Narrative:

We started our descent inbound to grr. At approximately 30 NM southwest of grr we started getting spurious indications in the master fire warning system. The master fire warning light on the glareshield was flickering very dimly associated with a very faint warning bell. There were no lights illuminated on the pedestal. We tested the fire warning system satisfactorily and managed to isolate the problem to #2 engine. Engine parameters were normal and we continued assuming an indication problem. While we were on a visual approach at 1500 ft AGL, on a 4 NM left base, the fire warning went to steady with all indications for the #2 engine. We executed the immediate action items for the engine fire checklist and advised grr tower and our flight attendants of the emergency and possible evacuate/evacuation. A single engine landing was made and after the aircraft stopped, we queried the tower as to whether or not they could confirm smoke of flames. Initially they said no, but as the fire trucks approached the aircraft, tower then relayed that crash fire rescue equipment did see smoke coming out of the #2 engine. I initiated the evacuate/evacuation. During the evacuate/evacuation the flight attendants encountered problems with the slides. Door #1L slide did not deploy automatically. The first flight attendant tried to engaged the manual inflation handle but was unable to. The first officer finally was able to deploy the slide with an estimated force of 80 pounds. Door #1R slide also did not deploy automatically, but was deployed by the flight attendant with the manual inflation handle. Door #2R deployed automatically, but door #2L made both rear exits unusable by the slide deploying early inside the aircraft when door #2L was only half way open. Some passenger did utilize the overwing exits and the aircraft was evacuate/evacuationed without any further problems. My first officer and I directed the people away from the aircraft. I asked if anyone was injured and at that point no one indicated to me any medical problems. Later we learned 2 passenger had suffered sprained ankles and 1 flight attendant had a minor cut on her finger. The passenger and crew were shuttled to the terminal and dispatch and maintenance were advised. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the aircraft was an older version of the B737-200, built in the early 60's. The postflt inspection found a dead short in one of the engine fire warning loop detectors. This caused the initial spurious signal that had been assumed to be 'false.' the doors were not addressed as the reporter stated that the NTSB report on this incident would be out in a few months and would cover this issue. It was hinted that at least one airworthiness directive had been overlooked regarding corrections to the doors or escape slides. The smoke emanating from the engine was from the latent extinguisher material that had been fired from the 2 bottles into #2 engine. In the dark it was hard to discern if it was residual or smoke from a fire. The evacuate/evacuation started within 90 seconds after the aircraft came to a stop.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMER DECLARED IN ACR B737-200. ENG FIRE WARNING, INFLT ENG SHUTDOWN. SMOKE IS OBSERVED BY CFR EMER GND EQUIP AND ACFT EVACED. PROBS ENCOUNTERED WITH EMER EVAC SLIDES DURING EVAC PHASE OF THIS NIGHT OP.

Narrative: WE STARTED OUR DSCNT INBOUND TO GRR. AT APPROX 30 NM SW OF GRR WE STARTED GETTING SPURIOUS INDICATIONS IN THE MASTER FIRE WARNING SYS. THE MASTER FIRE WARNING LIGHT ON THE GLARESHIELD WAS FLICKERING VERY DIMLY ASSOCIATED WITH A VERY FAINT WARNING BELL. THERE WERE NO LIGHTS ILLUMINATED ON THE PEDESTAL. WE TESTED THE FIRE WARNING SYS SATISFACTORILY AND MANAGED TO ISOLATE THE PROB TO #2 ENG. ENG PARAMETERS WERE NORMAL AND WE CONTINUED ASSUMING AN INDICATION PROB. WHILE WE WERE ON A VISUAL APCH AT 1500 FT AGL, ON A 4 NM L BASE, THE FIRE WARNING WENT TO STEADY WITH ALL INDICATIONS FOR THE #2 ENG. WE EXECUTED THE IMMEDIATE ACTION ITEMS FOR THE ENG FIRE CHKLIST AND ADVISED GRR TWR AND OUR FLT ATTENDANTS OF THE EMER AND POSSIBLE EVAC. A SINGLE ENG LNDG WAS MADE AND AFTER THE ACFT STOPPED, WE QUERIED THE TWR AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THEY COULD CONFIRM SMOKE OF FLAMES. INITIALLY THEY SAID NO, BUT AS THE FIRE TRUCKS APCHED THE ACFT, TWR THEN RELAYED THAT CFR DID SEE SMOKE COMING OUT OF THE #2 ENG. I INITIATED THE EVAC. DURING THE EVAC THE FLT ATTENDANTS ENCOUNTERED PROBS WITH THE SLIDES. DOOR #1L SLIDE DID NOT DEPLOY AUTOMATICALLY. THE FIRST FLT ATTENDANT TRIED TO ENGAGED THE MANUAL INFLATION HANDLE BUT WAS UNABLE TO. THE FO FINALLY WAS ABLE TO DEPLOY THE SLIDE WITH AN ESTIMATED FORCE OF 80 LBS. DOOR #1R SLIDE ALSO DID NOT DEPLOY AUTOMATICALLY, BUT WAS DEPLOYED BY THE FLT ATTENDANT WITH THE MANUAL INFLATION HANDLE. DOOR #2R DEPLOYED AUTOMATICALLY, BUT DOOR #2L MADE BOTH REAR EXITS UNUSABLE BY THE SLIDE DEPLOYING EARLY INSIDE THE ACFT WHEN DOOR #2L WAS ONLY HALF WAY OPEN. SOME PAX DID UTILIZE THE OVERWING EXITS AND THE ACFT WAS EVACED WITHOUT ANY FURTHER PROBS. MY FO AND I DIRECTED THE PEOPLE AWAY FROM THE ACFT. I ASKED IF ANYONE WAS INJURED AND AT THAT POINT NO ONE INDICATED TO ME ANY MEDICAL PROBS. LATER WE LEARNED 2 PAX HAD SUFFERED SPRAINED ANKLES AND 1 FLT ATTENDANT HAD A MINOR CUT ON HER FINGER. THE PAX AND CREW WERE SHUTTLED TO THE TERMINAL AND DISPATCH AND MAINT WERE ADVISED. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE ACFT WAS AN OLDER VERSION OF THE B737-200, BUILT IN THE EARLY 60'S. THE POSTFLT INSPECTION FOUND A DEAD SHORT IN ONE OF THE ENG FIRE WARNING LOOP DETECTORS. THIS CAUSED THE INITIAL SPURIOUS SIGNAL THAT HAD BEEN ASSUMED TO BE 'FALSE.' THE DOORS WERE NOT ADDRESSED AS THE RPTR STATED THAT THE NTSB RPT ON THIS INCIDENT WOULD BE OUT IN A FEW MONTHS AND WOULD COVER THIS ISSUE. IT WAS HINTED THAT AT LEAST ONE AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE HAD BEEN OVERLOOKED REGARDING CORRECTIONS TO THE DOORS OR ESCAPE SLIDES. THE SMOKE EMANATING FROM THE ENG WAS FROM THE LATENT EXTINGUISHER MATERIAL THAT HAD BEEN FIRED FROM THE 2 BOTTLES INTO #2 ENG. IN THE DARK IT WAS HARD TO DISCERN IF IT WAS RESIDUAL OR SMOKE FROM A FIRE. THE EVAC STARTED WITHIN 90 SECONDS AFTER THE ACFT CAME TO A STOP.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.