Narrative:

I am a first officer for a commuter airline that operates throughout southern california, to and from lax. I am currently assigned to the british aerospace model JS3201 (jetstream). This report involves a runway incursion by our aircraft after landing at lax. The chain of events are as follows: we were on a routine flight from oxr to lax on jul/xx/96. We conducted a visual approach to runway 24R at lax. When landing on runway 24R, there is a point where we normally exit the runway. It is one exit off the runway that branches into 2 txwys: taxiway Z (referred to as the 'forward high- speed'), and taxiway Y (referred to as the 'reverse high- speed'). On jul/yy/96, our instructions after landing on runway 24R were as follows: '(aircraft call sign), reverse high-speed approved, hold short of runway 24L.' this is a common instruction after landing on runway 24R, as runway 24L is the departing runway. As we were rolling out, I repeated the hold short instruction back to the tower controller. We made the turn onto the reverse high-speed taxiway (taxiway Y), and the captain advanced the power levers as if to cross runway 24L. I immediately said 'are we cleared across?' thinking I may have missed another instruction by the tower controller to cross runway 24L. The captain immediately applied the brakes, and stopped the aircraft, saying nothing. While we hadn't actually gone onto runway 24L, most of our aircraft had crossed the hold short lines. As the captain was bringing the aircraft to a stop just prior to going onto runway 24L, I looked to the left, only to southeast a fairchild metroliner on its takeoff roll on runway 24L, approximately 500-1000 ft down the runway. The event was discovered by my looking up to see the captain advancing the power levers as if to cross runway 24L. The corrective action was my asking the captain if we had been cleared across runway 24L, prompting him to immediately stop the aircraft. While there was no consequence as a result of our actions, I feel that this was a potentially disastrous situation. I'm not quite sure what factors may have affected human performance, other than just inattn on the captain's part. Possibly the events that occur after landing could be a contributing factor. After we land in the jetstream, several things happen. If the first officer is the PF (which I was), as we decelerate through 70 KTS, the first officer transfers control of the aircraft back to the captain, and retards the speed levers to 'low RPM.' when I read back the hold short instruction on this day, I had already transferred control of the aircraft back to the captain, and he was signaling with his hand to retard the speed levers. Since he was making this hand signal, and slowing the aircraft to exit the runway at the same time I was reading back the hold short instruction, I'm not sure how well he heard the tower controller's instructions. Fatigue may also have played a part, as we were on the 5TH leg of a 7-LEG day, that started at XA25 am, and was to end at XK15 pm (this event happened at XH44 pm).

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RPTR FO HAD RECEIVED TWR INSTRUCTIONS TO HOLD SHORT OF PARALLEL TXWY AFTER CLRING THEIR LNDG RWY. CAPT STARTED TO CROSS THE PARALLEL, BUT RPTR QUESTIONED IF THEY HAD BEEN CLRED. THE CAPT STOPPED, BUT BEYOND THE HOLD LINE JUST AS AN ACFT WAS TKOF ROLL ON THAT RWY. FLC HAD BEEN ON A 7 LEG, 11 HR DAY AND RPTR ATTRIBUTES LACK OF HEARING INSTRUCTIONS TO FATIGUE.

Narrative: I AM A FO FOR A COMMUTER AIRLINE THAT OPERATES THROUGHOUT SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, TO AND FROM LAX. I AM CURRENTLY ASSIGNED TO THE BRITISH AEROSPACE MODEL JS3201 (JETSTREAM). THIS RPT INVOLVES A RWY INCURSION BY OUR ACFT AFTER LNDG AT LAX. THE CHAIN OF EVENTS ARE AS FOLLOWS: WE WERE ON A ROUTINE FLT FROM OXR TO LAX ON JUL/XX/96. WE CONDUCTED A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 24R AT LAX. WHEN LNDG ON RWY 24R, THERE IS A POINT WHERE WE NORMALLY EXIT THE RWY. IT IS ONE EXIT OFF THE RWY THAT BRANCHES INTO 2 TXWYS: TXWY Z (REFERRED TO AS THE 'FORWARD HIGH- SPD'), AND TXWY Y (REFERRED TO AS THE 'REVERSE HIGH- SPD'). ON JUL/YY/96, OUR INSTRUCTIONS AFTER LNDG ON RWY 24R WERE AS FOLLOWS: '(ACFT CALL SIGN), REVERSE HIGH-SPD APPROVED, HOLD SHORT OF RWY 24L.' THIS IS A COMMON INSTRUCTION AFTER LNDG ON RWY 24R, AS RWY 24L IS THE DEPARTING RWY. AS WE WERE ROLLING OUT, I REPEATED THE HOLD SHORT INSTRUCTION BACK TO THE TWR CTLR. WE MADE THE TURN ONTO THE REVERSE HIGH-SPD TXWY (TXWY Y), AND THE CAPT ADVANCED THE PWR LEVERS AS IF TO CROSS RWY 24L. I IMMEDIATELY SAID 'ARE WE CLRED ACROSS?' THINKING I MAY HAVE MISSED ANOTHER INSTRUCTION BY THE TWR CTLR TO CROSS RWY 24L. THE CAPT IMMEDIATELY APPLIED THE BRAKES, AND STOPPED THE ACFT, SAYING NOTHING. WHILE WE HADN'T ACTUALLY GONE ONTO RWY 24L, MOST OF OUR ACFT HAD CROSSED THE HOLD SHORT LINES. AS THE CAPT WAS BRINGING THE ACFT TO A STOP JUST PRIOR TO GOING ONTO RWY 24L, I LOOKED TO THE L, ONLY TO SE A FAIRCHILD METROLINER ON ITS TKOF ROLL ON RWY 24L, APPROX 500-1000 FT DOWN THE RWY. THE EVENT WAS DISCOVERED BY MY LOOKING UP TO SEE THE CAPT ADVANCING THE PWR LEVERS AS IF TO CROSS RWY 24L. THE CORRECTIVE ACTION WAS MY ASKING THE CAPT IF WE HAD BEEN CLRED ACROSS RWY 24L, PROMPTING HIM TO IMMEDIATELY STOP THE ACFT. WHILE THERE WAS NO CONSEQUENCE AS A RESULT OF OUR ACTIONS, I FEEL THAT THIS WAS A POTENTIALLY DISASTROUS SIT. I'M NOT QUITE SURE WHAT FACTORS MAY HAVE AFFECTED HUMAN PERFORMANCE, OTHER THAN JUST INATTN ON THE CAPT'S PART. POSSIBLY THE EVENTS THAT OCCUR AFTER LNDG COULD BE A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR. AFTER WE LAND IN THE JETSTREAM, SEVERAL THINGS HAPPEN. IF THE FO IS THE PF (WHICH I WAS), AS WE DECELERATE THROUGH 70 KTS, THE FO TRANSFERS CTL OF THE ACFT BACK TO THE CAPT, AND RETARDS THE SPD LEVERS TO 'LOW RPM.' WHEN I READ BACK THE HOLD SHORT INSTRUCTION ON THIS DAY, I HAD ALREADY TRANSFERRED CTL OF THE ACFT BACK TO THE CAPT, AND HE WAS SIGNALING WITH HIS HAND TO RETARD THE SPD LEVERS. SINCE HE WAS MAKING THIS HAND SIGNAL, AND SLOWING THE ACFT TO EXIT THE RWY AT THE SAME TIME I WAS READING BACK THE HOLD SHORT INSTRUCTION, I'M NOT SURE HOW WELL HE HEARD THE TWR CTLR'S INSTRUCTIONS. FATIGUE MAY ALSO HAVE PLAYED A PART, AS WE WERE ON THE 5TH LEG OF A 7-LEG DAY, THAT STARTED AT XA25 AM, AND WAS TO END AT XK15 PM (THIS EVENT HAPPENED AT XH44 PM).

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.