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An air carrier B737 crossed the active runway 4R at taxiway east as an atx PA23 was crossing the landing threshold on that runway. Facility representative blames poor controller chairs for controllers not being able to see the runways. Facility management said this was an operational error.
| Attributes | |
| ACN | 353004 |
| Time | |
| Date | 199610 |
| Day | Mon |
| Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
| Place | |
| Locale Reference | airport : hnl |
| State Reference | HI |
| Altitude | agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 300 |
| Environment | |
| Flight Conditions | VMC |
| Light | Daylight |
| Aircraft 1 | |
| Operator | common carrier : air taxi |
| Make Model Name | PA-23-250 Aztec |
| Operating Under FAR Part | Part 135 |
| Flight Phase | landing other |
| Flight Plan | VFR |
| Aircraft 2 | |
| Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
| Make Model Name | B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model |
| Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
| Navigation In Use | Other |
| Flight Phase | ground other : taxi |
| Flight Plan | IFR |
| Person 1 | |
| Affiliation | government : faa |
| Function | other personnel other |
| Qualification | controller : radar pilot : instrument |
| Experience | controller military : 7 controller non radar : 3 controller radar : 20 controller supervisory : 20 flight time total : 4500 |
| ASRS Report | 353004 |
| Person 2 | |
| Affiliation | government : faa |
| Function | controller : local |
| Qualification | controller : non radar |
| Events | |
| Anomaly | conflict : ground critical incursion : runway non adherence : far non adherence : published procedure non adherence : required legal separation |
| Independent Detector | other controllera |
| Resolutory Action | other |
| Consequence | faa : investigated |
| Miss Distance | horizontal : 3000 vertical : 300 |
| Supplementary | |
| Primary Problem | ATC Human Performance |
| Air Traffic Incident | Operational Error |
Narrative:
FAA management concluded incident was an operational error, failure to scan by local controller. Air carrier Y was crossing runway 4L at taxiway east from runway 4R, small transport X was over landing threshold. During subsequent conferences with investigator-in-charge, this individual does not concede to our recommendations that there was, in fact, environmental conditions which are pertinent to the operational error. Management does not believe the runway 8L notamed closure is pertinent. However, on a daily basis, flow control is instituted for this closure to assist in limited airspace for TRACON functions and for tower for runway acceptance rates. Additionally, the 'domore' hydraulic controller chairs have been made inoperative for full extension to view runways and txwys for several months. This is per FAA directives for safety. Chairs were supposed to be repaired by the last week of oct/xx/96. As of jan/xx/96, this has not been completed, nor started. All position in cabin have limited or blocked viewing of active runways or txwys due to low chair ht, blocked by counters and BRITE radars -- local was assisted by cabin coordinator who could not view location of occurrence.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: AN ACR B737 CROSSED THE ACTIVE RWY 4R AT TXWY E AS AN ATX PA23 WAS XING THE LNDG THRESHOLD ON THAT RWY. FACILITY REPRESENTATIVE BLAMES POOR CTLR CHAIRS FOR CTLRS NOT BEING ABLE TO SEE THE RWYS. FACILITY MGMNT SAID THIS WAS AN OPERROR.
Narrative: FAA MGMNT CONCLUDED INCIDENT WAS AN OPERROR, FAILURE TO SCAN BY LCL CTLR. ACR Y WAS XING RWY 4L AT TXWY E FROM RWY 4R, SMT X WAS OVER LNDG THRESHOLD. DURING SUBSEQUENT CONFERENCES WITH INVESTIGATOR-IN-CHARGE, THIS INDIVIDUAL DOES NOT CONCEDE TO OUR RECOMMENDATIONS THAT THERE WAS, IN FACT, ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS WHICH ARE PERTINENT TO THE OPERROR. MGMNT DOES NOT BELIEVE THE RWY 8L NOTAMED CLOSURE IS PERTINENT. HOWEVER, ON A DAILY BASIS, FLOW CTL IS INSTITUTED FOR THIS CLOSURE TO ASSIST IN LIMITED AIRSPACE FOR TRACON FUNCTIONS AND FOR TWR FOR RWY ACCEPTANCE RATES. ADDITIONALLY, THE 'DOMORE' HYD CTLR CHAIRS HAVE BEEN MADE INOP FOR FULL EXTENSION TO VIEW RWYS AND TXWYS FOR SEVERAL MONTHS. THIS IS PER FAA DIRECTIVES FOR SAFETY. CHAIRS WERE SUPPOSED TO BE REPAIRED BY THE LAST WK OF OCT/XX/96. AS OF JAN/XX/96, THIS HAS NOT BEEN COMPLETED, NOR STARTED. ALL POS IN CABIN HAVE LIMITED OR BLOCKED VIEWING OF ACTIVE RWYS OR TXWYS DUE TO LOW CHAIR HT, BLOCKED BY COUNTERS AND BRITE RADARS -- LCL WAS ASSISTED BY CABIN COORDINATOR WHO COULD NOT VIEW LOCATION OF OCCURRENCE.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.