Narrative:

Showed up at aircraft 30 mins prior to departure. Aircraft had maintenance and we took a 25 min delay out of pit. Temperature on the ramp at pit was about 80 degrees F with the cockpit and cabin temperature running 34 degrees and 32 degrees C, respectively. APU was inoperative so there was no ground cooling. Upon engine start, the left engine did not have light off so we aborted the start utilizing the required memory items. Second start was ok. On taxi out, I checked the cabin and cockpit temperature, with the cabin cooling down normally but the cockpit temperature was still 31 degrees C -- much higher than normal. In-flight, crew decided to board people at tol with right engine running which is not a normal procedure. Reviewed the checklist and coordinated with flight and ground crews as required. Departing tol, we started the right engine using a ground power unit (gpu) as planned, but its power was insufficient for our aircraft and it dumped our display units. Went to abort start, but indications came back and engine indications were within limits. Boarded passenger and started left engine. During start, I noticed it was rising rapidly, most likely due to strong wind (20-25 KTS) up the tailpipe. I called for abort and noticed captain was already in the process of shutting down the engine. However, the condition lever bound up and the engine overtemped. We decided to turn aircraft into the wind, and second engine start was normal. Upon return to pit, captain reported problem to maintenance. The problem is we failed to refer to the 'hot start' emergency checklist in tol. This checklist requires we contact maintenance after a hot start. Looking back, this was purely poor judgement on both flight crew. A contributing factor was the high heat in the cockpit. The aircraft had no APU and the cockpit pack was not working normally. Combine this with a glass cockpit and flying into the sun and we were subjected to poor conditions for over 2 hours. I feel this affected our judgement, although both crew members were experienced and should have performed better. The lesson learned here is follow established procedures, especially under poor conditions.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACFT EQUIP PROB. ENG HOT START. FLC TURNED ACFT INTO THE WIND AND RESTARTED, BUT FAILED TO COMPLETE THE 'HOT START' EMER CHKLIST. HAD THEY DONE THAT CHKLIST, THEY WOULD HAVE NOTED THE REQUIREMENT TO CONTACT MAINT AFTER A HOT START.

Narrative: SHOWED UP AT ACFT 30 MINS PRIOR TO DEP. ACFT HAD MAINT AND WE TOOK A 25 MIN DELAY OUT OF PIT. TEMP ON THE RAMP AT PIT WAS ABOUT 80 DEGS F WITH THE COCKPIT AND CABIN TEMP RUNNING 34 DEGS AND 32 DEGS C, RESPECTIVELY. APU WAS INOP SO THERE WAS NO GND COOLING. UPON ENG START, THE L ENG DID NOT HAVE LIGHT OFF SO WE ABORTED THE START UTILIZING THE REQUIRED MEMORY ITEMS. SECOND START WAS OK. ON TAXI OUT, I CHKED THE CABIN AND COCKPIT TEMP, WITH THE CABIN COOLING DOWN NORMALLY BUT THE COCKPIT TEMP WAS STILL 31 DEGS C -- MUCH HIGHER THAN NORMAL. INFLT, CREW DECIDED TO BOARD PEOPLE AT TOL WITH R ENG RUNNING WHICH IS NOT A NORMAL PROC. REVIEWED THE CHKLIST AND COORDINATED WITH FLT AND GND CREWS AS REQUIRED. DEPARTING TOL, WE STARTED THE R ENG USING A GND PWR UNIT (GPU) AS PLANNED, BUT ITS PWR WAS INSUFFICIENT FOR OUR ACFT AND IT DUMPED OUR DISPLAY UNITS. WENT TO ABORT START, BUT INDICATIONS CAME BACK AND ENG INDICATIONS WERE WITHIN LIMITS. BOARDED PAX AND STARTED L ENG. DURING START, I NOTICED IT WAS RISING RAPIDLY, MOST LIKELY DUE TO STRONG WIND (20-25 KTS) UP THE TAILPIPE. I CALLED FOR ABORT AND NOTICED CAPT WAS ALREADY IN THE PROCESS OF SHUTTING DOWN THE ENG. HOWEVER, THE CONDITION LEVER BOUND UP AND THE ENG OVERTEMPED. WE DECIDED TO TURN ACFT INTO THE WIND, AND SECOND ENG START WAS NORMAL. UPON RETURN TO PIT, CAPT RPTED PROB TO MAINT. THE PROB IS WE FAILED TO REFER TO THE 'HOT START' EMER CHKLIST IN TOL. THIS CHKLIST REQUIRES WE CONTACT MAINT AFTER A HOT START. LOOKING BACK, THIS WAS PURELY POOR JUDGEMENT ON BOTH FLC. A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR WAS THE HIGH HEAT IN THE COCKPIT. THE ACFT HAD NO APU AND THE COCKPIT PACK WAS NOT WORKING NORMALLY. COMBINE THIS WITH A GLASS COCKPIT AND FLYING INTO THE SUN AND WE WERE SUBJECTED TO POOR CONDITIONS FOR OVER 2 HRS. I FEEL THIS AFFECTED OUR JUDGEMENT, ALTHOUGH BOTH CREW MEMBERS WERE EXPERIENCED AND SHOULD HAVE PERFORMED BETTER. THE LESSON LEARNED HERE IS FOLLOW ESTABLISHED PROCS, ESPECIALLY UNDER POOR CONDITIONS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.