Narrative:

I received the aircraft with the rudder limiter MEL deferred inoperative. This places a maximum 180 KIAS restr on the operation of the aircraft. I complied with this restr at all times while I was operating the aircraft. When the next crew took over the aircraft from me, they noticed that when the trend monitoring was done earlier in the day, it was done at 206 KIAS. I did not record this information -- it was a previous crew. I did, however, fail to notice that this parameter was exceeded. When the next crew took the aircraft from me and noticed the problem, they had the aircraft grounded. The manufacturer got involved and most certainly the feds did too! Several flts were delayed while the aircraft underwent an inspection. The bottom line is that I flew an aircraft that needed an inspection. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the flight crew that operated the aircraft and exceeded MEL limitations, before this reporter flew the aircraft, was aware of the MEL airspeed limitation, but also knew that the system had been deferred as a result of the comparator (which compares the standby airspeed indicator to the air data computer airspeed) and not the actual rudder limiter. The individual who had originally written up the problem (a company check airman) just happened to be riding in the jumpseat at the time that the trend information was to be taken. The check airman was knowledgeable of the actual malfunction because he troubleshot the system per the abnormal checklist when he first received the associated master caution and rudder limiter center warning panel lights. The check airman advised the flight crew to take the trend information using the normal power settings. The reporter states that the way that the MEL is set up for the rudder limiter, it doesn't distinguish between problems, it requires the deferral of the whole system. So, even though everyone knew what the actual problem entailed, they still were in violation of FARS because they acted against the MEL conditions and limitations. Reporter, a company instructor pilot, states that the pilots involved were given 2 hours of training and discussion in lieu of any FAA enforcement action. This reporter also states that since this occurrence, the company is looking into preventive measures. 2 proposals are in the making: any MEL limitations involving the airspeed at which the aircraft is operated may also require a chartreuse placard on the airspeed indicator. Also, the company may re-address the appropriateness of placing the rudder limiter on category C MEL (can be deferred for 10 days). Reporter feels that it was too easy to exceed the airspeed limits when operating at approximately one fourth of the normal power. This exceedance occurred on day #8 of the deferral period and stood out from other possible infractions because it left a paper trail.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN SF34 FLC EXCEEDED MEL AIRSPD LIMITATIONS IN ORDER TO RECORD TREND INFO. THE FLC HAD BEEN ADVISED BY A CHK AIRMAN WHO WAS ON THE JUMPSEAT, THAT THE ITEM ONLY INVOLVED PART OF THE WARNING SYS AND NOT THE ACTUAL MECHANICAL OP OF THE ENTIRE SYS WHICH WAS ON DEFERRAL. THIS RPTR, A CAPT, FLEW THE ACFT AFTER THE LIMITATIONS HAD BEEN EXCEEDED -- FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THE PROB, AND TO FIRST HAVE THE ACFT INSPECTED.

Narrative: I RECEIVED THE ACFT WITH THE RUDDER LIMITER MEL DEFERRED INOP. THIS PLACES A MAX 180 KIAS RESTR ON THE OP OF THE ACFT. I COMPLIED WITH THIS RESTR AT ALL TIMES WHILE I WAS OPERATING THE ACFT. WHEN THE NEXT CREW TOOK OVER THE ACFT FROM ME, THEY NOTICED THAT WHEN THE TREND MONITORING WAS DONE EARLIER IN THE DAY, IT WAS DONE AT 206 KIAS. I DID NOT RECORD THIS INFO -- IT WAS A PREVIOUS CREW. I DID, HOWEVER, FAIL TO NOTICE THAT THIS PARAMETER WAS EXCEEDED. WHEN THE NEXT CREW TOOK THE ACFT FROM ME AND NOTICED THE PROB, THEY HAD THE ACFT GNDED. THE MANUFACTURER GOT INVOLVED AND MOST CERTAINLY THE FEDS DID TOO! SEVERAL FLTS WERE DELAYED WHILE THE ACFT UNDERWENT AN INSPECTION. THE BOTTOM LINE IS THAT I FLEW AN ACFT THAT NEEDED AN INSPECTION. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE FLC THAT OPERATED THE ACFT AND EXCEEDED MEL LIMITATIONS, BEFORE THIS RPTR FLEW THE ACFT, WAS AWARE OF THE MEL AIRSPD LIMITATION, BUT ALSO KNEW THAT THE SYS HAD BEEN DEFERRED AS A RESULT OF THE COMPARATOR (WHICH COMPARES THE STANDBY AIRSPD INDICATOR TO THE AIR DATA COMPUTER AIRSPD) AND NOT THE ACTUAL RUDDER LIMITER. THE INDIVIDUAL WHO HAD ORIGINALLY WRITTEN UP THE PROB (A COMPANY CHK AIRMAN) JUST HAPPENED TO BE RIDING IN THE JUMPSEAT AT THE TIME THAT THE TREND INFO WAS TO BE TAKEN. THE CHK AIRMAN WAS KNOWLEDGEABLE OF THE ACTUAL MALFUNCTION BECAUSE HE TROUBLESHOT THE SYS PER THE ABNORMAL CHKLIST WHEN HE FIRST RECEIVED THE ASSOCIATED MASTER CAUTION AND RUDDER LIMITER CTR WARNING PANEL LIGHTS. THE CHK AIRMAN ADVISED THE FLC TO TAKE THE TREND INFO USING THE NORMAL PWR SETTINGS. THE RPTR STATES THAT THE WAY THAT THE MEL IS SET UP FOR THE RUDDER LIMITER, IT DOESN'T DISTINGUISH BTWN PROBS, IT REQUIRES THE DEFERRAL OF THE WHOLE SYS. SO, EVEN THOUGH EVERYONE KNEW WHAT THE ACTUAL PROB ENTAILED, THEY STILL WERE IN VIOLATION OF FARS BECAUSE THEY ACTED AGAINST THE MEL CONDITIONS AND LIMITATIONS. RPTR, A COMPANY INSTRUCTOR PLT, STATES THAT THE PLTS INVOLVED WERE GIVEN 2 HRS OF TRAINING AND DISCUSSION IN LIEU OF ANY FAA ENFORCEMENT ACTION. THIS RPTR ALSO STATES THAT SINCE THIS OCCURRENCE, THE COMPANY IS LOOKING INTO PREVENTIVE MEASURES. 2 PROPOSALS ARE IN THE MAKING: ANY MEL LIMITATIONS INVOLVING THE AIRSPD AT WHICH THE ACFT IS OPERATED MAY ALSO REQUIRE A CHARTREUSE PLACARD ON THE AIRSPD INDICATOR. ALSO, THE COMPANY MAY RE-ADDRESS THE APPROPRIATENESS OF PLACING THE RUDDER LIMITER ON CATEGORY C MEL (CAN BE DEFERRED FOR 10 DAYS). RPTR FEELS THAT IT WAS TOO EASY TO EXCEED THE AIRSPD LIMITS WHEN OPERATING AT APPROX ONE FOURTH OF THE NORMAL PWR. THIS EXCEEDANCE OCCURRED ON DAY #8 OF THE DEFERRAL PERIOD AND STOOD OUT FROM OTHER POSSIBLE INFRACTIONS BECAUSE IT LEFT A PAPER TRAIL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.