Narrative:

Location: tabir intersection, pie 330 degree radial, 35 DME. We were cleared by ATC to cross tabir intersection at 13000 ft and 250 KIAS. As we were approaching the intersection, it became obvious that we would make the altitude but that the captain was not acting to slow the aircraft to meet the speed restr. I mentioned the restr and he remarked, oh, that's right, 250 KTS -- he having forgotten about the speed restr. We began slowing to 250 KIAS, but crossed tabir at 13000 ft and still indicating 290 KTS, though slowing to 250 KIAS. This was caused by the captain simply forgetting the speed restr and by myself mistakenly assuming at the time that, although he was waiting longer than what I would wait to commence the speed reduction, the captain was nonetheless aware of the restr and would act in a timely manner and still meet it. This could have been prevented had the captain remembered the speed portion of the restr, and had I reminded him of the restr when I first felt it appropriate to begin slowing, rather than assume he would begin slowing later and still meet the speed as well as altitude part of the crossing restr.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN MD80 ACFT HAS A SPD DEV DURING DSCNT INTO TPA. PF DOES NOT PLAN FOR SPD DECREASE WHICH CAUSES HIS SPD TO REMAIN HIGH.

Narrative: LOCATION: TABIR INTXN, PIE 330 DEG RADIAL, 35 DME. WE WERE CLRED BY ATC TO CROSS TABIR INTXN AT 13000 FT AND 250 KIAS. AS WE WERE APCHING THE INTXN, IT BECAME OBVIOUS THAT WE WOULD MAKE THE ALT BUT THAT THE CAPT WAS NOT ACTING TO SLOW THE ACFT TO MEET THE SPD RESTR. I MENTIONED THE RESTR AND HE REMARKED, OH, THAT'S RIGHT, 250 KTS -- HE HAVING FORGOTTEN ABOUT THE SPD RESTR. WE BEGAN SLOWING TO 250 KIAS, BUT CROSSED TABIR AT 13000 FT AND STILL INDICATING 290 KTS, THOUGH SLOWING TO 250 KIAS. THIS WAS CAUSED BY THE CAPT SIMPLY FORGETTING THE SPD RESTR AND BY MYSELF MISTAKENLY ASSUMING AT THE TIME THAT, ALTHOUGH HE WAS WAITING LONGER THAN WHAT I WOULD WAIT TO COMMENCE THE SPD REDUCTION, THE CAPT WAS NONETHELESS AWARE OF THE RESTR AND WOULD ACT IN A TIMELY MANNER AND STILL MEET IT. THIS COULD HAVE BEEN PREVENTED HAD THE CAPT REMEMBERED THE SPD PORTION OF THE RESTR, AND HAD I REMINDED HIM OF THE RESTR WHEN I FIRST FELT IT APPROPRIATE TO BEGIN SLOWING, RATHER THAN ASSUME HE WOULD BEGIN SLOWING LATER AND STILL MEET THE SPD AS WELL AS ALT PART OF THE XING RESTR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.