Narrative:

After takeoff, while gear was retracting, the #2 engine had an explosion followed by extreme vibration. I was the PF and continued to climb and accelerated straight ahead. The first officer declared an emergency, and completed all checklists. We leveled off at 2000 ft and returned to land on runway 35 at limue. I shut down the #2 engine after landing. Fire rescue checked the aircraft exterior. We taxied back to the gate and disembarked the passenger. During climb out after engine failure, the aircraft climbed and accelerated much slower than expected. I overboosted #1 engine to increase performance. CRM -- I was able to brief the first cabin attendant who was able to brief the passenger and prepare the cabin. Overall success of this emergency is directly attributable to effective CRM techniques. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter said that the B737-200 would not accelerate or climb above 500 ft until he advanced the thrust lever on the #1 engine to maximum travel. These were JT8D-9 engines. The aircraft still had the flaps at 5 degrees from takeoff and the #2 engine had failed at 300 ft. The first officer, the cabin attendants and the passenger all commented on the poor performance of the aircraft on 1 engine according to the reporter. During the postflt inspection the reporter noted that the #2 engine appeared to be missing the last 1/3 of the engine interior. He said it was not an uncontained failure since most of the parts went out of the tail pipe. The overboosted #1 engine was checked and returned to service. The reporter said that he does not know what caused the #2 engine failure. He said that both engines came from the same supplier and the contract maintenance organization used by his company does all of the engine maintenance now.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR B737-200 FLC HAS THE #2 ENG EXPLODE DURING GEAR RETRACTION. THE EXPLOSION WAS CONTAINED AND THE ACFT RETURNED AND LANDED SAFELY.

Narrative: AFTER TKOF, WHILE GEAR WAS RETRACTING, THE #2 ENG HAD AN EXPLOSION FOLLOWED BY EXTREME VIBRATION. I WAS THE PF AND CONTINUED TO CLB AND ACCELERATED STRAIGHT AHEAD. THE FO DECLARED AN EMER, AND COMPLETED ALL CHKLISTS. WE LEVELED OFF AT 2000 FT AND RETURNED TO LAND ON RWY 35 AT LIMUE. I SHUT DOWN THE #2 ENG AFTER LNDG. FIRE RESCUE CHKED THE ACFT EXTERIOR. WE TAXIED BACK TO THE GATE AND DISEMBARKED THE PAX. DURING CLBOUT AFTER ENG FAILURE, THE ACFT CLBED AND ACCELERATED MUCH SLOWER THAN EXPECTED. I OVERBOOSTED #1 ENG TO INCREASE PERFORMANCE. CRM -- I WAS ABLE TO BRIEF THE FIRST CABIN ATTENDANT WHO WAS ABLE TO BRIEF THE PAX AND PREPARE THE CABIN. OVERALL SUCCESS OF THIS EMER IS DIRECTLY ATTRIBUTABLE TO EFFECTIVE CRM TECHNIQUES. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR SAID THAT THE B737-200 WOULD NOT ACCELERATE OR CLB ABOVE 500 FT UNTIL HE ADVANCED THE THRUST LEVER ON THE #1 ENG TO MAX TRAVEL. THESE WERE JT8D-9 ENGS. THE ACFT STILL HAD THE FLAPS AT 5 DEGS FROM TKOF AND THE #2 ENG HAD FAILED AT 300 FT. THE FO, THE CABIN ATTENDANTS AND THE PAX ALL COMMENTED ON THE POOR PERFORMANCE OF THE ACFT ON 1 ENG ACCORDING TO THE RPTR. DURING THE POSTFLT INSPECTION THE RPTR NOTED THAT THE #2 ENG APPEARED TO BE MISSING THE LAST 1/3 OF THE ENG INTERIOR. HE SAID IT WAS NOT AN UNCONTAINED FAILURE SINCE MOST OF THE PARTS WENT OUT OF THE TAIL PIPE. THE OVERBOOSTED #1 ENG WAS CHKED AND RETURNED TO SVC. THE RPTR SAID THAT HE DOES NOT KNOW WHAT CAUSED THE #2 ENG FAILURE. HE SAID THAT BOTH ENGS CAME FROM THE SAME SUPPLIER AND THE CONTRACT MAINT ORGANIZATION USED BY HIS COMPANY DOES ALL OF THE ENG MAINT NOW.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.