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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 353033 |
Time | |
Date | 199611 |
Day | Sun |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : sbn |
State Reference | IN |
Altitude | agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | Marginal |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Jetstream 41 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 135 |
Navigation In Use | Other Other |
Flight Phase | ground : preflight other |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : instrument pilot : flight engineer pilot : atp pilot : commercial |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 5 flight time total : 2430 flight time type : 410 |
ASRS Report | 353033 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Events | |
Anomaly | conflict : ground critical other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other other : unspecified |
Resolutory Action | none taken : detected after the fact |
Consequence | other Other |
Supplementary | |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation other |
Narrative:
I am writing this report in regards to a situation which occurred in south bend, in, on nov/sun/96, during an engine start. I am a first officer for a commuter operation, and while sitting in the right seat of our aircraft, a BAE4100, I was advised by the captain that we would be starting the #2 engine first, instead of the #1 engine which is usually started first. The ground station mgrs want all #2 engines to be started first because of the gpu's location. After we had completed the before start checklist, the captain signaled the ramp agent that we were ready to start #2 engine. The ramp agent then signaled to start the #1 engine, and the captain questioned the response by again holding up 2 fingers and pointing to the #2 engine. The ramp agent, looking confused, then signaled to start the #2 engine and the captain responded by asking me 'cleared to start #2?' I then looked at the area surrounding the engine, propeller, and wing and could not see anything that would prohibit a clear, successful start. I also looked to see the propeller was in the flat position (on the start locks) and the gas cap was secure, and then responded to the captain's question with the appropriate company procedures response of 'clear, flat, cap.' a few seconds after the captain had pressed the engine start button, I heard a thump, like something hitting the side of the aircraft. I then looked in front of the aircraft and saw the ramp agent with a frantic look on her face so I advised the captain to 'abort the start,' at which time he did. I then saw, through the window to my right side, another ramp agent walk out from between the propeller and the aircraft fuselage. I also saw her tell the ramp agent in front of the aircraft that she was alright and the propeller had missed her. The captain then had the flight attendant open the aircraft door, after which he talked with the ramp agent (the one who had given him the start signal) to make sure everyone and everything was ok. After the captain had confirmed everyone and everything was ok, we started the #1 engine with internal power, and performed the rest of our duties for a normal departure. Once we arrived at our destination, we were told by our operations department that the ramp agent (in between the propeller and aircraft fuselage) had changed her story and now said she was hit twice by the propeller, although not severely harmed. It wouldn't do much good to point fingers at who is to blame, but much is to be learned from this situation of events: 1) policy should be made to never park a gpu in front of the aircraft, with its power line having to run beside or near an engine to be plugged in (our case it was, since the BAE4100's external power receptacle is located behind the #2 engine). 2) I believe the captain of every flight, propeller or jet, should personally talk to the ramp agent who will be giving the start signals, and advise him/her of the start sequence he (captain) wishes to use. 3) I also have learned that regardless of the situation, you should never let people rush you, in which case safety is jeopardized, just to shave off a few mins. Being that in the airline business, time means money, people are (will) always trying (try) to hurry things and the line of communication is usually broken.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A RAMP AGENT WAS STRUCK BY A PROP DURING ENG START OF A BAE4100 JETSTREAM. AGENT RECEIVED ONLY MINOR INJURIES. THIS INCIDENT WAS MAINLY CAUSED BY THE USE OF AN AMENDED PROC USED IN STARTING THE #2 ENG FIRST RATHER THAN #1 DUE TO THE DIRECTION OF THE STATION AGENT AND THE APU PWR CART.
Narrative: I AM WRITING THIS RPT IN REGARDS TO A SIT WHICH OCCURRED IN SOUTH BEND, IN, ON NOV/SUN/96, DURING AN ENG START. I AM A FO FOR A COMMUTER OP, AND WHILE SITTING IN THE R SEAT OF OUR ACFT, A BAE4100, I WAS ADVISED BY THE CAPT THAT WE WOULD BE STARTING THE #2 ENG FIRST, INSTEAD OF THE #1 ENG WHICH IS USUALLY STARTED FIRST. THE GND STATION MGRS WANT ALL #2 ENGS TO BE STARTED FIRST BECAUSE OF THE GPU'S LOCATION. AFTER WE HAD COMPLETED THE BEFORE START CHKLIST, THE CAPT SIGNALED THE RAMP AGENT THAT WE WERE READY TO START #2 ENG. THE RAMP AGENT THEN SIGNALED TO START THE #1 ENG, AND THE CAPT QUESTIONED THE RESPONSE BY AGAIN HOLDING UP 2 FINGERS AND POINTING TO THE #2 ENG. THE RAMP AGENT, LOOKING CONFUSED, THEN SIGNALED TO START THE #2 ENG AND THE CAPT RESPONDED BY ASKING ME 'CLRED TO START #2?' I THEN LOOKED AT THE AREA SURROUNDING THE ENG, PROP, AND WING AND COULD NOT SEE ANYTHING THAT WOULD PROHIBIT A CLR, SUCCESSFUL START. I ALSO LOOKED TO SEE THE PROP WAS IN THE FLAT POS (ON THE START LOCKS) AND THE GAS CAP WAS SECURE, AND THEN RESPONDED TO THE CAPT'S QUESTION WITH THE APPROPRIATE COMPANY PROCS RESPONSE OF 'CLR, FLAT, CAP.' A FEW SECONDS AFTER THE CAPT HAD PRESSED THE ENG START BUTTON, I HEARD A THUMP, LIKE SOMETHING HITTING THE SIDE OF THE ACFT. I THEN LOOKED IN FRONT OF THE ACFT AND SAW THE RAMP AGENT WITH A FRANTIC LOOK ON HER FACE SO I ADVISED THE CAPT TO 'ABORT THE START,' AT WHICH TIME HE DID. I THEN SAW, THROUGH THE WINDOW TO MY R SIDE, ANOTHER RAMP AGENT WALK OUT FROM BTWN THE PROP AND THE ACFT FUSELAGE. I ALSO SAW HER TELL THE RAMP AGENT IN FRONT OF THE ACFT THAT SHE WAS ALRIGHT AND THE PROP HAD MISSED HER. THE CAPT THEN HAD THE FLT ATTENDANT OPEN THE ACFT DOOR, AFTER WHICH HE TALKED WITH THE RAMP AGENT (THE ONE WHO HAD GIVEN HIM THE START SIGNAL) TO MAKE SURE EVERYONE AND EVERYTHING WAS OK. AFTER THE CAPT HAD CONFIRMED EVERYONE AND EVERYTHING WAS OK, WE STARTED THE #1 ENG WITH INTERNAL PWR, AND PERFORMED THE REST OF OUR DUTIES FOR A NORMAL DEP. ONCE WE ARRIVED AT OUR DEST, WE WERE TOLD BY OUR OPS DEPT THAT THE RAMP AGENT (IN BTWN THE PROP AND ACFT FUSELAGE) HAD CHANGED HER STORY AND NOW SAID SHE WAS HIT TWICE BY THE PROP, ALTHOUGH NOT SEVERELY HARMED. IT WOULDN'T DO MUCH GOOD TO POINT FINGERS AT WHO IS TO BLAME, BUT MUCH IS TO BE LEARNED FROM THIS SIT OF EVENTS: 1) POLICY SHOULD BE MADE TO NEVER PARK A GPU IN FRONT OF THE ACFT, WITH ITS PWR LINE HAVING TO RUN BESIDE OR NEAR AN ENG TO BE PLUGGED IN (OUR CASE IT WAS, SINCE THE BAE4100'S EXTERNAL PWR RECEPTACLE IS LOCATED BEHIND THE #2 ENG). 2) I BELIEVE THE CAPT OF EVERY FLT, PROP OR JET, SHOULD PERSONALLY TALK TO THE RAMP AGENT WHO WILL BE GIVING THE START SIGNALS, AND ADVISE HIM/HER OF THE START SEQUENCE HE (CAPT) WISHES TO USE. 3) I ALSO HAVE LEARNED THAT REGARDLESS OF THE SIT, YOU SHOULD NEVER LET PEOPLE RUSH YOU, IN WHICH CASE SAFETY IS JEOPARDIZED, JUST TO SHAVE OFF A FEW MINS. BEING THAT IN THE AIRLINE BUSINESS, TIME MEANS MONEY, PEOPLE ARE (WILL) ALWAYS TRYING (TRY) TO HURRY THINGS AND THE LINE OF COM IS USUALLY BROKEN.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.