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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 330587 |
Time | |
Date | 199601 |
Day | Mon |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | atc facility : ord |
State Reference | IL |
Altitude | agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 0 |
Environment | |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight attendant : on duty |
Qualification | other other : other |
ASRS Report | 330587 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | oversight : supervisor |
Qualification | other other : other |
Events | |
Anomaly | non adherence : published procedure non adherence : far other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other other : unspecified |
Resolutory Action | none taken : anomaly accepted other |
Consequence | Other |
Supplementary | |
Air Traffic Incident | other |
Narrative:
This is in regards to the 'hands-on' training that occurred on jan/mon/96 at a contract airline's hangar. There were 33 of our airline's flight attendants present with 1 instructor and a 1-HR time frame to complete the required drills. The instructor asked for senior flight attendants to assist her. I was assigned to oversee drills at a B757 door, at no time was this door in the emergency mode. While signing off the drills a flight attendant told me I was to sign off all the B757 drills including the one for 3L or 3R door which clearly stated below it 'instructor only.' at no time while at the training facility did we even see a B757 3L or 3R door. I questioned the instructor several times about whether this was appropriate, she was very harried and told me just to do it. After completing this I was brought to an overwing window exit which was neither a B727 nor a B757, and tilted it out. I was told not to remove it as it was too heavy and without a contract airline's instructor there to help, that it was too difficult. All of this seemed very wrong to me and upon arrival to my base I informed my supervisor of all the events. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter states that the union and her supervisor were informed. The supervisor told her that the signature would be deleted from training records, but the reporter doesn't 'buy it.' aside from concern over far issues, the reporter's biggest worry is that the company paid the contract airline a lot of money for training that was poorly conducted. If anything ever goes wrong on a flight, the flight attendant 'hopes' that she and the other cabin attendants trained that day can operate all of the exits.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A FLT ATTENDANT, WHO WAS NOT QUALIFIED AS AN INSTRUCTOR, ENDORSED DRILLS THAT REQUIRED A QUALIFIED INSTRUCTOR'S SIGNATURE AND DID NOT RECEIVE APPROPRIATE TRAINING IN WINDOW EXITS. TRAINING ACTIVITY ON B757 AND B727.
Narrative: THIS IS IN REGARDS TO THE 'HANDS-ON' TRAINING THAT OCCURRED ON JAN/MON/96 AT A CONTRACT AIRLINE'S HANGAR. THERE WERE 33 OF OUR AIRLINE'S FLT ATTENDANTS PRESENT WITH 1 INSTRUCTOR AND A 1-HR TIME FRAME TO COMPLETE THE REQUIRED DRILLS. THE INSTRUCTOR ASKED FOR SENIOR FLT ATTENDANTS TO ASSIST HER. I WAS ASSIGNED TO OVERSEE DRILLS AT A B757 DOOR, AT NO TIME WAS THIS DOOR IN THE EMER MODE. WHILE SIGNING OFF THE DRILLS A FLT ATTENDANT TOLD ME I WAS TO SIGN OFF ALL THE B757 DRILLS INCLUDING THE ONE FOR 3L OR 3R DOOR WHICH CLRLY STATED BELOW IT 'INSTRUCTOR ONLY.' AT NO TIME WHILE AT THE TRAINING FACILITY DID WE EVEN SEE A B757 3L OR 3R DOOR. I QUESTIONED THE INSTRUCTOR SEVERAL TIMES ABOUT WHETHER THIS WAS APPROPRIATE, SHE WAS VERY HARRIED AND TOLD ME JUST TO DO IT. AFTER COMPLETING THIS I WAS BROUGHT TO AN OVERWING WINDOW EXIT WHICH WAS NEITHER A B727 NOR A B757, AND TILTED IT OUT. I WAS TOLD NOT TO REMOVE IT AS IT WAS TOO HVY AND WITHOUT A CONTRACT AIRLINE'S INSTRUCTOR THERE TO HELP, THAT IT WAS TOO DIFFICULT. ALL OF THIS SEEMED VERY WRONG TO ME AND UPON ARR TO MY BASE I INFORMED MY SUPVR OF ALL THE EVENTS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATES THAT THE UNION AND HER SUPVR WERE INFORMED. THE SUPVR TOLD HER THAT THE SIGNATURE WOULD BE DELETED FROM TRAINING RECORDS, BUT THE RPTR DOESN'T 'BUY IT.' ASIDE FROM CONCERN OVER FAR ISSUES, THE RPTR'S BIGGEST WORRY IS THAT THE COMPANY PAID THE CONTRACT AIRLINE A LOT OF MONEY FOR TRAINING THAT WAS POORLY CONDUCTED. IF ANYTHING EVER GOES WRONG ON A FLT, THE FLT ATTENDANT 'HOPES' THAT SHE AND THE OTHER CABIN ATTENDANTS TRAINED THAT DAY CAN OPERATE ALL OF THE EXITS.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.