Narrative:

We were on FAA proving runs en route from iah to mco. We had reached our cruising altitude of FL370. In the cockpit of a B727-200, was the crew of 3 and 1, sometimes 2, FAA aviation safety inspectors. Just prior to reaching sji VOR, the flight crew received an interphone call from the flight attendants stating that the FAA safety inspectors had given them a box that was a suspected bomb or explosive device. It was similar to a shoe box in size, was gift wrapped and it was 'unaccounted for by any passenger.' it was making a ticking noise and they were treating it as an actual bomb and were making the necessary preparations to position it in the R-1 galley. For this situation, normal company procedures require us to declare an emergency with ATC, advise them of our situation with the idented bomb on board, and request immediate assistance and priority handling to the nearest available appropriate airport. Unfortunately, our FAA aviation safety inspector had specifically requested that we do not advise ATC of their 'simulated emergency,' but that we were to improvise procedures to 'expedite' a landing. In an actual emergency situation such as this, ATC is our primary and most important resource, a resource denied to us by our aviation safety inspector. With the loss of our primary resource, we were required to improvise a procedure to resolve the 'emergency' to the satisfaction of the aviation safety inspectors. I requested that the so contact the company via phone patch. I requested the first officer to request a diversion to mobile, as I had been into the downtown airport facilities previously. The first officer also requested a descent so that we could reduce the cabin pressure as if we had an actual bomb aboard. I contacted the flight attendants via the interphone. They had completed the appropriate procedures in the cabin. I advised them that we were diverting to mobile and at that time gave them an estimate of 15-20 mins to the ground. The FAA aviation safety inspector was in the jump seat observing our improvised procedures to resolve their 'simulated emergency.' I was on the interphone at the point where the first officer received the clearance to divert to mobile. He repeated the clearance and the verbal portion that I heard was 'cleared to mobile (no airport defined) via radar vectors. I requested the so to acquire the approach plates for mobile. We were descending at approximately 4000 FPM as the first officer received further clrncs to 3000 ft as we neared mobile. During this descent, I briefed the crew for a landing at downtown airport, with the FAA aviation safety inspector observing the briefing. As we approached the mobile area, we were on a heading of 270 degrees and level at 3000 ft, a vector that took us right into a downwind to downtown airport. I advised ATC that we had the airport (downtown) in sight and were requesting a visual approach. I called downtown tower, advised them of our position and requested a visual approach. Downtown tower advised that they had traffic on a 1 mi final for runway 14. I advised the first officer when to turn base and we landed without incident. Our understanding was that the 'simulated bomb' problem was still in effect and we taxied to an open ramp area in front of an FBO where a marshal was guiding us to a parking spot. We followed the procedures for an emergency evacuate/evacuation and called for an evacuate/evacuation from the aircraft through the aft airstairs and 2 aft galley exits. During our taxi into the FBO ramp, ground control advised us to call ms X at approach control. This was our first indication that there was an ATC problem. I contacted ms X and she advised me that ATC understood that our flight was to go to mobile regional airport. I explained the situation that we were on FAA proving runs and that our FAA aviation safety inspector had required us to 'simulate' the procedures of having an explosive device and required to improvise nonstandard procedures to accomplish an 'emergency landing.' ms X requested my name, the address of the company, and the name and FSDO of our principal operations inspector. I gave her the name of our poi out of houston FSDO. She indicated that they would review the tapes and that I should call her back in approximately 2 hours. I immediately reported the situation to inspector Y and advised him of ms X's request. Inspector Y advised me that he would call her to discuss the situation. After inspector Y returned from his conversation with ms X, I asked him if I should call her as she had requested. Inspector Y advised me that he had worked to resolve the situation and that I should not call her. I complied with his recommendation. During this flight we had 1, and sometimes 2 FAA aviation safety inspectors on the cockpit jumpseat and were considered by the company as additional crew members. It is a required company procedure that we brief the jump seat riders concerning their responsibilities (and in this case, as an additional crew member). Both FAA aviation safety inspectors acknowledged our jump seat briefing, which included sterile cockpit below 10000 ft and the requirement to advise the flight crew if they observed any situation that affected the safety of the flight. If in fact, the aviation safety inspectors were aware of the misunderstanding concerning the diversion airport. They failed their prebriefed obligation to advise the flight crew of the safety infringement. During the process of FAA proving runs, if simulated emergency procedures that affect ATC, it can lead to an unsafe operation if ATC resources cannot be used, as indicated by our situation. FAA approved flight operations procedures should be utilized in all emergency sits, not improvised procedures. The proving runs should be a test of our company procedures to validate them. Instead, we are being tested on our ability to improvise emergency procedures, an unsafe practice. If an actual emergency procedure is to be performed on a proving run, FAA should coordinate the procedure with ATC so that normal company emergency procedures could be utilized. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter's air carrier had failed 3 previous proving runs because of maintenance problems. It failed this one also due to its own maintenance problems at ord, not due to maintenance purchased at bfm. The reporter believes that the aci's on board could not say anything about the wrong airport landing without putting themselves on report as they had agreed notto let something of this magnitude happen. The first officer on this trip had 16 hours in the B727, and the so barely had 50 hours in the last 6 months. The reporter felt as if he was flying solo. The bfm/mob situation was 'pretty mild' compared to what happened to the proving run at mco and then ord. The reporter lost his check airman's rating and has since gone on to another company as director of training. He is pleased to be away from this air carrier. Supplemental information from acn 355181: there are 2 airports in mobile and the captain requested 'downtown.' ATC assumed we were going to 'regional.' both airports in mobile have runway 14. The approach controller never mentioned which airport we were being vectored towards. ATC never gave a frequency for tower only to 'contact tower.' callback conversation with reporter acn #355181 revealed the following information: the reporter does not know what was said by his air carrier to the FSDO and the aci's. The air carrier passed its proving runs and is operating with these 'new' aircraft. Mobile downtown is the former brookley AFB. It is currently used by large aircraft and has a major repair facility. As the captain was familiar with this airport, and it has a much longer runway, the captain went there. Mobile regional is the traditional air carrier airport, so it is reasonable that ARTCC thought that the aircraft would go there. The reporter believes that the miscom happened about 150 mi out when it was not made clear which airport was intended. There was no traffic conflict. The captain is no longer with this air carrier, he has moved on to another air carrier.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR B727 MADE A WRONG ARPT LNDG, IN THE MINDS OF ARTCC, AT MOBILE.

Narrative: WE WERE ON FAA PROVING RUNS ENRTE FROM IAH TO MCO. WE HAD REACHED OUR CRUISING ALT OF FL370. IN THE COCKPIT OF A B727-200, WAS THE CREW OF 3 AND 1, SOMETIMES 2, FAA AVIATION SAFETY INSPECTORS. JUST PRIOR TO REACHING SJI VOR, THE FLC RECEIVED AN INTERPHONE CALL FROM THE FLT ATTENDANTS STATING THAT THE FAA SAFETY INSPECTORS HAD GIVEN THEM A BOX THAT WAS A SUSPECTED BOMB OR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE. IT WAS SIMILAR TO A SHOE BOX IN SIZE, WAS GIFT WRAPPED AND IT WAS 'UNACCOUNTED FOR BY ANY PAX.' IT WAS MAKING A TICKING NOISE AND THEY WERE TREATING IT AS AN ACTUAL BOMB AND WERE MAKING THE NECESSARY PREPARATIONS TO POS IT IN THE R-1 GALLEY. FOR THIS SIT, NORMAL COMPANY PROCS REQUIRE US TO DECLARE AN EMER WITH ATC, ADVISE THEM OF OUR SIT WITH THE IDENTED BOMB ON BOARD, AND REQUEST IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE AND PRIORITY HANDLING TO THE NEAREST AVAILABLE APPROPRIATE ARPT. UNFORTUNATELY, OUR FAA AVIATION SAFETY INSPECTOR HAD SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED THAT WE DO NOT ADVISE ATC OF THEIR 'SIMULATED EMER,' BUT THAT WE WERE TO IMPROVISE PROCS TO 'EXPEDITE' A LNDG. IN AN ACTUAL EMER SIT SUCH AS THIS, ATC IS OUR PRIMARY AND MOST IMPORTANT RESOURCE, A RESOURCE DENIED TO US BY OUR AVIATION SAFETY INSPECTOR. WITH THE LOSS OF OUR PRIMARY RESOURCE, WE WERE REQUIRED TO IMPROVISE A PROC TO RESOLVE THE 'EMER' TO THE SATISFACTION OF THE AVIATION SAFETY INSPECTORS. I REQUESTED THAT THE SO CONTACT THE COMPANY VIA PHONE PATCH. I REQUESTED THE FO TO REQUEST A DIVERSION TO MOBILE, AS I HAD BEEN INTO THE DOWNTOWN ARPT FACILITIES PREVIOUSLY. THE FO ALSO REQUESTED A DSCNT SO THAT WE COULD REDUCE THE CABIN PRESSURE AS IF WE HAD AN ACTUAL BOMB ABOARD. I CONTACTED THE FLT ATTENDANTS VIA THE INTERPHONE. THEY HAD COMPLETED THE APPROPRIATE PROCS IN THE CABIN. I ADVISED THEM THAT WE WERE DIVERTING TO MOBILE AND AT THAT TIME GAVE THEM AN ESTIMATE OF 15-20 MINS TO THE GND. THE FAA AVIATION SAFETY INSPECTOR WAS IN THE JUMP SEAT OBSERVING OUR IMPROVISED PROCS TO RESOLVE THEIR 'SIMULATED EMER.' I WAS ON THE INTERPHONE AT THE POINT WHERE THE FO RECEIVED THE CLRNC TO DIVERT TO MOBILE. HE REPEATED THE CLRNC AND THE VERBAL PORTION THAT I HEARD WAS 'CLRED TO MOBILE (NO ARPT DEFINED) VIA RADAR VECTORS. I REQUESTED THE SO TO ACQUIRE THE APCH PLATES FOR MOBILE. WE WERE DSNDING AT APPROX 4000 FPM AS THE FO RECEIVED FURTHER CLRNCS TO 3000 FT AS WE NEARED MOBILE. DURING THIS DSCNT, I BRIEFED THE CREW FOR A LNDG AT DOWNTOWN ARPT, WITH THE FAA AVIATION SAFETY INSPECTOR OBSERVING THE BRIEFING. AS WE APCHED THE MOBILE AREA, WE WERE ON A HDG OF 270 DEGS AND LEVEL AT 3000 FT, A VECTOR THAT TOOK US RIGHT INTO A DOWNWIND TO DOWNTOWN ARPT. I ADVISED ATC THAT WE HAD THE ARPT (DOWNTOWN) IN SIGHT AND WERE REQUESTING A VISUAL APCH. I CALLED DOWNTOWN TWR, ADVISED THEM OF OUR POS AND REQUESTED A VISUAL APCH. DOWNTOWN TWR ADVISED THAT THEY HAD TFC ON A 1 MI FINAL FOR RWY 14. I ADVISED THE FO WHEN TO TURN BASE AND WE LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT. OUR UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT THE 'SIMULATED BOMB' PROB WAS STILL IN EFFECT AND WE TAXIED TO AN OPEN RAMP AREA IN FRONT OF AN FBO WHERE A MARSHAL WAS GUIDING US TO A PARKING SPOT. WE FOLLOWED THE PROCS FOR AN EMER EVAC AND CALLED FOR AN EVAC FROM THE ACFT THROUGH THE AFT AIRSTAIRS AND 2 AFT GALLEY EXITS. DURING OUR TAXI INTO THE FBO RAMP, GND CTL ADVISED US TO CALL MS X AT APCH CTL. THIS WAS OUR FIRST INDICATION THAT THERE WAS AN ATC PROB. I CONTACTED MS X AND SHE ADVISED ME THAT ATC UNDERSTOOD THAT OUR FLT WAS TO GO TO MOBILE REGIONAL ARPT. I EXPLAINED THE SIT THAT WE WERE ON FAA PROVING RUNS AND THAT OUR FAA AVIATION SAFETY INSPECTOR HAD REQUIRED US TO 'SIMULATE' THE PROCS OF HAVING AN EXPLOSIVE DEVICE AND REQUIRED TO IMPROVISE NONSTANDARD PROCS TO ACCOMPLISH AN 'EMER LNDG.' MS X REQUESTED MY NAME, THE ADDRESS OF THE COMPANY, AND THE NAME AND FSDO OF OUR PRINCIPAL OPS INSPECTOR. I GAVE HER THE NAME OF OUR POI OUT OF HOUSTON FSDO. SHE INDICATED THAT THEY WOULD REVIEW THE TAPES AND THAT I SHOULD CALL HER BACK IN APPROX 2 HRS. I IMMEDIATELY RPTED THE SIT TO INSPECTOR Y AND ADVISED HIM OF MS X'S REQUEST. INSPECTOR Y ADVISED ME THAT HE WOULD CALL HER TO DISCUSS THE SIT. AFTER INSPECTOR Y RETURNED FROM HIS CONVERSATION WITH MS X, I ASKED HIM IF I SHOULD CALL HER AS SHE HAD REQUESTED. INSPECTOR Y ADVISED ME THAT HE HAD WORKED TO RESOLVE THE SIT AND THAT I SHOULD NOT CALL HER. I COMPLIED WITH HIS RECOMMENDATION. DURING THIS FLT WE HAD 1, AND SOMETIMES 2 FAA AVIATION SAFETY INSPECTORS ON THE COCKPIT JUMPSEAT AND WERE CONSIDERED BY THE COMPANY AS ADDITIONAL CREW MEMBERS. IT IS A REQUIRED COMPANY PROC THAT WE BRIEF THE JUMP SEAT RIDERS CONCERNING THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES (AND IN THIS CASE, AS AN ADDITIONAL CREW MEMBER). BOTH FAA AVIATION SAFETY INSPECTORS ACKNOWLEDGED OUR JUMP SEAT BRIEFING, WHICH INCLUDED STERILE COCKPIT BELOW 10000 FT AND THE REQUIREMENT TO ADVISE THE FLC IF THEY OBSERVED ANY SIT THAT AFFECTED THE SAFETY OF THE FLT. IF IN FACT, THE AVIATION SAFETY INSPECTORS WERE AWARE OF THE MISUNDERSTANDING CONCERNING THE DIVERSION ARPT. THEY FAILED THEIR PREBRIEFED OBLIGATION TO ADVISE THE FLC OF THE SAFETY INFRINGEMENT. DURING THE PROCESS OF FAA PROVING RUNS, IF SIMULATED EMER PROCS THAT AFFECT ATC, IT CAN LEAD TO AN UNSAFE OP IF ATC RESOURCES CANNOT BE USED, AS INDICATED BY OUR SIT. FAA APPROVED FLT OPS PROCS SHOULD BE UTILIZED IN ALL EMER SITS, NOT IMPROVISED PROCS. THE PROVING RUNS SHOULD BE A TEST OF OUR COMPANY PROCS TO VALIDATE THEM. INSTEAD, WE ARE BEING TESTED ON OUR ABILITY TO IMPROVISE EMER PROCS, AN UNSAFE PRACTICE. IF AN ACTUAL EMER PROC IS TO BE PERFORMED ON A PROVING RUN, FAA SHOULD COORDINATE THE PROC WITH ATC SO THAT NORMAL COMPANY EMER PROCS COULD BE UTILIZED. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR'S ACR HAD FAILED 3 PREVIOUS PROVING RUNS BECAUSE OF MAINT PROBS. IT FAILED THIS ONE ALSO DUE TO ITS OWN MAINT PROBS AT ORD, NOT DUE TO MAINT PURCHASED AT BFM. THE RPTR BELIEVES THAT THE ACI'S ON BOARD COULD NOT SAY ANYTHING ABOUT THE WRONG ARPT LNDG WITHOUT PUTTING THEMSELVES ON RPT AS THEY HAD AGREED NOTTO LET SOMETHING OF THIS MAGNITUDE HAPPEN. THE FO ON THIS TRIP HAD 16 HRS IN THE B727, AND THE SO BARELY HAD 50 HRS IN THE LAST 6 MONTHS. THE RPTR FELT AS IF HE WAS FLYING SOLO. THE BFM/MOB SIT WAS 'PRETTY MILD' COMPARED TO WHAT HAPPENED TO THE PROVING RUN AT MCO AND THEN ORD. THE RPTR LOST HIS CHK AIRMAN'S RATING AND HAS SINCE GONE ON TO ANOTHER COMPANY AS DIRECTOR OF TRAINING. HE IS PLEASED TO BE AWAY FROM THIS ACR. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 355181: THERE ARE 2 ARPTS IN MOBILE AND THE CAPT REQUESTED 'DOWNTOWN.' ATC ASSUMED WE WERE GOING TO 'REGIONAL.' BOTH ARPTS IN MOBILE HAVE RWY 14. THE APCH CTLR NEVER MENTIONED WHICH ARPT WE WERE BEING VECTORED TOWARDS. ATC NEVER GAVE A FREQ FOR TWR ONLY TO 'CONTACT TWR.' CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR ACN #355181 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR DOES NOT KNOW WHAT WAS SAID BY HIS ACR TO THE FSDO AND THE ACI'S. THE ACR PASSED ITS PROVING RUNS AND IS OPERATING WITH THESE 'NEW' ACFT. MOBILE DOWNTOWN IS THE FORMER BROOKLEY AFB. IT IS CURRENTLY USED BY LARGE ACFT AND HAS A MAJOR REPAIR FACILITY. AS THE CAPT WAS FAMILIAR WITH THIS ARPT, AND IT HAS A MUCH LONGER RWY, THE CAPT WENT THERE. MOBILE REGIONAL IS THE TRADITIONAL ACR ARPT, SO IT IS REASONABLE THAT ARTCC THOUGHT THAT THE ACFT WOULD GO THERE. THE RPTR BELIEVES THAT THE MISCOM HAPPENED ABOUT 150 MI OUT WHEN IT WAS NOT MADE CLR WHICH ARPT WAS INTENDED. THERE WAS NO TFC CONFLICT. THE CAPT IS NO LONGER WITH THIS ACR, HE HAS MOVED ON TO ANOTHER ACR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.