Narrative:

The 2 pilots involved were both flight instructors. Unfortunately, both pilots had disagreements in the past over flying and instruction techniques and we did not 'mix' well together. I also questioned pilot B's attitude. I ceased renting from the flight school where pilot B was a chief flight instructor due to these reasons. The aircraft used on this flight was an aircraft on-line at the flight school where pilot B instructed. The passenger and both flight instructors had planned to fly to local airport, which was about 10 mins en route. Pilot B was originally planning to take an aircraft with full fuel. With 3 people and with the given WX conditions I felt that this was not safe. In pilot B's words, 'I'll get it off the runway' caused myself and passenger a to be concerned about his decision making process. Besides, there were many other aircraft that they could have been using. I was going to say something when pilot B decided to take a different aircraft with less fuel. During preflight, pilot B must have been in a rush as he made a comment about 'you are not doing an annual inspection, hurry up.' I'm thinking 'what is the rush with a good preflight?' at any rate, the preflight was thoroughly completed. (These were similar attitudes and behaviors I have witnessed by pilot B in the past.) I typically preferred to have the most experienced pilots situation in the front. The 2 most experienced pilots were myself and pilot B, since passenger a was a private pilot with far less flight time than both flight instructors. Originally, passenger a was to situation in the front with pilot B for the flight to the destination. I asked passenger a if he would mind sitting in the back. Passenger a did not mind at all. Prior to loading the aircraft, pilot B was rather upset that passenger a would not be sitting in the front. Pilot B didn't understand and almost demanded that I situation in the back. I offered to drive back to the destination airport if it was going to be an issue and explained that for safety reasons I would prefer if both flight instructors sat in the front. Finally, pilot B agreed and passenger a sat in the back and both flight instructors sat in the front with myself in the left seat and pilot B in the right seat. Everyone entered the aircraft and put on their seatbelts. Pilot B proceeded to adjust levers and knobs without using a checklist and after these 'settings' were made, had told me to taxi. I taxied to the run-up area without incident. Prior to run-up, I was not able to find a before takeoff checklist. After some confusion by passenger a and pilot B, the checklist was found and I reviewed the checklist prior to takeoff. Pilot B was upset that the checklist was not readily available, but in actuality it was, as it was located on the aircraft's clipboard. Apparently, a standard location for the flight school. After putting in partial flaps (less than those recommended by the poh) as requested by pilot B, the aircraft was cleared for takeoff. About 20 seconds after takeoff the aircraft was about 100 ft AGL with myself at the controls. Suddenly the aircraft pitched down. Since this pitching moment was uncommanded by me, I was concerned that there was something mechanically wrong with the controls of the aircraft. Looking inside the cabin revealed that pilot B was pushing forward on the control with his hand. Pilot B did not give any verbal reason for such an input and actually startled me. Since the aircraft was climbing sufficiently and the stall warning horn was not activated, I did not see any reason to reduce the aircraft's pitch attitude with urgency. I didn't think there was any reason to react quickly without first evaluating the situation. I told pilot B to release the controls. Pilot B did not, and again I repeated to pilot B to release the controls. Pilot B did not release the controllers. Since the situation was unsafe as there were 2 pilots on the controls during a critical phase of flight, I released all controls, yoke and rudder pedals, and told pilot B to fly the aircraft. Several times, pilot B told me to fly the aircraft, but on each request, I denied the option of handling the controls. I asked pilot B to fly the remaining portion of the flight to the destination airport. Words were exchanged between myself and the other flight instructor. From past experiences with pilot B,I've found that his critiques and not accurate and more destructive than positive. So when pilot B proceeded by saying '...you know I'm gonna tell ya something,' I turned off the intercom system so as not to hear pilot B. Pilot B had turned on the intercom system and threatened to break my flight arm if I turn off the intercom system again. Since pilot B got to the point that I didn't want to hear his 'criticism' I left the intercom turned on. The flight terminated at the destination airport without further incident, which was pretty impressive since pilot B did not properly provide the ATIS identify to the destination tower on initial contact and given that pilot B did not use the correct call sign for the aircraft, and after a turn from base through final to be completed by a somewhat heavy side load placed on the landing gear. Due to their aviation differences, both flight instructors should not have been in the same aircraft, especially if both were to situation in the front seat. I was trying to ensure a safe flight by having the most experienced pilots in the front seats, but it was actually reversed and made the flight less safe. Both flight instructors should have known there would have been issues between the 2 flight techniques. A takeoff brief was never executed from myself prior to takeoff. That would have ensured that all pilots had a good understanding of procedures and what was expected. (I typically perform a pretkof brief, but knowing flight instructor B's techniques I felt that pilot B would be irritated in this pretkof procedure.) I should have not turned off the intercom system as this made matters worse and caused further distrs to both pilots, as well as really made pilot B very angry. Pilot B should have given verbal notification of what was happening by either stating 'I've got the aircraft' or perhaps 'lower the nose.' by overriding the aircraft controls without warning made a confusing and unsafe situation on the flight deck. If pilot B was going to have me fly the aircraft, then he should have had allowed me do everything including starting with aircraft starting procedures. Mixed pilot input when not agreed or briefed is not safe. I should have seen this as a sign of things to come. Avoid issues that led to a stressful and hostile flight deck.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RPTING FLT INSTRUCTOR COMPLAINT OF ANOTHER FLT INSTRUCTOR'S ATTITUDE DURING FLT IN PIPER PA28 WHEREIN THE OTHER CFI OVERRIDES CTLS ON TKOF AND PERSISTS IN NOT FOLLOWING GOOD OPERATING PROCS OR ATTEMPTING TO COOPERATE WITH THE RPTR DURING THE FLT.

Narrative: THE 2 PLTS INVOLVED WERE BOTH FLT INSTRUCTORS. UNFORTUNATELY, BOTH PLTS HAD DISAGREEMENTS IN THE PAST OVER FLYING AND INSTRUCTION TECHNIQUES AND WE DID NOT 'MIX' WELL TOGETHER. I ALSO QUESTIONED PLT B'S ATTITUDE. I CEASED RENTING FROM THE FLT SCHOOL WHERE PLT B WAS A CHIEF FLT INSTRUCTOR DUE TO THESE REASONS. THE ACFT USED ON THIS FLT WAS AN ACFT ON-LINE AT THE FLT SCHOOL WHERE PLT B INSTRUCTED. THE PAX AND BOTH FLT INSTRUCTORS HAD PLANNED TO FLY TO LCL ARPT, WHICH WAS ABOUT 10 MINS ENRTE. PLT B WAS ORIGINALLY PLANNING TO TAKE AN ACFT WITH FULL FUEL. WITH 3 PEOPLE AND WITH THE GIVEN WX CONDITIONS I FELT THAT THIS WAS NOT SAFE. IN PLT B'S WORDS, 'I'LL GET IT OFF THE RWY' CAUSED MYSELF AND PAX A TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT HIS DECISION MAKING PROCESS. BESIDES, THERE WERE MANY OTHER ACFT THAT THEY COULD HAVE BEEN USING. I WAS GOING TO SAY SOMETHING WHEN PLT B DECIDED TO TAKE A DIFFERENT ACFT WITH LESS FUEL. DURING PREFLT, PLT B MUST HAVE BEEN IN A RUSH AS HE MADE A COMMENT ABOUT 'YOU ARE NOT DOING AN ANNUAL INSPECTION, HURRY UP.' I'M THINKING 'WHAT IS THE RUSH WITH A GOOD PREFLT?' AT ANY RATE, THE PREFLT WAS THOROUGHLY COMPLETED. (THESE WERE SIMILAR ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIORS I HAVE WITNESSED BY PLT B IN THE PAST.) I TYPICALLY PREFERRED TO HAVE THE MOST EXPERIENCED PLTS SIT IN THE FRONT. THE 2 MOST EXPERIENCED PLTS WERE MYSELF AND PLT B, SINCE PAX A WAS A PVT PLT WITH FAR LESS FLT TIME THAN BOTH FLT INSTRUCTORS. ORIGINALLY, PAX A WAS TO SIT IN THE FRONT WITH PLT B FOR THE FLT TO THE DEST. I ASKED PAX A IF HE WOULD MIND SITTING IN THE BACK. PAX A DID NOT MIND AT ALL. PRIOR TO LOADING THE ACFT, PLT B WAS RATHER UPSET THAT PAX A WOULD NOT BE SITTING IN THE FRONT. PLT B DIDN'T UNDERSTAND AND ALMOST DEMANDED THAT I SIT IN THE BACK. I OFFERED TO DRIVE BACK TO THE DEST ARPT IF IT WAS GOING TO BE AN ISSUE AND EXPLAINED THAT FOR SAFETY REASONS I WOULD PREFER IF BOTH FLT INSTRUCTORS SAT IN THE FRONT. FINALLY, PLT B AGREED AND PAX A SAT IN THE BACK AND BOTH FLT INSTRUCTORS SAT IN THE FRONT WITH MYSELF IN THE L SEAT AND PLT B IN THE R SEAT. EVERYONE ENTERED THE ACFT AND PUT ON THEIR SEATBELTS. PLT B PROCEEDED TO ADJUST LEVERS AND KNOBS WITHOUT USING A CHKLIST AND AFTER THESE 'SETTINGS' WERE MADE, HAD TOLD ME TO TAXI. I TAXIED TO THE RUN-UP AREA WITHOUT INCIDENT. PRIOR TO RUN-UP, I WAS NOT ABLE TO FIND A BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST. AFTER SOME CONFUSION BY PAX A AND PLT B, THE CHKLIST WAS FOUND AND I REVIEWED THE CHKLIST PRIOR TO TKOF. PLT B WAS UPSET THAT THE CHKLIST WAS NOT READILY AVAILABLE, BUT IN ACTUALITY IT WAS, AS IT WAS LOCATED ON THE ACFT'S CLIPBOARD. APPARENTLY, A STANDARD LOCATION FOR THE FLT SCHOOL. AFTER PUTTING IN PARTIAL FLAPS (LESS THAN THOSE RECOMMENDED BY THE POH) AS REQUESTED BY PLT B, THE ACFT WAS CLRED FOR TKOF. ABOUT 20 SECONDS AFTER TKOF THE ACFT WAS ABOUT 100 FT AGL WITH MYSELF AT THE CTLS. SUDDENLY THE ACFT PITCHED DOWN. SINCE THIS PITCHING MOMENT WAS UNCOMMANDED BY ME, I WAS CONCERNED THAT THERE WAS SOMETHING MECHANICALLY WRONG WITH THE CTLS OF THE ACFT. LOOKING INSIDE THE CABIN REVEALED THAT PLT B WAS PUSHING FORWARD ON THE CTL WITH HIS HAND. PLT B DID NOT GIVE ANY VERBAL REASON FOR SUCH AN INPUT AND ACTUALLY STARTLED ME. SINCE THE ACFT WAS CLBING SUFFICIENTLY AND THE STALL WARNING HORN WAS NOT ACTIVATED, I DID NOT SEE ANY REASON TO REDUCE THE ACFT'S PITCH ATTITUDE WITH URGENCY. I DIDN'T THINK THERE WAS ANY REASON TO REACT QUICKLY WITHOUT FIRST EVALUATING THE SIT. I TOLD PLT B TO RELEASE THE CTLS. PLT B DID NOT, AND AGAIN I REPEATED TO PLT B TO RELEASE THE CTLS. PLT B DID NOT RELEASE THE CTLRS. SINCE THE SIT WAS UNSAFE AS THERE WERE 2 PLTS ON THE CTLS DURING A CRITICAL PHASE OF FLT, I RELEASED ALL CTLS, YOKE AND RUDDER PEDALS, AND TOLD PLT B TO FLY THE ACFT. SEVERAL TIMES, PLT B TOLD ME TO FLY THE ACFT, BUT ON EACH REQUEST, I DENIED THE OPTION OF HANDLING THE CTLS. I ASKED PLT B TO FLY THE REMAINING PORTION OF THE FLT TO THE DEST ARPT. WORDS WERE EXCHANGED BTWN MYSELF AND THE OTHER FLT INSTRUCTOR. FROM PAST EXPERIENCES WITH PLT B,I'VE FOUND THAT HIS CRITIQUES AND NOT ACCURATE AND MORE DESTRUCTIVE THAN POSITIVE. SO WHEN PLT B PROCEEDED BY SAYING '...YOU KNOW I'M GONNA TELL YA SOMETHING,' I TURNED OFF THE INTERCOM SYS SO AS NOT TO HEAR PLT B. PLT B HAD TURNED ON THE INTERCOM SYS AND THREATENED TO BREAK MY FLT ARM IF I TURN OFF THE INTERCOM SYS AGAIN. SINCE PLT B GOT TO THE POINT THAT I DIDN'T WANT TO HEAR HIS 'CRITICISM' I LEFT THE INTERCOM TURNED ON. THE FLT TERMINATED AT THE DEST ARPT WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT, WHICH WAS PRETTY IMPRESSIVE SINCE PLT B DID NOT PROPERLY PROVIDE THE ATIS IDENT TO THE DEST TWR ON INITIAL CONTACT AND GIVEN THAT PLT B DID NOT USE THE CORRECT CALL SIGN FOR THE ACFT, AND AFTER A TURN FROM BASE THROUGH FINAL TO BE COMPLETED BY A SOMEWHAT HVY SIDE LOAD PLACED ON THE LNDG GEAR. DUE TO THEIR AVIATION DIFFERENCES, BOTH FLT INSTRUCTORS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN IN THE SAME ACFT, ESPECIALLY IF BOTH WERE TO SIT IN THE FRONT SEAT. I WAS TRYING TO ENSURE A SAFE FLT BY HAVING THE MOST EXPERIENCED PLTS IN THE FRONT SEATS, BUT IT WAS ACTUALLY REVERSED AND MADE THE FLT LESS SAFE. BOTH FLT INSTRUCTORS SHOULD HAVE KNOWN THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN ISSUES BTWN THE 2 FLT TECHNIQUES. A TKOF BRIEF WAS NEVER EXECUTED FROM MYSELF PRIOR TO TKOF. THAT WOULD HAVE ENSURED THAT ALL PLTS HAD A GOOD UNDERSTANDING OF PROCS AND WHAT WAS EXPECTED. (I TYPICALLY PERFORM A PRETKOF BRIEF, BUT KNOWING FLT INSTRUCTOR B'S TECHNIQUES I FELT THAT PLT B WOULD BE IRRITATED IN THIS PRETKOF PROC.) I SHOULD HAVE NOT TURNED OFF THE INTERCOM SYS AS THIS MADE MATTERS WORSE AND CAUSED FURTHER DISTRS TO BOTH PLTS, AS WELL AS REALLY MADE PLT B VERY ANGRY. PLT B SHOULD HAVE GIVEN VERBAL NOTIFICATION OF WHAT WAS HAPPENING BY EITHER STATING 'I'VE GOT THE ACFT' OR PERHAPS 'LOWER THE NOSE.' BY OVERRIDING THE ACFT CTLS WITHOUT WARNING MADE A CONFUSING AND UNSAFE SIT ON THE FLT DECK. IF PLT B WAS GOING TO HAVE ME FLY THE ACFT, THEN HE SHOULD HAVE HAD ALLOWED ME DO EVERYTHING INCLUDING STARTING WITH ACFT STARTING PROCS. MIXED PLT INPUT WHEN NOT AGREED OR BRIEFED IS NOT SAFE. I SHOULD HAVE SEEN THIS AS A SIGN OF THINGS TO COME. AVOID ISSUES THAT LED TO A STRESSFUL AND HOSTILE FLT DECK.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.