Narrative:

We were flying the ATR42, a 46 seat aircraft manned by a crew of 3. I had a new hire flight attendant with me doing her IOE. The climb checks were done so she was getting the cart set up to serve and I sat down in a passenger seat to get her paperwork done. We were approximately 10-15 mins into our flight and I heard a chime that I assumed was the crew's signal that they were no longer in sterile cockpit. I was unaware that this was actually a call from the cockpit because this is the same chime you hear when the sterile cockpit light or seatbelt sign is turned off. The training flight attendant answered the call. About 1 min later the training flight attendant came and whispered in my ear that the cockpit called and said that we are going back to ord. We lost hydraulic pressure, but not to worry because the backup system was working and we did not have to prepare for an emergency. She told me that he was going to call back in 5 mins with more information. The first thing that I started thinking was how I was going to put this to the passenger. I did not even consider what happens to the aircraft when you lose the hydraulics, the backup system would only provide the minimal control needed to get the aircraft on the ground. I was also unaware that once we got on the ground and stopped we could not go any further. I made a PA to the passenger stating the problem, that there was no need to be alarmed and gave them the prepare to land instructions. I told the training flight attendant to secure the cart and galley while I ensure the cabin is secure and the passenger are not panicking. While we were busy doing this the captain made a PA to the passenger. He told them about the problem, it should be a normal landing and that once we stopped on the runway we could not move the aircraft any further. He told them that they would be sent by bus back to the terminal and then asked us to prepare for landing. I made 1 final check of the cabin and I sat down for landing. The training flight attendant took her seat in the back by me. When we landed the emergency equipment was waiting for us. I guess that the crew must have declared an emergency. This looks bad to the passenger when we tell them that everything is ok and it is not an emergency, but yet when we land all the emergency equipment is waiting for us. I also felt as though the crew was not being straight with us, however, I really can't say since the training flight attendant is the one who took the information from them. Granted, everything came off without a hitch. I saw some serious problems with this situation. I never knew that the cockpit was making an emergency or perhaps we should say urgent call, because there is no special signal or emergency call light. I should have never just assumed it was the sterile cockpit signal. I should have made a visual check of the cabin to distinguish the source of the chime. The cockpit should have relayed the information about the problem to me not the training flight attendant. She may not have relayed the information to me correctly. I feel that if they were talking to me I would have had a better idea about how to prepare. I was really unclr as to whether or not this was an emergency or not. It has been my experience that often times the crew will minimize the seriousness of a problem. They may be trying to save us the trouble of preparing for an emergency or whatever I don't know. I do know that when you have a serious mechanical problem such as loss of hydraulic pressure, there is potential for a more serious problem to manifest. If we knew how serious it could become, at least we could be prepared for the worst. Holding back on the facts is not going to help us any if what appears to be a not so serious problem turns into an accident. I should have gotten my emergency checklist out because there was a possibility that the situation could have become more serious. I should have made the training flight attendant situation in the forward emergency exit row. I also should have checked with the passenger who were seated there to make sure that they knew how to open the exits. I feel that a better understanding of the aircraft system would have been a great benefit to me. I would have had a better idea about how serious the problem was and what to expect if something was to go wrong. For instance, one thing that could happen is once we got on the ground we might not have been able to stop.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN INSTRUCTOR FLT ATTENDANT ON AN ATR42 RPTS ON THE HANDLING OF A HYD SYS LOSS EMER. THE ACFT RETURNED TO ORD AND LANDED.

Narrative: WE WERE FLYING THE ATR42, A 46 SEAT ACFT MANNED BY A CREW OF 3. I HAD A NEW HIRE FLT ATTENDANT WITH ME DOING HER IOE. THE CLB CHKS WERE DONE SO SHE WAS GETTING THE CART SET UP TO SERVE AND I SAT DOWN IN A PAX SEAT TO GET HER PAPERWORK DONE. WE WERE APPROX 10-15 MINS INTO OUR FLT AND I HEARD A CHIME THAT I ASSUMED WAS THE CREW'S SIGNAL THAT THEY WERE NO LONGER IN STERILE COCKPIT. I WAS UNAWARE THAT THIS WAS ACTUALLY A CALL FROM THE COCKPIT BECAUSE THIS IS THE SAME CHIME YOU HEAR WHEN THE STERILE COCKPIT LIGHT OR SEATBELT SIGN IS TURNED OFF. THE TRAINING FLT ATTENDANT ANSWERED THE CALL. ABOUT 1 MIN LATER THE TRAINING FLT ATTENDANT CAME AND WHISPERED IN MY EAR THAT THE COCKPIT CALLED AND SAID THAT WE ARE GOING BACK TO ORD. WE LOST HYD PRESSURE, BUT NOT TO WORRY BECAUSE THE BACKUP SYS WAS WORKING AND WE DID NOT HAVE TO PREPARE FOR AN EMER. SHE TOLD ME THAT HE WAS GOING TO CALL BACK IN 5 MINS WITH MORE INFO. THE FIRST THING THAT I STARTED THINKING WAS HOW I WAS GOING TO PUT THIS TO THE PAX. I DID NOT EVEN CONSIDER WHAT HAPPENS TO THE ACFT WHEN YOU LOSE THE HYDS, THE BACKUP SYS WOULD ONLY PROVIDE THE MINIMAL CTL NEEDED TO GET THE ACFT ON THE GND. I WAS ALSO UNAWARE THAT ONCE WE GOT ON THE GND AND STOPPED WE COULD NOT GO ANY FURTHER. I MADE A PA TO THE PAX STATING THE PROB, THAT THERE WAS NO NEED TO BE ALARMED AND GAVE THEM THE PREPARE TO LAND INSTRUCTIONS. I TOLD THE TRAINING FLT ATTENDANT TO SECURE THE CART AND GALLEY WHILE I ENSURE THE CABIN IS SECURE AND THE PAX ARE NOT PANICKING. WHILE WE WERE BUSY DOING THIS THE CAPT MADE A PA TO THE PAX. HE TOLD THEM ABOUT THE PROB, IT SHOULD BE A NORMAL LNDG AND THAT ONCE WE STOPPED ON THE RWY WE COULD NOT MOVE THE ACFT ANY FURTHER. HE TOLD THEM THAT THEY WOULD BE SENT BY BUS BACK TO THE TERMINAL AND THEN ASKED US TO PREPARE FOR LNDG. I MADE 1 FINAL CHK OF THE CABIN AND I SAT DOWN FOR LNDG. THE TRAINING FLT ATTENDANT TOOK HER SEAT IN THE BACK BY ME. WHEN WE LANDED THE EMER EQUIP WAS WAITING FOR US. I GUESS THAT THE CREW MUST HAVE DECLARED AN EMER. THIS LOOKS BAD TO THE PAX WHEN WE TELL THEM THAT EVERYTHING IS OK AND IT IS NOT AN EMER, BUT YET WHEN WE LAND ALL THE EMER EQUIP IS WAITING FOR US. I ALSO FELT AS THOUGH THE CREW WAS NOT BEING STRAIGHT WITH US, HOWEVER, I REALLY CAN'T SAY SINCE THE TRAINING FLT ATTENDANT IS THE ONE WHO TOOK THE INFO FROM THEM. GRANTED, EVERYTHING CAME OFF WITHOUT A HITCH. I SAW SOME SERIOUS PROBS WITH THIS SIT. I NEVER KNEW THAT THE COCKPIT WAS MAKING AN EMER OR PERHAPS WE SHOULD SAY URGENT CALL, BECAUSE THERE IS NO SPECIAL SIGNAL OR EMER CALL LIGHT. I SHOULD HAVE NEVER JUST ASSUMED IT WAS THE STERILE COCKPIT SIGNAL. I SHOULD HAVE MADE A VISUAL CHK OF THE CABIN TO DISTINGUISH THE SOURCE OF THE CHIME. THE COCKPIT SHOULD HAVE RELAYED THE INFO ABOUT THE PROB TO ME NOT THE TRAINING FLT ATTENDANT. SHE MAY NOT HAVE RELAYED THE INFO TO ME CORRECTLY. I FEEL THAT IF THEY WERE TALKING TO ME I WOULD HAVE HAD A BETTER IDEA ABOUT HOW TO PREPARE. I WAS REALLY UNCLR AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THIS WAS AN EMER OR NOT. IT HAS BEEN MY EXPERIENCE THAT OFTEN TIMES THE CREW WILL MINIMIZE THE SERIOUSNESS OF A PROB. THEY MAY BE TRYING TO SAVE US THE TROUBLE OF PREPARING FOR AN EMER OR WHATEVER I DON'T KNOW. I DO KNOW THAT WHEN YOU HAVE A SERIOUS MECHANICAL PROB SUCH AS LOSS OF HYD PRESSURE, THERE IS POTENTIAL FOR A MORE SERIOUS PROB TO MANIFEST. IF WE KNEW HOW SERIOUS IT COULD BECOME, AT LEAST WE COULD BE PREPARED FOR THE WORST. HOLDING BACK ON THE FACTS IS NOT GOING TO HELP US ANY IF WHAT APPEARS TO BE A NOT SO SERIOUS PROB TURNS INTO AN ACCIDENT. I SHOULD HAVE GOTTEN MY EMER CHKLIST OUT BECAUSE THERE WAS A POSSIBILITY THAT THE SIT COULD HAVE BECOME MORE SERIOUS. I SHOULD HAVE MADE THE TRAINING FLT ATTENDANT SIT IN THE FORWARD EMER EXIT ROW. I ALSO SHOULD HAVE CHKED WITH THE PAX WHO WERE SEATED THERE TO MAKE SURE THAT THEY KNEW HOW TO OPEN THE EXITS. I FEEL THAT A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE ACFT SYS WOULD HAVE BEEN A GREAT BENEFIT TO ME. I WOULD HAVE HAD A BETTER IDEA ABOUT HOW SERIOUS THE PROB WAS AND WHAT TO EXPECT IF SOMETHING WAS TO GO WRONG. FOR INSTANCE, ONE THING THAT COULD HAPPEN IS ONCE WE GOT ON THE GND WE MIGHT NOT HAVE BEEN ABLE TO STOP.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.