Narrative:

NOAA pubs released the latest version of the approach plates (procedures) that was effective aug/thu/96. There was a new approach shown, the localizer/DME runway 15 at scappose, or. Controllers were briefed that the approach had passed flight check and the approach was usable. So on aug/fri/96 we began to vector several IFR training flts for said approach. After 3 or 4 days of these approachs, come monday morning, an aircraft being vectored for the approach advised us that he was not receiving the localizer. We had another aircraft verify this and advised the appropriate personnel of the outage. Upon contacting airways facility personnel of the outage, they informed us that the localizer was not commissioned. Yes, it had passed flight check, yes, it was published, but not usable due to their not commissioning it and they had turned off the localizer without telling any facility that would possibly be effected. I have several concerns with this situation. What if an aircraft being vectored to the approach, before all facts were known to us, had crashed? The FAA's and the controller's liability definitely would have been brought to light. It's an unacceptable position to be put in. The lack of communication like this between airways facilities and air traffic in a situation like this is also unacceptable. I don't want to be put into this type of situation again.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: APCH CTLR VECTORED AN ACFT FOR THE NEW LOC DME RWY 15 APCH TO FKO. THE ACFT ADVISED THE CTLR THAT HE WAS UNABLE TO PICK UP THE LOC. CTLR CHKED WITH MAINT AND WAS ADVISED THAT THEY HAD SHUT IF OFF AS IT WASN'T CERTIFIED. CTLRS HAD USED PREVIOUSLY AFTER BEING BRIEFED THAT IT WAS OPERATIONAL. CTLR SAYS POOR COORD BTWN MAINT AND TRACON PERSONNEL.

Narrative: NOAA PUBS RELEASED THE LATEST VERSION OF THE APCH PLATES (PROCS) THAT WAS EFFECTIVE AUG/THU/96. THERE WAS A NEW APCH SHOWN, THE LOC/DME RWY 15 AT SCAPPOSE, OR. CTLRS WERE BRIEFED THAT THE APCH HAD PASSED FLT CHK AND THE APCH WAS USABLE. SO ON AUG/FRI/96 WE BEGAN TO VECTOR SEVERAL IFR TRAINING FLTS FOR SAID APCH. AFTER 3 OR 4 DAYS OF THESE APCHS, COME MONDAY MORNING, AN ACFT BEING VECTORED FOR THE APCH ADVISED US THAT HE WAS NOT RECEIVING THE LOC. WE HAD ANOTHER ACFT VERIFY THIS AND ADVISED THE APPROPRIATE PERSONNEL OF THE OUTAGE. UPON CONTACTING AIRWAYS FACILITY PERSONNEL OF THE OUTAGE, THEY INFORMED US THAT THE LOC WAS NOT COMMISSIONED. YES, IT HAD PASSED FLT CHK, YES, IT WAS PUBLISHED, BUT NOT USABLE DUE TO THEIR NOT COMMISSIONING IT AND THEY HAD TURNED OFF THE LOC WITHOUT TELLING ANY FACILITY THAT WOULD POSSIBLY BE EFFECTED. I HAVE SEVERAL CONCERNS WITH THIS SIT. WHAT IF AN ACFT BEING VECTORED TO THE APCH, BEFORE ALL FACTS WERE KNOWN TO US, HAD CRASHED? THE FAA'S AND THE CTLR'S LIABILITY DEFINITELY WOULD HAVE BEEN BROUGHT TO LIGHT. IT'S AN UNACCEPTABLE POS TO BE PUT IN. THE LACK OF COM LIKE THIS BTWN AIRWAYS FACILITIES AND AIR TFC IN A SIT LIKE THIS IS ALSO UNACCEPTABLE. I DON'T WANT TO BE PUT INTO THIS TYPE OF SIT AGAIN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.