Narrative:

Departing out of ewr, we discovered that the landing gear would not retract. A few attempts were tried during the initial segments of the takeoff phase by the PNF. The PNF was also trying to receive radio calls and communicate the information to the PF. We were passed on to the next departure and given a new heading to the northeast and an altitude of 5000 ft. The captain called for the emergency checklist. I, the copilot (PNF) read the procedure out loud and the captain complied. When I read a portion of the procedure that the captain was uncertain of and questioned, I re-read it and showed him the segment on the checklist. As he read the sentence, he continued to climb past the assigned altitude of 5000 ft, reaching 5700 ft before noticing it. He then took immediate action to return to the assigned altitude. Shortly thereafter, we were sent to another departure frequency. No mention was made by either controller of the altitude bust. There was a high noise level in the cockpit from the bleeds, and we failed to hear the altitude alert bell. There was a high level of activity in the area, so attention was made to the radio in addition to the troubleshooting, causing a diversion of attention to the flying and hence the altitude by both the PF and the PNF. Measures that could have prevented this would have been to increase cockpit management between the crew. Specifically, the captain (PF) should not have taken his eyes off the panel to read the checklist. The PNF should have included a scan of the panel, as it is his job to back up the PF for possible errors such as passing through an assigned altitude.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ALTDEV ALT OVERSHOT IN CLB DURING RADAR VECTORING DEP PROC. FLC DISTR ACFT EQUIP PROB LNDG GEAR. CHKLIST USE.

Narrative: DEPARTING OUT OF EWR, WE DISCOVERED THAT THE LNDG GEAR WOULD NOT RETRACT. A FEW ATTEMPTS WERE TRIED DURING THE INITIAL SEGMENTS OF THE TKOF PHASE BY THE PNF. THE PNF WAS ALSO TRYING TO RECEIVE RADIO CALLS AND COMMUNICATE THE INFO TO THE PF. WE WERE PASSED ON TO THE NEXT DEP AND GIVEN A NEW HDG TO THE NE AND AN ALT OF 5000 FT. THE CAPT CALLED FOR THE EMER CHKLIST. I, THE COPLT (PNF) READ THE PROC OUT LOUD AND THE CAPT COMPLIED. WHEN I READ A PORTION OF THE PROC THAT THE CAPT WAS UNCERTAIN OF AND QUESTIONED, I RE-READ IT AND SHOWED HIM THE SEGMENT ON THE CHKLIST. AS HE READ THE SENTENCE, HE CONTINUED TO CLB PAST THE ASSIGNED ALT OF 5000 FT, REACHING 5700 FT BEFORE NOTICING IT. HE THEN TOOK IMMEDIATE ACTION TO RETURN TO THE ASSIGNED ALT. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, WE WERE SENT TO ANOTHER DEP FREQ. NO MENTION WAS MADE BY EITHER CTLR OF THE ALT BUST. THERE WAS A HIGH NOISE LEVEL IN THE COCKPIT FROM THE BLEEDS, AND WE FAILED TO HEAR THE ALT ALERT BELL. THERE WAS A HIGH LEVEL OF ACTIVITY IN THE AREA, SO ATTN WAS MADE TO THE RADIO IN ADDITION TO THE TROUBLESHOOTING, CAUSING A DIVERSION OF ATTN TO THE FLYING AND HENCE THE ALT BY BOTH THE PF AND THE PNF. MEASURES THAT COULD HAVE PREVENTED THIS WOULD HAVE BEEN TO INCREASE COCKPIT MGMNT BTWN THE CREW. SPECIFICALLY, THE CAPT (PF) SHOULD NOT HAVE TAKEN HIS EYES OFF THE PANEL TO READ THE CHKLIST. THE PNF SHOULD HAVE INCLUDED A SCAN OF THE PANEL, AS IT IS HIS JOB TO BACK UP THE PF FOR POSSIBLE ERRORS SUCH AS PASSING THROUGH AN ASSIGNED ALT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.