Narrative:

Upon establishing communication with ny approach control in the vicinity of rober intersection, we were advised to expect ILS approach to runway 22L at jfk. When about 20 mi from the airport this was changed to ILS runway 22R. Busy time. Radios reset and new approach briefed. During vectoring inside rober the ATIS changed twice. Information valid upon commencing our descent and terminal area vectoring reported over 1 mi visibility. The latest information reported surface visibility to be '1/4 mi fog.' this was received about 15 mi from the runway. At no time did approach control advise us (or anyone else that we heard) of the RVR on either runway 22L or 22R. At about 10 mi from the airport, when established on the localizer at 2000 ft and cleared for the approach we were instructed to contact kennedy tower on 123.9. Upon checking in on this frequency we were told to contact tower on 119.1. By now we had departed 2000 ft on the GS. I had expected an RVR report from the tower upon initial contact, but none was given, only a very bored voice that cleared us to land. With the requirements to make the required radio calls, complete checklists, etc, it was not until passing 1000 ft that my mental alarm bells began ringing to the effect that we had left the final approach fix with the WX below minimums. I then said to the first officer and flight engineer, 'should we be here? Published minimums for this approach are 3/4 mi or 4000 ft RVR. Has anyone heard the RVR?' the first officer replied that this approach had been notamed requiring 5000 ft RVR. I agreed, remembering having read that and commented on the raised minimums when resetting our altimeter bugs for the changed runway. Neither the first officer nor the flight engineer could remember hearing the RVR, but aircraft ahead of us had been cleared for approachs on both runways 22L and 22R and to our knowledge no one had missed. By now we were passing 700 ft on final and still on solid instruments. I called the tower and said, 'tower, this is (call sign). I think we're illegal for this approach. What is the RVR on runway 22R?' my question evidently took the local controller by surprise, because rather than coming back with an immediate answer he said, 'err, stand by.' by this time we were just under 600 ft and quite abruptly were below the clouds with excellent visibility and a view of the entire runway and airport environment. I called the field in sight, and we landed without further incident. After leaving the aircraft, I made a beeline to the chief pilot's office to describe the approach. The chief pilot immediately called the tower supervisor and a 3-WAY conversation followed, during which I learned that because of the ht of the new tower at jfk it is quite possible for its cabin attendant to be in the clouds (which it was throughout this episode), while the actual runway conditions can be quite different. And since the prevailing visibility reported by ATIS is measured from the tower cabin attendant, the ATIS can be inaccurate. The tower supervisor had no explanation as to why we had been cleared as we had been, with no RVR or RVV information reported. I was wrong for allowing the final approach segment to be commenced without certain knowledge that sufficient visibility existed. But I would suggest that the approach and especially the local controllers were remiss in not letting the pilots know what to expect. Isn't that their obligation? As an aside, I later asked the pilot of another aircraft that had landed just behind us whether his flight had experienced any unusual circumstances regarding the ATIS/WX reporting. He replied that they had not, and when told of my situation suggested that I should learn to 'infer' the true field conditions as he had in his 30 yrs at kennedy. Since I've only been jfk based for 20 yrs (and elsewhere for the other 10) I must still have a lot to learn.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OF A LOCKHEED 1011 DEPARTED THE FINAL APCH FIX WHEN THE LATEST WX RPT INDICATED THAT THE ARPT VISIBILITY WAS BELOW LEGAL LNDG MINIMUMS. THE RPT WAS GIVEN VIA LCL ARPT ATIS WHICH IS DERIVED FROM THE TWR PERSONNEL. NO RVR VISUAL READING WAS GIVEN BY THE LCL TWR CTLR.

Narrative: UPON ESTABLISHING COM WITH NY APCH CTL IN THE VICINITY OF ROBER INTXN, WE WERE ADVISED TO EXPECT ILS APCH TO RWY 22L AT JFK. WHEN ABOUT 20 MI FROM THE ARPT THIS WAS CHANGED TO ILS RWY 22R. BUSY TIME. RADIOS RESET AND NEW APCH BRIEFED. DURING VECTORING INSIDE ROBER THE ATIS CHANGED TWICE. INFO VALID UPON COMMENCING OUR DSCNT AND TERMINAL AREA VECTORING RPTED OVER 1 MI VISIBILITY. THE LATEST INFO RPTED SURFACE VISIBILITY TO BE '1/4 MI FOG.' THIS WAS RECEIVED ABOUT 15 MI FROM THE RWY. AT NO TIME DID APCH CTL ADVISE US (OR ANYONE ELSE THAT WE HEARD) OF THE RVR ON EITHER RWY 22L OR 22R. AT ABOUT 10 MI FROM THE ARPT, WHEN ESTABLISHED ON THE LOC AT 2000 FT AND CLRED FOR THE APCH WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO CONTACT KENNEDY TWR ON 123.9. UPON CHKING IN ON THIS FREQ WE WERE TOLD TO CONTACT TWR ON 119.1. BY NOW WE HAD DEPARTED 2000 FT ON THE GS. I HAD EXPECTED AN RVR RPT FROM THE TWR UPON INITIAL CONTACT, BUT NONE WAS GIVEN, ONLY A VERY BORED VOICE THAT CLRED US TO LAND. WITH THE REQUIREMENTS TO MAKE THE REQUIRED RADIO CALLS, COMPLETE CHKLISTS, ETC, IT WAS NOT UNTIL PASSING 1000 FT THAT MY MENTAL ALARM BELLS BEGAN RINGING TO THE EFFECT THAT WE HAD LEFT THE FINAL APCH FIX WITH THE WX BELOW MINIMUMS. I THEN SAID TO THE FO AND FE, 'SHOULD WE BE HERE? PUBLISHED MINIMUMS FOR THIS APCH ARE 3/4 MI OR 4000 FT RVR. HAS ANYONE HEARD THE RVR?' THE FO REPLIED THAT THIS APCH HAD BEEN NOTAMED REQUIRING 5000 FT RVR. I AGREED, REMEMBERING HAVING READ THAT AND COMMENTED ON THE RAISED MINIMUMS WHEN RESETTING OUR ALTIMETER BUGS FOR THE CHANGED RWY. NEITHER THE FO NOR THE FE COULD REMEMBER HEARING THE RVR, BUT ACFT AHEAD OF US HAD BEEN CLRED FOR APCHS ON BOTH RWYS 22L AND 22R AND TO OUR KNOWLEDGE NO ONE HAD MISSED. BY NOW WE WERE PASSING 700 FT ON FINAL AND STILL ON SOLID INSTS. I CALLED THE TWR AND SAID, 'TWR, THIS IS (CALL SIGN). I THINK WE'RE ILLEGAL FOR THIS APCH. WHAT IS THE RVR ON RWY 22R?' MY QUESTION EVIDENTLY TOOK THE LCL CTLR BY SURPRISE, BECAUSE RATHER THAN COMING BACK WITH AN IMMEDIATE ANSWER HE SAID, 'ERR, STAND BY.' BY THIS TIME WE WERE JUST UNDER 600 FT AND QUITE ABRUPTLY WERE BELOW THE CLOUDS WITH EXCELLENT VISIBILITY AND A VIEW OF THE ENTIRE RWY AND ARPT ENVIRONMENT. I CALLED THE FIELD IN SIGHT, AND WE LANDED WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. AFTER LEAVING THE ACFT, I MADE A BEELINE TO THE CHIEF PLT'S OFFICE TO DESCRIBE THE APCH. THE CHIEF PLT IMMEDIATELY CALLED THE TWR SUPVR AND A 3-WAY CONVERSATION FOLLOWED, DURING WHICH I LEARNED THAT BECAUSE OF THE HT OF THE NEW TWR AT JFK IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE FOR ITS CAB TO BE IN THE CLOUDS (WHICH IT WAS THROUGHOUT THIS EPISODE), WHILE THE ACTUAL RWY CONDITIONS CAN BE QUITE DIFFERENT. AND SINCE THE PREVAILING VISIBILITY RPTED BY ATIS IS MEASURED FROM THE TWR CAB, THE ATIS CAN BE INACCURATE. THE TWR SUPVR HAD NO EXPLANATION AS TO WHY WE HAD BEEN CLRED AS WE HAD BEEN, WITH NO RVR OR RVV INFO RPTED. I WAS WRONG FOR ALLOWING THE FINAL APCH SEGMENT TO BE COMMENCED WITHOUT CERTAIN KNOWLEDGE THAT SUFFICIENT VISIBILITY EXISTED. BUT I WOULD SUGGEST THAT THE APCH AND ESPECIALLY THE LCL CTLRS WERE REMISS IN NOT LETTING THE PLTS KNOW WHAT TO EXPECT. ISN'T THAT THEIR OBLIGATION? AS AN ASIDE, I LATER ASKED THE PLT OF ANOTHER ACFT THAT HAD LANDED JUST BEHIND US WHETHER HIS FLT HAD EXPERIENCED ANY UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCES REGARDING THE ATIS/WX RPTING. HE REPLIED THAT THEY HAD NOT, AND WHEN TOLD OF MY SIT SUGGESTED THAT I SHOULD LEARN TO 'INFER' THE TRUE FIELD CONDITIONS AS HE HAD IN HIS 30 YRS AT KENNEDY. SINCE I'VE ONLY BEEN JFK BASED FOR 20 YRS (AND ELSEWHERE FOR THE OTHER 10) I MUST STILL HAVE A LOT TO LEARN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.