Narrative:

On the morning of jul/xx/96, I was advised by our engineering department that raft assemblies installed on 3 separate airplanes had been incorrectly assembled and were in danger of possible uncommanded inflation. These 3 airplanes were stopped and directives assigned to the faulty slides and quarantine until personnel could defuse. Our MEL allows for rafts to be 'inoperative' but not removal, addressing this situation for the airplanes to continue revenue flight would then require an engineering variation authority/authorized (eva). This authority/authorized was authority/authorized by our engineering department with weight and balance adjustments made accordingly through our operations engine department. The airplane continued in revenue service, restr to non overwater status until replacement slides could be installed. My main concern was to secure the rafts before another inadvertent raft deployment occurred, safety of customers and fellow employees, as well as possible damage to the aircraft overhead. (Note -- 2 rafts had already deployed inadvertently.) upon returning the next day I was advised the issuance of eva's for this condition was improper. Further inquiry indicated the director of engineering felt this is a 'grey' area in that an eva cannot be written to cover a MEL item but the MEL does not cover, in this case, removal of this equipment. This was idented the previous afternoon with the airplanes allowed to remain in service even though the question arose. In discussion with the director of engineering, he felt our manual was in need of clarification and did not warrant stopping the airplanes. I felt we had acted properly, complying with regulations as written. If, in fact, it is determined this particular incident was handled improperly, I will aggressively pursue clarification of our manuals. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated that this matter has been satisfied since the director of engineering agreed that the engineering variance was the appropriate way to remove the affected rafts and continue non overwater operations. He further stated that there were only 3 airplanes that had to be interrupted in service to remove 1 of the 4 rafts installed. The company maintenance manual covering the life rafts will be revised to clarify the definite procedures in handling the raft removal that was not perfectly clear as indicated in the MEL.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A COMPANY MAINT ENGINEERING TECHNICIAN ISSUED ENGINEERING VARIANCE TO REMOVE DEFECTIVE LIFE RAFTS FROM THE ACFT, AND YET ALLOW THE ACFT TO REMAIN IN SVC EXCLUDING OVERWATER FLTS. THE NEXT DAY THE DIRECTOR OF MAINT QUESTIONED THIS PROC.

Narrative: ON THE MORNING OF JUL/XX/96, I WAS ADVISED BY OUR ENGINEERING DEPT THAT RAFT ASSEMBLIES INSTALLED ON 3 SEPARATE AIRPLANES HAD BEEN INCORRECTLY ASSEMBLED AND WERE IN DANGER OF POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED INFLATION. THESE 3 AIRPLANES WERE STOPPED AND DIRECTIVES ASSIGNED TO THE FAULTY SLIDES AND QUARANTINE UNTIL PERSONNEL COULD DEFUSE. OUR MEL ALLOWS FOR RAFTS TO BE 'INOP' BUT NOT REMOVAL, ADDRESSING THIS SIT FOR THE AIRPLANES TO CONTINUE REVENUE FLT WOULD THEN REQUIRE AN ENGINEERING VARIATION AUTH (EVA). THIS AUTH WAS AUTH BY OUR ENGINEERING DEPT WITH WT AND BAL ADJUSTMENTS MADE ACCORDINGLY THROUGH OUR OPS ENG DEPT. THE AIRPLANE CONTINUED IN REVENUE SVC, RESTR TO NON OVERWATER STATUS UNTIL REPLACEMENT SLIDES COULD BE INSTALLED. MY MAIN CONCERN WAS TO SECURE THE RAFTS BEFORE ANOTHER INADVERTENT RAFT DEPLOYMENT OCCURRED, SAFETY OF CUSTOMERS AND FELLOW EMPLOYEES, AS WELL AS POSSIBLE DAMAGE TO THE ACFT OVERHEAD. (NOTE -- 2 RAFTS HAD ALREADY DEPLOYED INADVERTENTLY.) UPON RETURNING THE NEXT DAY I WAS ADVISED THE ISSUANCE OF EVA'S FOR THIS CONDITION WAS IMPROPER. FURTHER INQUIRY INDICATED THE DIRECTOR OF ENGINEERING FELT THIS IS A 'GREY' AREA IN THAT AN EVA CANNOT BE WRITTEN TO COVER A MEL ITEM BUT THE MEL DOES NOT COVER, IN THIS CASE, REMOVAL OF THIS EQUIP. THIS WAS IDENTED THE PREVIOUS AFTERNOON WITH THE AIRPLANES ALLOWED TO REMAIN IN SVC EVEN THOUGH THE QUESTION AROSE. IN DISCUSSION WITH THE DIRECTOR OF ENGINEERING, HE FELT OUR MANUAL WAS IN NEED OF CLARIFICATION AND DID NOT WARRANT STOPPING THE AIRPLANES. I FELT WE HAD ACTED PROPERLY, COMPLYING WITH REGS AS WRITTEN. IF, IN FACT, IT IS DETERMINED THIS PARTICULAR INCIDENT WAS HANDLED IMPROPERLY, I WILL AGGRESSIVELY PURSUE CLARIFICATION OF OUR MANUALS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT THIS MATTER HAS BEEN SATISFIED SINCE THE DIRECTOR OF ENGINEERING AGREED THAT THE ENGINEERING VARIANCE WAS THE APPROPRIATE WAY TO REMOVE THE AFFECTED RAFTS AND CONTINUE NON OVERWATER OPS. HE FURTHER STATED THAT THERE WERE ONLY 3 AIRPLANES THAT HAD TO BE INTERRUPTED IN SVC TO REMOVE 1 OF THE 4 RAFTS INSTALLED. THE COMPANY MAINT MANUAL COVERING THE LIFE RAFTS WILL BE REVISED TO CLARIFY THE DEFINITE PROCS IN HANDLING THE RAFT REMOVAL THAT WAS NOT PERFECTLY CLR AS INDICATED IN THE MEL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.