraft was fueled to the planned climb limit weight. Part 1, section 6, paragraph 7.4.C states that the load agent will comply with the rules in paragraph a, which states in part that the dispatcher and captain have agreed to the amount. At gdl, and many other stations, the captain is the last to know about ferry fuel. Dispatcher was in complete agreement that 6000 pounds, instead of 11585 pounds, was a good amount, but the extra fuel was already on board by the time I reviewed the flight plan. WX at gdl was thunderstorms in the vicinity and for the climb out. The extra weight kept the aircraft from climbing well. It would only climb at 1000 FPM at 280 KTS. In the mid 20000 ft altitude range, anti-ice was on for the later stage of the climb. In the future, I will not hesitate to defuel when the situation dictates. Safety has a cost -- thanks.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: CAPT OF AN MD80 TOOK OFF NOT REALIZING THAT HE HAD MORE FUEL THEN REQUIRED FOR THE TRIP CAUSING A SLOWER CLB RATE THAN DESIRED FOR THE WX WHICH HE WISHED TO CLB ABOVE ASAP.
Narrative: RELEASE FUEL 25.3, REQUESTED FERRY FUEL 11.5 -- ACTUAL FERRY FUEL 11.3 -- TOTAL FUEL 36.6. ACFT WAS FUELED TO THE PLANNED CLB LIMIT WT. PART 1, SECTION 6, PARAGRAPH 7.4.C STATES THAT THE LOAD AGENT WILL COMPLY WITH THE RULES IN PARAGRAPH A, WHICH STATES IN PART THAT THE DISPATCHER AND CAPT HAVE AGREED TO THE AMOUNT. AT GDL, AND MANY OTHER STATIONS, THE CAPT IS THE LAST TO KNOW ABOUT FERRY FUEL. DISPATCHER WAS IN COMPLETE AGREEMENT THAT 6000 LBS, INSTEAD OF 11585 LBS, WAS A GOOD AMOUNT, BUT THE EXTRA FUEL WAS ALREADY ON BOARD BY THE TIME I REVIEWED THE FLT PLAN. WX AT GDL WAS TSTMS IN THE VICINITY AND FOR THE CLBOUT. THE EXTRA WT KEPT THE ACFT FROM CLBING WELL. IT WOULD ONLY CLB AT 1000 FPM AT 280 KTS. IN THE MID 20000 FT ALT RANGE, ANTI-ICE WAS ON FOR THE LATER STAGE OF THE CLB. IN THE FUTURE, I WILL NOT HESITATE TO DEFUEL WHEN THE SIT DICTATES. SAFETY HAS A COST -- THANKS.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.