Narrative:

On descent into stl we were told to expect visual approach runway 12L. We briefed the lda just in case we were cleared for it instead. I was the PNF and heard the approach controllers give this to other aircraft. While on a vector to the final course, we were told to look for a converging air carrier DC9. It was 6 mi out that we were told we were really flying the lda. The clouds were scattered but at 4000-2200 ft AGL they were dense enough that we did not see the other aircraft until we were 1/2 mi and was concerned that it was lower than us we may not keep the visual contact. Our controller gave us a late turn to intercept the final resulting in an overshoot and flying 1000 ft above, the captain not being able to see the aircraft to our right. Our TCASII gave us an RA to climb. I had the conflict visually so we continued the approach. If the localizer runway 12L course is followed, the runway intercept point is approximately 200 ft AGL and the captain also commented on how uncomfortable he felt flying this approach. You can't have an appreciation for this by seeing it on paper until you do it with another aircraft on your wing, marginal VMC, being surprised by the type approach it is. I feel that this procedure is unsafe and should be stopped. I will not accept this approach if given it again and recommend this to my fellow pilots. It should especially not be incorporated into the precision runway monitor program now under consideration. I tried to notify the controllers on the ground but was unable to find a telephone number. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter was flying a B737-300 when they were cleared for the approach, but the controller would not specify which to runway 12L. The reporter said that the controller would only ask if the flight crew could see the DC9 or the airport. Finally at about 6 DME, according to the reporter, the controller said that they were cleared for the lda runway 12L approach. The first officer said that he was fairly new to the aircraft, but the captain was highly experienced and he expressed his discomfort with the situation. The reporter said that he was on a committee that was working on an lda approach at another airport in cooperation with the FAA and that approach and its procedure were good. The approach at stl was not, in his opinion, being operated to acceptable standards. He said that the controller seemed to think that they were in better visibility than they were and the controller did not make a decision on which approach to use until beyond the FAF for that approach.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR FLC WAS TOLD TO EXPECT A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 12L, BUT AS THEY TURNED ONTO THE LOC FROM A VECTOR (OVERSHOOTING FROM A LATE TURN-ON) THE CTLR WOULD NOT COMMIT TO WHAT TYPE OF APCH THEY WOULD USE. FINALLY, INSIDE THE FAF THEY WERE CLRED FOR THE LDA TO RWY 12L.

Narrative: ON DSCNT INTO STL WE WERE TOLD TO EXPECT VISUAL APCH RWY 12L. WE BRIEFED THE LDA JUST IN CASE WE WERE CLRED FOR IT INSTEAD. I WAS THE PNF AND HEARD THE APCH CTLRS GIVE THIS TO OTHER ACFT. WHILE ON A VECTOR TO THE FINAL COURSE, WE WERE TOLD TO LOOK FOR A CONVERGING ACR DC9. IT WAS 6 MI OUT THAT WE WERE TOLD WE WERE REALLY FLYING THE LDA. THE CLOUDS WERE SCATTERED BUT AT 4000-2200 FT AGL THEY WERE DENSE ENOUGH THAT WE DID NOT SEE THE OTHER ACFT UNTIL WE WERE 1/2 MI AND WAS CONCERNED THAT IT WAS LOWER THAN US WE MAY NOT KEEP THE VISUAL CONTACT. OUR CTLR GAVE US A LATE TURN TO INTERCEPT THE FINAL RESULTING IN AN OVERSHOOT AND FLYING 1000 FT ABOVE, THE CAPT NOT BEING ABLE TO SEE THE ACFT TO OUR R. OUR TCASII GAVE US AN RA TO CLB. I HAD THE CONFLICT VISUALLY SO WE CONTINUED THE APCH. IF THE LOC RWY 12L COURSE IS FOLLOWED, THE RWY INTERCEPT POINT IS APPROX 200 FT AGL AND THE CAPT ALSO COMMENTED ON HOW UNCOMFORTABLE HE FELT FLYING THIS APCH. YOU CAN'T HAVE AN APPRECIATION FOR THIS BY SEEING IT ON PAPER UNTIL YOU DO IT WITH ANOTHER ACFT ON YOUR WING, MARGINAL VMC, BEING SURPRISED BY THE TYPE APCH IT IS. I FEEL THAT THIS PROC IS UNSAFE AND SHOULD BE STOPPED. I WILL NOT ACCEPT THIS APCH IF GIVEN IT AGAIN AND RECOMMEND THIS TO MY FELLOW PLTS. IT SHOULD ESPECIALLY NOT BE INCORPORATED INTO THE PRECISION RWY MONITOR PROGRAM NOW UNDER CONSIDERATION. I TRIED TO NOTIFY THE CTLRS ON THE GND BUT WAS UNABLE TO FIND A TELEPHONE NUMBER. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR WAS FLYING A B737-300 WHEN THEY WERE CLRED FOR THE APCH, BUT THE CTLR WOULD NOT SPECIFY WHICH TO RWY 12L. THE RPTR SAID THAT THE CTLR WOULD ONLY ASK IF THE FLC COULD SEE THE DC9 OR THE ARPT. FINALLY AT ABOUT 6 DME, ACCORDING TO THE RPTR, THE CTLR SAID THAT THEY WERE CLRED FOR THE LDA RWY 12L APCH. THE FO SAID THAT HE WAS FAIRLY NEW TO THE ACFT, BUT THE CAPT WAS HIGHLY EXPERIENCED AND HE EXPRESSED HIS DISCOMFORT WITH THE SIT. THE RPTR SAID THAT HE WAS ON A COMMITTEE THAT WAS WORKING ON AN LDA APCH AT ANOTHER ARPT IN COOPERATION WITH THE FAA AND THAT APCH AND ITS PROC WERE GOOD. THE APCH AT STL WAS NOT, IN HIS OPINION, BEING OPERATED TO ACCEPTABLE STANDARDS. HE SAID THAT THE CTLR SEEMED TO THINK THAT THEY WERE IN BETTER VISIBILITY THAN THEY WERE AND THE CTLR DID NOT MAKE A DECISION ON WHICH APCH TO USE UNTIL BEYOND THE FAF FOR THAT APCH.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.