Narrative:

Due to the WX at aus, aircraft had fuel load of 29.6 when the before start checklist was completed. There were 109 passenger, plus 5 crew, plus 2 omc's producing a weight of 116.8 which was our maximum weight for a flap 1 degree improved takeoff. This produced a V1 equal 145, vr equal 157, and V2 equal 161. The taxi was a slow but steady progression to runway 8 due to numerous departures but no excessive braking was used. When cleared onto runway 8, all checklists were completed. I maneuvered the aircraft as close to the end of the runway as possible. First officer made takeoff but had him run-up engines to 1.4-1.6 EPR prior to releasing the brakes. After passing first 2000 ft had 80 KIAS and 100 KIAS by first 3000 ft. Both engines' instruments indicated maximum power was being produced. At about 130 KIAS we felt a shudder and then a vibration as aircraft settled on the right gear. I assumed a blown tire. Because of our speed and seeing the distance remaining, I decided to abort the takeoff. A change of controls was completed with first officer then helping on brakes. At this time, the second tire on the right gear failed. I was able to keep the aircraft in the center of the runway. Below 60 KIAS the brakes seemed to fade and decelerating became more difficult with engines out of reverse. The aircraft stopped about 1500 ft from end of the runway. During the abort sequence, the first officer made multiple radio calls to the tower advising of our abort on runway 8 and requesting fire trucks. There appeared to be confusion in the tower as to who was calling which necessitated repeated calls by the first officer. By the time the aircraft was stopped, I had already decided to evacuate/evacuation the aircraft due to the possibility of fire in the gear area. All engines were shut down. When I went to the cabin almost everyone was off the aircraft, but both of us had to prevent several passenger from taking carry- on luggage with them. All 4 door slides deployed normally. Once outside, I found the #2 brake on fire, did a passenger count and checked for injuries (there were none). Rescue equipment arrived a few mins later. Pilots need a better idea as to what to expect from the remaining tires, especially on a dual tire main gear aircraft such as the B737 and B727. Both the failure on takeoff as well as on landing needs to be discussed. Is it logical to assume that after one tire fails, the second one will fail whether the takeoff is aborted or continued? Does any data exist on the increase in takeoff roll versus stopping distance when 1 or 2 tires fail? Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: flight crew did not hear any pop, bang, or explosion, they just felt the aircraft start to settle on the side of the blown tires. They knew the aircraft would have to be evacuate/evacuationed so when the aircraft stopped from the abort, the captain gave the command to abort. By the time the flight crew shut the engines down and went to the cabin, the cabin had been emptied. As the flight crew evacuate/evacuationed the aircraft they gathered the passenger outside the aircraft and checked them for injuries. A few passenger had some elbow injuries due to the heat generated from slide burns. The flight didn't have the trailing edge flaps fully extended as the hydraulic pressure shuts off immediately. The captain took count of the passenger outside of the aircraft and inquired of their injuries. During all this the crash fire rescue equipment had not reached the aircraft. When the crash fire rescue equipment did reach the aircraft, the buses were close behind so as to permit immediate return to the terminal. Speed at the time of the abort was 135 KTS. Captain stopped the aircraft in the center of the runway. Callback conversation with reporter of acn 361188 revealed the following information: during the takeoff roll, first one tire then shortly thereafter the other on the right main gear failed. Because the aircraft was still well below V1 speed, the flight crew elected to abort. When the abort was initiated, the captain took control of the aircraft and the first officer called the tower notifying of the abort and to send the fire equipment. Reporter first officer had difficulty establishing communication with tower, because their call sign was air carrier abc and the tower responded to 1ABC. Thinking that the tower was calling someone else, the reporter called twice again. Finally, when the aircraft was stopped he established communication with the tower who said the fire equipment was rolling. Because of the delay in communication with the tower and the late callout of the fire equipment, the flight crew was unsure of the extent of the aircraft damage and/or if they had a fire in the left brake. Smelling burning rubber and hot brakes in the cabin they were uncertain that there either was, or would be a brake fire. Being concerned that the passenger may initiate an evacuate/evacuation on their own if they smelled the smoke and acrid odor, the flight crew elected to evacuate/evacuation the aircraft. As they commenced the evacuate/evacuation checklist they realized the flaps were still at 1 degree because of the maximum gross, flaps 1 degree takeoff. They decided not to lower the flaps because it would require keeping the engines running. So, the first officer made a PA announcement to evacuate/evacuation as the captain commenced the evacuate/evacuation checklist and shut down the engines. At that point there was some confusion regarding who was doing the checklist and accomplishing the items. Reporter believes the situation of flaps 1 degree takeoff with an abort and evacuate/evacuation should be studied to determine if, in such scenarios the engines should be left running until the flaps are down or do as they did and shut down the engines before the flaps were down. Reporter believes that it made no difference in what the passenger would do, because the passenger that did go out onto the wing in the initial evacuate/evacuation were looking for a slide, and not finding one, came back into the cabin where they were directed to a door exit. Many of the passenger tried to carry bags off with them, but the flight crew had to make them leave the bags, and in some cases, literally had to take them from them. The B737 and B727 don't have video demonstrations for the pre-departure safety demonstration and the only way the passenger would know about the wing evacuate/evacuation is if they read the safety card, and that is unlikely. All passenger evacuate/evacuationed safely, though some suffered bruises and scrapes. 74 passenger evacuate/evacuationed through the L1 door while 40 went through door R1. With a ratio of almost 2 to 1 exiting the left front may be because that is where they boarded the aircraft. The captain and first officer lined up the passenger on either side of the runway and did a head count. After everyone was off the aircraft it still took about 2 mins for the fire crew to arrive and when they did they took immediate action to fight the brake fire. But, before they came the captain tried to put it out with a halon bottle from the cabin to no avail. After watching the brake burn for a couple of mins, the fire crew sprayed something on it which produced an irritating mist causing the passenger to have discomfort. The flight crew moved them away from the downwind of the fire fighting mist. Reporter thinks that perhaps the fire department has procedures for different types of fires, but it would be beneficial to the flight crew to know if they are or are not going to fight the fire. Both the FAA and the NTSB have been investigating the incident and reporter thinks because of the notoriety of the B737 and its rudder problems may have something to do with the extra scrutiny. There has been no feedback from either agency to date.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-200 ABORTS AT HIGH SPD DURING TKOF AT DEN. EVAC COMMANDED WITH FEW INJURIES.

Narrative: DUE TO THE WX AT AUS, ACFT HAD FUEL LOAD OF 29.6 WHEN THE BEFORE START CHKLIST WAS COMPLETED. THERE WERE 109 PAX, PLUS 5 CREW, PLUS 2 OMC'S PRODUCING A WT OF 116.8 WHICH WAS OUR MAX WT FOR A FLAP 1 DEG IMPROVED TKOF. THIS PRODUCED A V1 EQUAL 145, VR EQUAL 157, AND V2 EQUAL 161. THE TAXI WAS A SLOW BUT STEADY PROGRESSION TO RWY 8 DUE TO NUMEROUS DEPS BUT NO EXCESSIVE BRAKING WAS USED. WHEN CLRED ONTO RWY 8, ALL CHKLISTS WERE COMPLETED. I MANEUVERED THE ACFT AS CLOSE TO THE END OF THE RWY AS POSSIBLE. FO MADE TKOF BUT HAD HIM RUN-UP ENGS TO 1.4-1.6 EPR PRIOR TO RELEASING THE BRAKES. AFTER PASSING FIRST 2000 FT HAD 80 KIAS AND 100 KIAS BY FIRST 3000 FT. BOTH ENGS' INSTS INDICATED MAX PWR WAS BEING PRODUCED. AT ABOUT 130 KIAS WE FELT A SHUDDER AND THEN A VIBRATION AS ACFT SETTLED ON THE R GEAR. I ASSUMED A BLOWN TIRE. BECAUSE OF OUR SPD AND SEEING THE DISTANCE REMAINING, I DECIDED TO ABORT THE TKOF. A CHANGE OF CTLS WAS COMPLETED WITH FO THEN HELPING ON BRAKES. AT THIS TIME, THE SECOND TIRE ON THE R GEAR FAILED. I WAS ABLE TO KEEP THE ACFT IN THE CTR OF THE RWY. BELOW 60 KIAS THE BRAKES SEEMED TO FADE AND DECELERATING BECAME MORE DIFFICULT WITH ENGS OUT OF REVERSE. THE ACFT STOPPED ABOUT 1500 FT FROM END OF THE RWY. DURING THE ABORT SEQUENCE, THE FO MADE MULTIPLE RADIO CALLS TO THE TWR ADVISING OF OUR ABORT ON RWY 8 AND REQUESTING FIRE TRUCKS. THERE APPEARED TO BE CONFUSION IN THE TWR AS TO WHO WAS CALLING WHICH NECESSITATED REPEATED CALLS BY THE FO. BY THE TIME THE ACFT WAS STOPPED, I HAD ALREADY DECIDED TO EVAC THE ACFT DUE TO THE POSSIBILITY OF FIRE IN THE GEAR AREA. ALL ENGS WERE SHUT DOWN. WHEN I WENT TO THE CABIN ALMOST EVERYONE WAS OFF THE ACFT, BUT BOTH OF US HAD TO PREVENT SEVERAL PAX FROM TAKING CARRY- ON LUGGAGE WITH THEM. ALL 4 DOOR SLIDES DEPLOYED NORMALLY. ONCE OUTSIDE, I FOUND THE #2 BRAKE ON FIRE, DID A PAX COUNT AND CHKED FOR INJURIES (THERE WERE NONE). RESCUE EQUIP ARRIVED A FEW MINS LATER. PLTS NEED A BETTER IDEA AS TO WHAT TO EXPECT FROM THE REMAINING TIRES, ESPECIALLY ON A DUAL TIRE MAIN GEAR ACFT SUCH AS THE B737 AND B727. BOTH THE FAILURE ON TKOF AS WELL AS ON LNDG NEEDS TO BE DISCUSSED. IS IT LOGICAL TO ASSUME THAT AFTER ONE TIRE FAILS, THE SECOND ONE WILL FAIL WHETHER THE TKOF IS ABORTED OR CONTINUED? DOES ANY DATA EXIST ON THE INCREASE IN TKOF ROLL VERSUS STOPPING DISTANCE WHEN 1 OR 2 TIRES FAIL? CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: FLC DID NOT HEAR ANY POP, BANG, OR EXPLOSION, THEY JUST FELT THE ACFT START TO SETTLE ON THE SIDE OF THE BLOWN TIRES. THEY KNEW THE ACFT WOULD HAVE TO BE EVACED SO WHEN THE ACFT STOPPED FROM THE ABORT, THE CAPT GAVE THE COMMAND TO ABORT. BY THE TIME THE FLC SHUT THE ENGS DOWN AND WENT TO THE CABIN, THE CABIN HAD BEEN EMPTIED. AS THE FLC EVACED THE ACFT THEY GATHERED THE PAX OUTSIDE THE ACFT AND CHKED THEM FOR INJURIES. A FEW PAX HAD SOME ELBOW INJURIES DUE TO THE HEAT GENERATED FROM SLIDE BURNS. THE FLT DIDN'T HAVE THE TRAILING EDGE FLAPS FULLY EXTENDED AS THE HYD PRESSURE SHUTS OFF IMMEDIATELY. THE CAPT TOOK COUNT OF THE PAX OUTSIDE OF THE ACFT AND INQUIRED OF THEIR INJURIES. DURING ALL THIS THE CFR HAD NOT REACHED THE ACFT. WHEN THE CFR DID REACH THE ACFT, THE BUSES WERE CLOSE BEHIND SO AS TO PERMIT IMMEDIATE RETURN TO THE TERMINAL. SPD AT THE TIME OF THE ABORT WAS 135 KTS. CAPT STOPPED THE ACFT IN THE CTR OF THE RWY. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR OF ACN 361188 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: DURING THE TKOF ROLL, FIRST ONE TIRE THEN SHORTLY THEREAFTER THE OTHER ON THE R MAIN GEAR FAILED. BECAUSE THE ACFT WAS STILL WELL BELOW V1 SPD, THE FLC ELECTED TO ABORT. WHEN THE ABORT WAS INITIATED, THE CAPT TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT AND THE FO CALLED THE TWR NOTIFYING OF THE ABORT AND TO SEND THE FIRE EQUIP. RPTR FO HAD DIFFICULTY ESTABLISHING COM WITH TWR, BECAUSE THEIR CALL SIGN WAS ACR ABC AND THE TWR RESPONDED TO 1ABC. THINKING THAT THE TWR WAS CALLING SOMEONE ELSE, THE RPTR CALLED TWICE AGAIN. FINALLY, WHEN THE ACFT WAS STOPPED HE ESTABLISHED COM WITH THE TWR WHO SAID THE FIRE EQUIP WAS ROLLING. BECAUSE OF THE DELAY IN COM WITH THE TWR AND THE LATE CALLOUT OF THE FIRE EQUIP, THE FLC WAS UNSURE OF THE EXTENT OF THE ACFT DAMAGE AND/OR IF THEY HAD A FIRE IN THE L BRAKE. SMELLING BURNING RUBBER AND HOT BRAKES IN THE CABIN THEY WERE UNCERTAIN THAT THERE EITHER WAS, OR WOULD BE A BRAKE FIRE. BEING CONCERNED THAT THE PAX MAY INITIATE AN EVAC ON THEIR OWN IF THEY SMELLED THE SMOKE AND ACRID ODOR, THE FLC ELECTED TO EVAC THE ACFT. AS THEY COMMENCED THE EVAC CHKLIST THEY REALIZED THE FLAPS WERE STILL AT 1 DEG BECAUSE OF THE MAX GROSS, FLAPS 1 DEG TKOF. THEY DECIDED NOT TO LOWER THE FLAPS BECAUSE IT WOULD REQUIRE KEEPING THE ENGS RUNNING. SO, THE FO MADE A PA ANNOUNCEMENT TO EVAC AS THE CAPT COMMENCED THE EVAC CHKLIST AND SHUT DOWN THE ENGS. AT THAT POINT THERE WAS SOME CONFUSION REGARDING WHO WAS DOING THE CHKLIST AND ACCOMPLISHING THE ITEMS. RPTR BELIEVES THE SIT OF FLAPS 1 DEG TKOF WITH AN ABORT AND EVAC SHOULD BE STUDIED TO DETERMINE IF, IN SUCH SCENARIOS THE ENGS SHOULD BE LEFT RUNNING UNTIL THE FLAPS ARE DOWN OR DO AS THEY DID AND SHUT DOWN THE ENGS BEFORE THE FLAPS WERE DOWN. RPTR BELIEVES THAT IT MADE NO DIFFERENCE IN WHAT THE PAX WOULD DO, BECAUSE THE PAX THAT DID GO OUT ONTO THE WING IN THE INITIAL EVAC WERE LOOKING FOR A SLIDE, AND NOT FINDING ONE, CAME BACK INTO THE CABIN WHERE THEY WERE DIRECTED TO A DOOR EXIT. MANY OF THE PAX TRIED TO CARRY BAGS OFF WITH THEM, BUT THE FLC HAD TO MAKE THEM LEAVE THE BAGS, AND IN SOME CASES, LITERALLY HAD TO TAKE THEM FROM THEM. THE B737 AND B727 DON'T HAVE VIDEO DEMONSTRATIONS FOR THE PRE-DEP SAFETY DEMO AND THE ONLY WAY THE PAX WOULD KNOW ABOUT THE WING EVAC IS IF THEY READ THE SAFETY CARD, AND THAT IS UNLIKELY. ALL PAX EVACED SAFELY, THOUGH SOME SUFFERED BRUISES AND SCRAPES. 74 PAX EVACED THROUGH THE L1 DOOR WHILE 40 WENT THROUGH DOOR R1. WITH A RATIO OF ALMOST 2 TO 1 EXITING THE L FRONT MAY BE BECAUSE THAT IS WHERE THEY BOARDED THE ACFT. THE CAPT AND FO LINED UP THE PAX ON EITHER SIDE OF THE RWY AND DID A HEAD COUNT. AFTER EVERYONE WAS OFF THE ACFT IT STILL TOOK ABOUT 2 MINS FOR THE FIRE CREW TO ARRIVE AND WHEN THEY DID THEY TOOK IMMEDIATE ACTION TO FIGHT THE BRAKE FIRE. BUT, BEFORE THEY CAME THE CAPT TRIED TO PUT IT OUT WITH A HALON BOTTLE FROM THE CABIN TO NO AVAIL. AFTER WATCHING THE BRAKE BURN FOR A COUPLE OF MINS, THE FIRE CREW SPRAYED SOMETHING ON IT WHICH PRODUCED AN IRRITATING MIST CAUSING THE PAX TO HAVE DISCOMFORT. THE FLC MOVED THEM AWAY FROM THE DOWNWIND OF THE FIRE FIGHTING MIST. RPTR THINKS THAT PERHAPS THE FIRE DEPT HAS PROCS FOR DIFFERENT TYPES OF FIRES, BUT IT WOULD BE BENEFICIAL TO THE FLC TO KNOW IF THEY ARE OR ARE NOT GOING TO FIGHT THE FIRE. BOTH THE FAA AND THE NTSB HAVE BEEN INVESTIGATING THE INCIDENT AND RPTR THINKS BECAUSE OF THE NOTORIETY OF THE B737 AND ITS RUDDER PROBS MAY HAVE SOMETHING TO DO WITH THE EXTRA SCRUTINY. THERE HAS BEEN NO FEEDBACK FROM EITHER AGENCY TO DATE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.