Narrative:

Passing FL350, #3 engine N1 started fluctuating +/-3 percent, at first. Over a short period of time, the fluctuations got much worse. Attempts to stabilize the engine were unsuccessful. The first officer noted that he had lost control of the engine, by the throttle, shortly thereafter. We did an in-flight engine shutdown and, being unable to maintain altitude, descended and turned back to sdf. While descending, the so noted that the #3 boost/feed switch was in the 'off' position. An in-flight restart was attempted at FL310, but was unsuccessful. Passing FL190, in a descent, another in-flight engine start was attempted. The engine started normally. During the return flight to sdf, the engine operated normally. When the problem first started, the fluctuations of the engine, along with dropping oil pressure, led me to believe the engine might be 'eating itself.' I felt the safest course of action was a 'precautionary engine shutdown.' after the #3 boost/feed switch was discovered to be 'off,' my thoughts were that the engine had not shown what would be considered indications of fuel starvation. It was my judgement, that the safest course of action, was to return to our point of origination and have the engine checked out. The switch in question is normally 'covered' with a relatively large plastic knob indicating its function. The knob was missing for this flight and listed as a 'deferred item' as per our company maintenance procedures. This did make the switch harder to see and subsequently it was overlooked during normal checklist flows. Supplemental information from acn 354792: I noticed the #3 boost pump switch, without the large plastic knob, off. I tried to move the switch to the on position, which I did, and the boost/feed light illuminated and then went out, indicating that fuel pressure was being provided to the #3 engine. I checked the large, plastic knob on the boost pump switch immediately next to this switch, the center-wing auxiliary boost pump switch and it was on. It should not have been on because there was no fuel in this tank. During my before engine start checklist procedures, I scanned the boost pump switches as I turned them on. I did not grab a switch, turn it on, confirm the fuel pressure gauge was indicating pressure, and then proceed to the next switch, as I should have. Contributing factor: my haste in accomplishing the checklist and performing this portion in a perfunctory manner. The large plastic knob was missing. This did make the switch harder to see and it was overlooked during normal checklist flows.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR DC8-70 FREIGHTER CREW HAD AN INFLT ENG SHUTDOWN. THE FUEL BOOST PUMP WAS 'OFF.'

Narrative: PASSING FL350, #3 ENG N1 STARTED FLUCTUATING +/-3 PERCENT, AT FIRST. OVER A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME, THE FLUCTUATIONS GOT MUCH WORSE. ATTEMPTS TO STABILIZE THE ENG WERE UNSUCCESSFUL. THE FO NOTED THAT HE HAD LOST CTL OF THE ENG, BY THE THROTTLE, SHORTLY THEREAFTER. WE DID AN INFLT ENG SHUTDOWN AND, BEING UNABLE TO MAINTAIN ALT, DSNDED AND TURNED BACK TO SDF. WHILE DSNDING, THE SO NOTED THAT THE #3 BOOST/FEED SWITCH WAS IN THE 'OFF' POS. AN INFLT RESTART WAS ATTEMPTED AT FL310, BUT WAS UNSUCCESSFUL. PASSING FL190, IN A DSCNT, ANOTHER INFLT ENG START WAS ATTEMPTED. THE ENG STARTED NORMALLY. DURING THE RETURN FLT TO SDF, THE ENG OPERATED NORMALLY. WHEN THE PROB FIRST STARTED, THE FLUCTUATIONS OF THE ENG, ALONG WITH DROPPING OIL PRESSURE, LED ME TO BELIEVE THE ENG MIGHT BE 'EATING ITSELF.' I FELT THE SAFEST COURSE OF ACTION WAS A 'PRECAUTIONARY ENG SHUTDOWN.' AFTER THE #3 BOOST/FEED SWITCH WAS DISCOVERED TO BE 'OFF,' MY THOUGHTS WERE THAT THE ENG HAD NOT SHOWN WHAT WOULD BE CONSIDERED INDICATIONS OF FUEL STARVATION. IT WAS MY JUDGEMENT, THAT THE SAFEST COURSE OF ACTION, WAS TO RETURN TO OUR POINT OF ORIGINATION AND HAVE THE ENG CHKED OUT. THE SWITCH IN QUESTION IS NORMALLY 'COVERED' WITH A RELATIVELY LARGE PLASTIC KNOB INDICATING ITS FUNCTION. THE KNOB WAS MISSING FOR THIS FLT AND LISTED AS A 'DEFERRED ITEM' AS PER OUR COMPANY MAINT PROCS. THIS DID MAKE THE SWITCH HARDER TO SEE AND SUBSEQUENTLY IT WAS OVERLOOKED DURING NORMAL CHKLIST FLOWS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 354792: I NOTICED THE #3 BOOST PUMP SWITCH, WITHOUT THE LARGE PLASTIC KNOB, OFF. I TRIED TO MOVE THE SWITCH TO THE ON POS, WHICH I DID, AND THE BOOST/FEED LIGHT ILLUMINATED AND THEN WENT OUT, INDICATING THAT FUEL PRESSURE WAS BEING PROVIDED TO THE #3 ENG. I CHKED THE LARGE, PLASTIC KNOB ON THE BOOST PUMP SWITCH IMMEDIATELY NEXT TO THIS SWITCH, THE CTR-WING AUX BOOST PUMP SWITCH AND IT WAS ON. IT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ON BECAUSE THERE WAS NO FUEL IN THIS TANK. DURING MY BEFORE ENG START CHKLIST PROCS, I SCANNED THE BOOST PUMP SWITCHES AS I TURNED THEM ON. I DID NOT GRAB A SWITCH, TURN IT ON, CONFIRM THE FUEL PRESSURE GAUGE WAS INDICATING PRESSURE, AND THEN PROCEED TO THE NEXT SWITCH, AS I SHOULD HAVE. CONTRIBUTING FACTOR: MY HASTE IN ACCOMPLISHING THE CHKLIST AND PERFORMING THIS PORTION IN A PERFUNCTORY MANNER. THE LARGE PLASTIC KNOB WAS MISSING. THIS DID MAKE THE SWITCH HARDER TO SEE AND IT WAS OVERLOOKED DURING NORMAL CHKLIST FLOWS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.