Narrative:

As program manager for the company's aircraft hydraulic system I became aware of the fact that the hydraulic electrical motor pump (acmp), designed and manufactured by parker abex, suffered from design defects. The defects were such that under the right events the motor would smoke and flame up in a manner to cause the aircraft to catch fire. I became aware of this defect after 3 of the acmp's caught fire on parker abex's own test rig. Aircraft manufacturer began hearing rumors about the acmp test rig fire about the same time. I was directed by mr X, hydraulic system, to stonewall aircraft manufacturer and try to convince them that there was no defects with the acmp. Aircraft manufacturer transmitted memos after memos to parker abex requesting that corrected action be taken. Aircraft manufacturer and parker abex reliability departments both wrote reports that stated that the acmp, as currently designed, would create an unacceptable safety hazard for the aircraft. Again I was directed by mr X to stonewall aircraft manufacturer and take no action. I felt that I could not ignore the matter any longer. I informed aircraft manufacturer that I had the same safety concerns with the acmp. I further met with various engineers at aircraft manufacturer to discuss the matter to try to resolve the problem. I also arranged for a controled test to be performed on an actual aircraft acmp. Mr X became aware of my actions and quickly moved for my termination. At my termination meeting he informed me, in the presence of company human resource manager that I was being terminated because I kept aircraft manufacturer too well informed about the hydraulic system problems and that I did not filter the information that my employees were giving to aircraft manufacturer. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter states he was not going to be a part of such a cover up and was fired for his refusal to sign the safety of flight certificate. He was fortunately able to find employment elsewhere. Reporter came from another aircraft manufacturer originally and stated that they would never do such a thing and he could not either. This is a brand new aircraft and is still undergoing test procedures. It is a 2 engine jet seating about 39 people. Reporter was told that if the situation was not mentioned and an accident occurred no one would know for sure if the hydraulic pump was the problem. Unless certain events take place this equipment is not a problem, but the failure rate was too high for the engineers to be comfortable. It did not truly comply with far 25. Reporter feels the part manufacturer is concerned with time and money and willing to compromise the situation. Reporter is in the process of filing a lawsuit against the company from which he was fired.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PROGRAM MGR FOR NEW ACFT HAS CONCERNS REGARDING FAULTY DESIGN OF HYD PUMP WHICH MAY CAUSE A FIRE ON THE ACFT. ACFT EQUIP PROB HYD PUMP.

Narrative: AS PROGRAM MGR FOR THE COMPANY'S ACFT HYD SYS I BECAME AWARE OF THE FACT THAT THE HYD ELECTRICAL MOTOR PUMP (ACMP), DESIGNED AND MANUFACTURED BY PARKER ABEX, SUFFERED FROM DESIGN DEFECTS. THE DEFECTS WERE SUCH THAT UNDER THE RIGHT EVENTS THE MOTOR WOULD SMOKE AND FLAME UP IN A MANNER TO CAUSE THE ACFT TO CATCH FIRE. I BECAME AWARE OF THIS DEFECT AFTER 3 OF THE ACMP'S CAUGHT FIRE ON PARKER ABEX'S OWN TEST RIG. ACFT MANUFACTURER BEGAN HEARING RUMORS ABOUT THE ACMP TEST RIG FIRE ABOUT THE SAME TIME. I WAS DIRECTED BY MR X, HYD SYS, TO STONEWALL ACFT MANUFACTURER AND TRY TO CONVINCE THEM THAT THERE WAS NO DEFECTS WITH THE ACMP. ACFT MANUFACTURER XMITTED MEMOS AFTER MEMOS TO PARKER ABEX REQUESTING THAT CORRECTED ACTION BE TAKEN. ACFT MANUFACTURER AND PARKER ABEX RELIABILITY DEPTS BOTH WROTE RPTS THAT STATED THAT THE ACMP, AS CURRENTLY DESIGNED, WOULD CREATE AN UNACCEPTABLE SAFETY HAZARD FOR THE ACFT. AGAIN I WAS DIRECTED BY MR X TO STONEWALL ACFT MANUFACTURER AND TAKE NO ACTION. I FELT THAT I COULD NOT IGNORE THE MATTER ANY LONGER. I INFORMED ACFT MANUFACTURER THAT I HAD THE SAME SAFETY CONCERNS WITH THE ACMP. I FURTHER MET WITH VARIOUS ENGINEERS AT ACFT MANUFACTURER TO DISCUSS THE MATTER TO TRY TO RESOLVE THE PROB. I ALSO ARRANGED FOR A CTLED TEST TO BE PERFORMED ON AN ACTUAL ACFT ACMP. MR X BECAME AWARE OF MY ACTIONS AND QUICKLY MOVED FOR MY TERMINATION. AT MY TERMINATION MEETING HE INFORMED ME, IN THE PRESENCE OF COMPANY HUMAN RESOURCE MGR THAT I WAS BEING TERMINATED BECAUSE I KEPT ACFT MANUFACTURER TOO WELL INFORMED ABOUT THE HYD SYS PROBS AND THAT I DID NOT FILTER THE INFO THAT MY EMPLOYEES WERE GIVING TO ACFT MANUFACTURER. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATES HE WAS NOT GOING TO BE A PART OF SUCH A COVER UP AND WAS FIRED FOR HIS REFUSAL TO SIGN THE SAFETY OF FLT CERTIFICATE. HE WAS FORTUNATELY ABLE TO FIND EMPLOYMENT ELSEWHERE. RPTR CAME FROM ANOTHER ACFT MANUFACTURER ORIGINALLY AND STATED THAT THEY WOULD NEVER DO SUCH A THING AND HE COULD NOT EITHER. THIS IS A BRAND NEW ACFT AND IS STILL UNDERGOING TEST PROCS. IT IS A 2 ENG JET SEATING ABOUT 39 PEOPLE. RPTR WAS TOLD THAT IF THE SIT WAS NOT MENTIONED AND AN ACCIDENT OCCURRED NO ONE WOULD KNOW FOR SURE IF THE HYD PUMP WAS THE PROB. UNLESS CERTAIN EVENTS TAKE PLACE THIS EQUIP IS NOT A PROB, BUT THE FAILURE RATE WAS TOO HIGH FOR THE ENGINEERS TO BE COMFORTABLE. IT DID NOT TRULY COMPLY WITH FAR 25. RPTR FEELS THE PART MANUFACTURER IS CONCERNED WITH TIME AND MONEY AND WILLING TO COMPROMISE THE SIT. RPTR IS IN THE PROCESS OF FILING A LAWSUIT AGAINST THE COMPANY FROM WHICH HE WAS FIRED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.