Narrative:

I arrived at the aircraft to find a recurring write-up in the maintenance log. 3 discrepancies and 3 corrective actions in as many days. The true intent behind corrective actions in these scenarios is often open to question. This occasion was no exception. However, with an operations check ok and a box swap in the book, the company had a weak case that they were making escalating efforts to correct the problem. I continued my review of the log. The discrepancy had the initial appearance of being properly deferred. Upon reading the MEL though, I found that the maintenance action column directed one to another MEL part. This additional MEL part required another MEL placard and deferral. I saw no placard and could not find the additional deferral in the log. I asked company maintenance to arrange for the additional placard and deferral. The company refused. It was explained to me that if a root deferral was complied with, additional documentation was not required. This practice was called 'stacking.' I had not heard of this procedure before. By now, my flight was significantly behind schedule. Not my first concern in matters of safety and legality, but a concern nonetheless. It was abundantly clear that no further discussion would be tolerated by the company. Further inquiry would probably take hours, probably be unproductive and would certainly invoke the wrath of the company. I believed there was no overt safety problem with the aircraft and that I fully understood the nature of the discrepancy. I decided to launch. I regret that decision. The gray area I took off into that day represents a risk to my license I can't tolerate. Safety concern: the additional MEL part referred to in the core deferral specifies a procedure that must be implemented in order to conduct a safe flight. I question whether the crews who flew the aircraft before I did dug through the MEL far enough to know of this requirement. If the operations procedures in the MEL were not split between 2 parts there would be a much higher probability that flcs would find this essential information. A crew conducting a preflight is not allotted the time to go on an easter egg hunt for data. Far compliance: the manner in which the corrective action was described in the MEL provides room for interpretation, if not outright circumvention. I would prefer the entire procedure be included in one paragraph. A description of the entire procedure written under one MEL part would have prevented any confusion. The search for a definitive interpretation of an far is long and arduous. An aircraft preflight 30 mins before departure is a poor place to begin such an inquiry. Which brings us to my final point: there was no source of a prompt, correct answer while I was sitting in the chocks. I was either to fly the trip or be punished. I did not entirely trust the company, but what if their explanation was correct? (There is always a first time.) callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the only thing this company is concerned with is getting the airplanes out of town. Anyone in maintenance who could be trusted to give reasonable and correct answers has been taken out of the loop. Placarding is incorrect and logbook entries do not describe the actual deferred item. Management applies great pressure to take the trip with no explanation of the deferred items. The aircraft was a B757.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B757 WAS DISPATCHED WITH IMPROPER PLACARDS ON DEFERRED ITEMS.

Narrative: I ARRIVED AT THE ACFT TO FIND A RECURRING WRITE-UP IN THE MAINT LOG. 3 DISCREPANCIES AND 3 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS IN AS MANY DAYS. THE TRUE INTENT BEHIND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS IN THESE SCENARIOS IS OFTEN OPEN TO QUESTION. THIS OCCASION WAS NO EXCEPTION. HOWEVER, WITH AN OPS CHK OK AND A BOX SWAP IN THE BOOK, THE COMPANY HAD A WEAK CASE THAT THEY WERE MAKING ESCALATING EFFORTS TO CORRECT THE PROB. I CONTINUED MY REVIEW OF THE LOG. THE DISCREPANCY HAD THE INITIAL APPEARANCE OF BEING PROPERLY DEFERRED. UPON READING THE MEL THOUGH, I FOUND THAT THE MAINT ACTION COLUMN DIRECTED ONE TO ANOTHER MEL PART. THIS ADDITIONAL MEL PART REQUIRED ANOTHER MEL PLACARD AND DEFERRAL. I SAW NO PLACARD AND COULD NOT FIND THE ADDITIONAL DEFERRAL IN THE LOG. I ASKED COMPANY MAINT TO ARRANGE FOR THE ADDITIONAL PLACARD AND DEFERRAL. THE COMPANY REFUSED. IT WAS EXPLAINED TO ME THAT IF A ROOT DEFERRAL WAS COMPLIED WITH, ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTATION WAS NOT REQUIRED. THIS PRACTICE WAS CALLED 'STACKING.' I HAD NOT HEARD OF THIS PROC BEFORE. BY NOW, MY FLT WAS SIGNIFICANTLY BEHIND SCHEDULE. NOT MY FIRST CONCERN IN MATTERS OF SAFETY AND LEGALITY, BUT A CONCERN NONETHELESS. IT WAS ABUNDANTLY CLR THAT NO FURTHER DISCUSSION WOULD BE TOLERATED BY THE COMPANY. FURTHER INQUIRY WOULD PROBABLY TAKE HRS, PROBABLY BE UNPRODUCTIVE AND WOULD CERTAINLY INVOKE THE WRATH OF THE COMPANY. I BELIEVED THERE WAS NO OVERT SAFETY PROB WITH THE ACFT AND THAT I FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE NATURE OF THE DISCREPANCY. I DECIDED TO LAUNCH. I REGRET THAT DECISION. THE GRAY AREA I TOOK OFF INTO THAT DAY REPRESENTS A RISK TO MY LICENSE I CAN'T TOLERATE. SAFETY CONCERN: THE ADDITIONAL MEL PART REFERRED TO IN THE CORE DEFERRAL SPECIFIES A PROC THAT MUST BE IMPLEMENTED IN ORDER TO CONDUCT A SAFE FLT. I QUESTION WHETHER THE CREWS WHO FLEW THE ACFT BEFORE I DID DUG THROUGH THE MEL FAR ENOUGH TO KNOW OF THIS REQUIREMENT. IF THE OPS PROCS IN THE MEL WERE NOT SPLIT BTWN 2 PARTS THERE WOULD BE A MUCH HIGHER PROBABILITY THAT FLCS WOULD FIND THIS ESSENTIAL INFO. A CREW CONDUCTING A PREFLT IS NOT ALLOTTED THE TIME TO GO ON AN EASTER EGG HUNT FOR DATA. FAR COMPLIANCE: THE MANNER IN WHICH THE CORRECTIVE ACTION WAS DESCRIBED IN THE MEL PROVIDES ROOM FOR INTERP, IF NOT OUTRIGHT CIRCUMVENTION. I WOULD PREFER THE ENTIRE PROC BE INCLUDED IN ONE PARAGRAPH. A DESCRIPTION OF THE ENTIRE PROC WRITTEN UNDER ONE MEL PART WOULD HAVE PREVENTED ANY CONFUSION. THE SEARCH FOR A DEFINITIVE INTERP OF AN FAR IS LONG AND ARDUOUS. AN ACFT PREFLT 30 MINS BEFORE DEP IS A POOR PLACE TO BEGIN SUCH AN INQUIRY. WHICH BRINGS US TO MY FINAL POINT: THERE WAS NO SOURCE OF A PROMPT, CORRECT ANSWER WHILE I WAS SITTING IN THE CHOCKS. I WAS EITHER TO FLY THE TRIP OR BE PUNISHED. I DID NOT ENTIRELY TRUST THE COMPANY, BUT WHAT IF THEIR EXPLANATION WAS CORRECT? (THERE IS ALWAYS A FIRST TIME.) CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE ONLY THING THIS COMPANY IS CONCERNED WITH IS GETTING THE AIRPLANES OUT OF TOWN. ANYONE IN MAINT WHO COULD BE TRUSTED TO GIVE REASONABLE AND CORRECT ANSWERS HAS BEEN TAKEN OUT OF THE LOOP. PLACARDING IS INCORRECT AND LOGBOOK ENTRIES DO NOT DESCRIBE THE ACTUAL DEFERRED ITEM. MGMNT APPLIES GREAT PRESSURE TO TAKE THE TRIP WITH NO EXPLANATION OF THE DEFERRED ITEMS. THE ACFT WAS A B757.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.