Narrative:

Operating under IFR, departing from N52, and en route to sbj VOR, previously alerted to aircraft 'over solberg VOR' at 2000 ft, about 1-2 mins before event. After being turned to heading of 180 degrees I was alerted to 'traffic 9 O'clock, less than a mi' -- obviously not the previously called traffic. Actually 7-8 O'clock, rather than 9 O'clock, there was at my altitude a converging white twin (cessna?) in cruise confign. Evasive action, which necessitated departing from assigned altitude and course, was required by me. I was not able to see any movement (evasive action) by the other aircraft, nor did I see him pass. Quite shaken by the event, I told departure control I needed to return to somerset (N52) -- my point of departure. The cabin was in complete disarray, with the unsecured 70 pound golden retriever having been thrown into the rear baggage area. Upon landing at N52 the aircraft was checked for damage by me and the FBO -- none was found. While see and avoid may be the watch words, the convergence angle was not one I had included in the scan, especially in the vicinity of a radio fix such as sbj VOR. That notwithstanding, the departure controller should have alerted me earlier. Interestingly, after reporting the near miss to ny departure, the controller told me he had called traffic to me earlier. Not so, other than the original advisory regarding the aircraft 'over solberg.' this was confirmed by my spouse, also a pilot, who was assisting with clearance and navigation chores. As a general comment, enhancement of safety in the immediate vicinity of busy navaids such as vors, should be a priority of both pilots (improved traffic scans) and ATC (more timely advisories, establishing radar identify prior to reaching the fix, etc).

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SMA HAS AN NMAC WITH A LIGHT TWIN IN THE VICINITY OF N52.

Narrative: OPERATING UNDER IFR, DEPARTING FROM N52, AND ENRTE TO SBJ VOR, PREVIOUSLY ALERTED TO ACFT 'OVER SOLBERG VOR' AT 2000 FT, ABOUT 1-2 MINS BEFORE EVENT. AFTER BEING TURNED TO HDG OF 180 DEGS I WAS ALERTED TO 'TFC 9 O'CLOCK, LESS THAN A MI' -- OBVIOUSLY NOT THE PREVIOUSLY CALLED TFC. ACTUALLY 7-8 O'CLOCK, RATHER THAN 9 O'CLOCK, THERE WAS AT MY ALT A CONVERGING WHITE TWIN (CESSNA?) IN CRUISE CONFIGN. EVASIVE ACTION, WHICH NECESSITATED DEPARTING FROM ASSIGNED ALT AND COURSE, WAS REQUIRED BY ME. I WAS NOT ABLE TO SEE ANY MOVEMENT (EVASIVE ACTION) BY THE OTHER ACFT, NOR DID I SEE HIM PASS. QUITE SHAKEN BY THE EVENT, I TOLD DEP CTL I NEEDED TO RETURN TO SOMERSET (N52) -- MY POINT OF DEP. THE CABIN WAS IN COMPLETE DISARRAY, WITH THE UNSECURED 70 LB GOLDEN RETRIEVER HAVING BEEN THROWN INTO THE REAR BAGGAGE AREA. UPON LNDG AT N52 THE ACFT WAS CHKED FOR DAMAGE BY ME AND THE FBO -- NONE WAS FOUND. WHILE SEE AND AVOID MAY BE THE WATCH WORDS, THE CONVERGENCE ANGLE WAS NOT ONE I HAD INCLUDED IN THE SCAN, ESPECIALLY IN THE VICINITY OF A RADIO FIX SUCH AS SBJ VOR. THAT NOTWITHSTANDING, THE DEP CTLR SHOULD HAVE ALERTED ME EARLIER. INTERESTINGLY, AFTER RPTING THE NEAR MISS TO NY DEP, THE CTLR TOLD ME HE HAD CALLED TFC TO ME EARLIER. NOT SO, OTHER THAN THE ORIGINAL ADVISORY REGARDING THE ACFT 'OVER SOLBERG.' THIS WAS CONFIRMED BY MY SPOUSE, ALSO A PLT, WHO WAS ASSISTING WITH CLRNC AND NAV CHORES. AS A GENERAL COMMENT, ENHANCEMENT OF SAFETY IN THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF BUSY NAVAIDS SUCH AS VORS, SHOULD BE A PRIORITY OF BOTH PLTS (IMPROVED TFC SCANS) AND ATC (MORE TIMELY ADVISORIES, ESTABLISHING RADAR IDENT PRIOR TO REACHING THE FIX, ETC).

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.