Narrative:

Returning to the aircraft 15 mins prior to departure, we found that our aircraft would be the last to board out of 3 aircraft. First officer entered the aircraft to start #2 engine and I cleared him for start. Since the majority of the first starts are performed by the first officer, many capts, including myself, delegate the before start checklist to the first officer. The passenger finally arrived approximately 5 mins prior to departure time and I greeted the passenger as they boarded the aircraft. Due to the small number of passenger, the flight attendant had already given the passenger count to first officer and he was in the process of completing the weight and balance when I entered the cockpit. Time in cockpit was minimal prior to completion of the weight and balance and, with no obvious signs that the before start checklist had not been completed, I started the #2 engine. The after start checklist was completed and we left the blocks on time. The taxi checklist was completed during taxi to the active runway and we received immediate takeoff clearance upon arrival. We then completed the before takeoff checklist and departed. On climb out we received a ccas warning for fuel and although we had adequate fuel for our destination and reserve, we did not have sufficient fuel for the round trip. I decided to return to hnl. I informed the passenger and flight operations about the need to return. The necessary fuel was uplifted and we left the blocks without further incident. The air carrier flight operations manual states that the first officer will observe all fueling of the aircraft. Although it may sound as though I am trying to place most of the blame on the first officer, as the captain I am ultimately responsible for all operations of my aircraft and I accept that fact. I did not query the first officer whether the before start checklist had been completed, taking for granted that it had. After meeting with the chief pilot, I suggested that a memo be drafted requiring all capts to strictly adhere to the challenge and response procedure for the before start checklist. I also stated that I thought it would be beneficial to have a check of the fuel on another part of the checklist as a backup. Several days after this incident, I was informed by the chief pilot that I had unknowingly neglected to record this takeoff and landing in the aircraft logbook. An amendment was completed to correct this discrepancy. Supplemental information from acn 347529: the reasons for this incident are: 1) failure on behalf of myself to monitor the fueling of the aircraft. 2) omission of the before start checklist, which was not called for. 3) fuel load on the weight and balance was inaccurate. 4) the lack of CRM. I felt rushed throughout the day by the captain. My feeling was to keep harmony between myself and the captain. I felt I would meet resistance from my captain had I spoken up about issues that I may have been concerned about. 5) over familiarization with routine caused me to become complacent with my duties.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR ATR42 CREW FAILED TO GET A PROPER FUEL LOAD BEFORE DEP AND HAD TO RETURN LAND. ERROR ADMITTED. FLC TECHNIQUE PREFLT CHKLIST OP AND PREFLT MONITORING OF THE FUELING OF THE ACFT.

Narrative: RETURNING TO THE ACFT 15 MINS PRIOR TO DEP, WE FOUND THAT OUR ACFT WOULD BE THE LAST TO BOARD OUT OF 3 ACFT. FO ENTERED THE ACFT TO START #2 ENG AND I CLRED HIM FOR START. SINCE THE MAJORITY OF THE FIRST STARTS ARE PERFORMED BY THE FO, MANY CAPTS, INCLUDING MYSELF, DELEGATE THE BEFORE START CHKLIST TO THE FO. THE PAX FINALLY ARRIVED APPROX 5 MINS PRIOR TO DEP TIME AND I GREETED THE PAX AS THEY BOARDED THE ACFT. DUE TO THE SMALL NUMBER OF PAX, THE FLT ATTENDANT HAD ALREADY GIVEN THE PAX COUNT TO FO AND HE WAS IN THE PROCESS OF COMPLETING THE WT AND BAL WHEN I ENTERED THE COCKPIT. TIME IN COCKPIT WAS MINIMAL PRIOR TO COMPLETION OF THE WT AND BAL AND, WITH NO OBVIOUS SIGNS THAT THE BEFORE START CHKLIST HAD NOT BEEN COMPLETED, I STARTED THE #2 ENG. THE AFTER START CHKLIST WAS COMPLETED AND WE LEFT THE BLOCKS ON TIME. THE TAXI CHKLIST WAS COMPLETED DURING TAXI TO THE ACTIVE RWY AND WE RECEIVED IMMEDIATE TKOF CLRNC UPON ARR. WE THEN COMPLETED THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST AND DEPARTED. ON CLBOUT WE RECEIVED A CCAS WARNING FOR FUEL AND ALTHOUGH WE HAD ADEQUATE FUEL FOR OUR DEST AND RESERVE, WE DID NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT FUEL FOR THE ROUND TRIP. I DECIDED TO RETURN TO HNL. I INFORMED THE PAX AND FLT OPS ABOUT THE NEED TO RETURN. THE NECESSARY FUEL WAS UPLIFTED AND WE LEFT THE BLOCKS WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. THE ACR FLT OPS MANUAL STATES THAT THE FO WILL OBSERVE ALL FUELING OF THE ACFT. ALTHOUGH IT MAY SOUND AS THOUGH I AM TRYING TO PLACE MOST OF THE BLAME ON THE FO, AS THE CAPT I AM ULTIMATELY RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL OPS OF MY ACFT AND I ACCEPT THAT FACT. I DID NOT QUERY THE FO WHETHER THE BEFORE START CHKLIST HAD BEEN COMPLETED, TAKING FOR GRANTED THAT IT HAD. AFTER MEETING WITH THE CHIEF PLT, I SUGGESTED THAT A MEMO BE DRAFTED REQUIRING ALL CAPTS TO STRICTLY ADHERE TO THE CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE PROC FOR THE BEFORE START CHKLIST. I ALSO STATED THAT I THOUGHT IT WOULD BE BENEFICIAL TO HAVE A CHK OF THE FUEL ON ANOTHER PART OF THE CHKLIST AS A BACKUP. SEVERAL DAYS AFTER THIS INCIDENT, I WAS INFORMED BY THE CHIEF PLT THAT I HAD UNKNOWINGLY NEGLECTED TO RECORD THIS TKOF AND LNDG IN THE ACFT LOGBOOK. AN AMENDMENT WAS COMPLETED TO CORRECT THIS DISCREPANCY. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 347529: THE REASONS FOR THIS INCIDENT ARE: 1) FAILURE ON BEHALF OF MYSELF TO MONITOR THE FUELING OF THE ACFT. 2) OMISSION OF THE BEFORE START CHKLIST, WHICH WAS NOT CALLED FOR. 3) FUEL LOAD ON THE WT AND BAL WAS INACCURATE. 4) THE LACK OF CRM. I FELT RUSHED THROUGHOUT THE DAY BY THE CAPT. MY FEELING WAS TO KEEP HARMONY BTWN MYSELF AND THE CAPT. I FELT I WOULD MEET RESISTANCE FROM MY CAPT HAD I SPOKEN UP ABOUT ISSUES THAT I MAY HAVE BEEN CONCERNED ABOUT. 5) OVER FAMILIARIZATION WITH ROUTINE CAUSED ME TO BECOME COMPLACENT WITH MY DUTIES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.