Narrative:

On jan/xx/97, I performed the final inspection on an engine change, air carrier aircraft #1 engine. The new engine was previously on an aircraft in the #2 position (tail). The new engine had just had a check performed on it. It had a serviceable tag on it. On takeoff and climb out from seattle the crew noted low oil pressure. There was no engine shutdown. On arrival in denver 2 oil caps were missing from where the remote servicing lines connect to the oil tank for a #2 engine, also the nose spinner was loose and not torqued. I feel we were sent an unserviceable engine. The lines should have been capped when it was removed from the #2 position. The caps are not obvious to see. They are hidden by ground service ports. On a serviceable engine the spinner is tight and not normally checked by the installing crew. The paperwork is not written very well. There is no reference for converting a #2 position engine to a wing engine. The maintenance manual for installing a #2 engine makes a maintenance manual reference for wing to tail confign. Most line stations only get wing confign engines. I do not know why we were sent a #2 engine with lines uncapped and parts loose. The engine change took over 4 days. I was only there for the last day. I checked the torque of the mount bolts and the final installation. I did not pull the paperwork or inspect the removed engine. We have no hangar in seattle. The WX was cold and raining hard all night. The lighting was poor. We also do a&B checks outside at night in the rain. We had many problems with equipment and we were under pressure from management to get the job done to meet an early morning trip. I feel we were set up for this problem. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated that this incident has received a great deal of attention by the company and the FAA to fully investigate the problem and assure that it will not happen again. He stated that the combination of the rain, condition of the serviceable engine, the full instructions for the wing engine installation to a tail mount and his lack of recent experience changing a #2 DC10 engine accumulated in causing the problem. It had been at least 4 yrs since had changed a DC10 engine. He believes that steps have been taken by alerting everyone that may be involved that this type of problem will not reoccur.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR MECH FINAL INSPECTOR FAILED TO CHK A DC10-10 WING ENG FOR A SERVICEABLE ENG PRIOR TO APPROVING IT FOR SVC AS A REPLACEMENT #2 ENG CAUSING LOW OIL PRESSURE DURING CLB OUT.

Narrative: ON JAN/XX/97, I PERFORMED THE FINAL INSPECTION ON AN ENG CHANGE, ACR ACFT #1 ENG. THE NEW ENG WAS PREVIOUSLY ON AN ACFT IN THE #2 POS (TAIL). THE NEW ENG HAD JUST HAD A CHK PERFORMED ON IT. IT HAD A SERVICEABLE TAG ON IT. ON TKOF AND CLB OUT FROM SEATTLE THE CREW NOTED LOW OIL PRESSURE. THERE WAS NO ENG SHUTDOWN. ON ARR IN DENVER 2 OIL CAPS WERE MISSING FROM WHERE THE REMOTE SERVICING LINES CONNECT TO THE OIL TANK FOR A #2 ENG, ALSO THE NOSE SPINNER WAS LOOSE AND NOT TORQUED. I FEEL WE WERE SENT AN UNSERVICEABLE ENG. THE LINES SHOULD HAVE BEEN CAPPED WHEN IT WAS REMOVED FROM THE #2 POS. THE CAPS ARE NOT OBVIOUS TO SEE. THEY ARE HIDDEN BY GND SVC PORTS. ON A SERVICEABLE ENG THE SPINNER IS TIGHT AND NOT NORMALLY CHKED BY THE INSTALLING CREW. THE PAPERWORK IS NOT WRITTEN VERY WELL. THERE IS NO REF FOR CONVERTING A #2 POS ENG TO A WING ENG. THE MAINT MANUAL FOR INSTALLING A #2 ENG MAKES A MAINT MANUAL REF FOR WING TO TAIL CONFIGN. MOST LINE STATIONS ONLY GET WING CONFIGN ENGS. I DO NOT KNOW WHY WE WERE SENT A #2 ENG WITH LINES UNCAPPED AND PARTS LOOSE. THE ENG CHANGE TOOK OVER 4 DAYS. I WAS ONLY THERE FOR THE LAST DAY. I CHKED THE TORQUE OF THE MOUNT BOLTS AND THE FINAL INSTALLATION. I DID NOT PULL THE PAPERWORK OR INSPECT THE REMOVED ENG. WE HAVE NO HANGAR IN SEATTLE. THE WX WAS COLD AND RAINING HARD ALL NIGHT. THE LIGHTING WAS POOR. WE ALSO DO A&B CHKS OUTSIDE AT NIGHT IN THE RAIN. WE HAD MANY PROBS WITH EQUIP AND WE WERE UNDER PRESSURE FROM MGMNT TO GET THE JOB DONE TO MEET AN EARLY MORNING TRIP. I FEEL WE WERE SET UP FOR THIS PROB. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT THIS INCIDENT HAS RECEIVED A GREAT DEAL OF ATTN BY THE COMPANY AND THE FAA TO FULLY INVESTIGATE THE PROB AND ASSURE THAT IT WILL NOT HAPPEN AGAIN. HE STATED THAT THE COMBINATION OF THE RAIN, CONDITION OF THE SERVICEABLE ENG, THE FULL INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE WING ENG INSTALLATION TO A TAIL MOUNT AND HIS LACK OF RECENT EXPERIENCE CHANGING A #2 DC10 ENG ACCUMULATED IN CAUSING THE PROB. IT HAD BEEN AT LEAST 4 YRS SINCE HAD CHANGED A DC10 ENG. HE BELIEVES THAT STEPS HAVE BEEN TAKEN BY ALERTING EVERYONE THAT MAY BE INVOLVED THAT THIS TYPE OF PROB WILL NOT REOCCUR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.