Narrative:

Crew had previously arrived at dulles 1 hour prior from providence, and were told we were to fly same aircraft to manchester and to park at gate. Dulles at XA40, I was first crew member back to the aircraft and was unaware aircraft had been moved slightly by ramp personnel using a tug which required the use of a nose gear pin being inserted up in the wheelwell. I performed a standard and thorough through flight outside visual inspection tires, as well as all lower extremities of the aircraft. Evidently, ramp personnel inserted the nose gear pin in the wheelwell without a 'remove before flight' red flag attached. Consequently I did not see the pin, and I possibly mistook it for gear armature. The captain next arrived at the aircraft and also performed a thorough preflight inspection for a 'through flight.' he did not see the gear pin either. Normally, ramp personnel are supposed to inform crew that the aircraft was moved and they were supposed to remove the pin after it was moved. On a 'through flight' visual inspection, neither of us was looking for a nose gear pin 6 inches long with no flag attached. We were cleared for takeoff on runway 19L and, after rotation and 'gear-up' call, crew noticed red light indication on nose gear, indicating nose gear had not fully retracted. The captain declared an emergency with dulles tower and I landed the aircraft safely and uneventfully with all gear down and locked. We returned to the gate with maintenance personnel standing by. A company maintenance supervisor pulled the pin out of the nose gear, showed it to us, and informed us that the pin should have had a flag attached and that appropriate disciplinary action was to be taken against the person who failed to remove it under his supervision. It appears the chain of events that led up to the problem could have been prevented had ramp personnel communicated their previous actions to the pilot crew. However, to prevent further occurrences like this recommend the following: that the crew should not assume that just because it is a 'through flight,' the aircraft has not been moved or had other things done to it by ramp personnel who might inadvertently fail to notify the crew. Visual preflight inspection on through flts should include the use of a flashlight to visually inspect wheelwells for pins which may have no red flags attached. If it happened to us, it can certainly happen again.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC TO TURN AROUND IN THE SAME ACFT. MAINT REPOSITIONED ACFT AT THE GATE AND FAILED TO NOTIFY THE CREW NOSE GEAR PINS WERE INSTALLED. UNABLE TO RAISE THE GEAR AND RETURNED TO IAD. MAINT REMOVED GEAR PINS. EMER DECLARED.

Narrative: CREW HAD PREVIOUSLY ARRIVED AT DULLES 1 HR PRIOR FROM PROVIDENCE, AND WERE TOLD WE WERE TO FLY SAME ACFT TO MANCHESTER AND TO PARK AT GATE. DULLES AT XA40, I WAS FIRST CREW MEMBER BACK TO THE ACFT AND WAS UNAWARE ACFT HAD BEEN MOVED SLIGHTLY BY RAMP PERSONNEL USING A TUG WHICH REQUIRED THE USE OF A NOSE GEAR PIN BEING INSERTED UP IN THE WHEELWELL. I PERFORMED A STANDARD AND THOROUGH THROUGH FLT OUTSIDE VISUAL INSPECTION TIRES, AS WELL AS ALL LOWER EXTREMITIES OF THE ACFT. EVIDENTLY, RAMP PERSONNEL INSERTED THE NOSE GEAR PIN IN THE WHEELWELL WITHOUT A 'REMOVE BEFORE FLT' RED FLAG ATTACHED. CONSEQUENTLY I DID NOT SEE THE PIN, AND I POSSIBLY MISTOOK IT FOR GEAR ARMATURE. THE CAPT NEXT ARRIVED AT THE ACFT AND ALSO PERFORMED A THOROUGH PREFLT INSPECTION FOR A 'THROUGH FLT.' HE DID NOT SEE THE GEAR PIN EITHER. NORMALLY, RAMP PERSONNEL ARE SUPPOSED TO INFORM CREW THAT THE ACFT WAS MOVED AND THEY WERE SUPPOSED TO REMOVE THE PIN AFTER IT WAS MOVED. ON A 'THROUGH FLT' VISUAL INSPECTION, NEITHER OF US WAS LOOKING FOR A NOSE GEAR PIN 6 INCHES LONG WITH NO FLAG ATTACHED. WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF ON RWY 19L AND, AFTER ROTATION AND 'GEAR-UP' CALL, CREW NOTICED RED LIGHT INDICATION ON NOSE GEAR, INDICATING NOSE GEAR HAD NOT FULLY RETRACTED. THE CAPT DECLARED AN EMER WITH DULLES TWR AND I LANDED THE ACFT SAFELY AND UNEVENTFULLY WITH ALL GEAR DOWN AND LOCKED. WE RETURNED TO THE GATE WITH MAINT PERSONNEL STANDING BY. A COMPANY MAINT SUPVR PULLED THE PIN OUT OF THE NOSE GEAR, SHOWED IT TO US, AND INFORMED US THAT THE PIN SHOULD HAVE HAD A FLAG ATTACHED AND THAT APPROPRIATE DISCIPLINARY ACTION WAS TO BE TAKEN AGAINST THE PERSON WHO FAILED TO REMOVE IT UNDER HIS SUPERVISION. IT APPEARS THE CHAIN OF EVENTS THAT LED UP TO THE PROB COULD HAVE BEEN PREVENTED HAD RAMP PERSONNEL COMMUNICATED THEIR PREVIOUS ACTIONS TO THE PLT CREW. HOWEVER, TO PREVENT FURTHER OCCURRENCES LIKE THIS RECOMMEND THE FOLLOWING: THAT THE CREW SHOULD NOT ASSUME THAT JUST BECAUSE IT IS A 'THROUGH FLT,' THE ACFT HAS NOT BEEN MOVED OR HAD OTHER THINGS DONE TO IT BY RAMP PERSONNEL WHO MIGHT INADVERTENTLY FAIL TO NOTIFY THE CREW. VISUAL PREFLT INSPECTION ON THROUGH FLTS SHOULD INCLUDE THE USE OF A FLASHLIGHT TO VISUALLY INSPECT WHEELWELLS FOR PINS WHICH MAY HAVE NO RED FLAGS ATTACHED. IF IT HAPPENED TO US, IT CAN CERTAINLY HAPPEN AGAIN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.