Narrative:

The following security breaches occurred at gig, feb/xx/97 pm, on an outbound flight, these were observed by FAA international security team specialist X and his assistant. Graffiti was plastered along the fuselage at gig, at the gate, during the time the aircraft was on the ground. No one observed the incident, and the guilty party was not challenged, therefore the party had access to the entire aircraft and cockpit. Children were observed, unsupervised and unchallenged, on the jetbridge during the aircraft's stay in gig, prior to our arrival at the aircraft. We know this because the children were seen by the first officer and international officer upon their arrival at the forward entry door. Circuit breakers were found pulled during preflight. Switches were found in position that they should not be in, ie, ignition switches. Flashlights found sitting on the purser's jumpseat, later found to have belonged to security personnel who had already left the aircraft. Station personnel closed the forward entry door, and pulled the jetbridge, never having provided the captain with the required security form to sign. It took me 15 mins to have them return the jetbridge to the aircraft and provide the form for me to sign as required by FAA/air carrier operations manual. We departed gig after doing all we could to ensure the safety of the flight. Gig is incapable of doing so. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter flies the B767-300ER. He has found that rio de janeiro and caracas are very lax in their security programs. The FAA monitors that he mentioned made an announced visit. They, and the reporter, feel that the rio station personnel 'were putting on a show' for them, as they had found little else on their investigation. The FAA team did not return with the reporter. The reporter's debrief was mostly done in frustration as the rio station personnel were totally unresponsive to the reporter's suggestions. The reporter has gotten no response from his air carrier or the FAA on this matter and will call the FAA hotline. The reporter had to answer to his air carrier for a 'crew delay' for the wait for the security form that the captain is required to sign.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR B767-300ER CREW HAD A SECURITY PROB IN GIG. THERE WERE SWITCHES IN THE WRONG PLACE, GRAFFITI ON THE SIDE IF THE ACFT, CHILDREN IN THE JETBRIDGE, FLASHLIGHTS LEFT IN THE CABIN. THE STATION PERSONNEL WERE UNRESPONSIVE TO THE CREW'S COMPLAINTS.

Narrative: THE FOLLOWING SECURITY BREACHES OCCURRED AT GIG, FEB/XX/97 PM, ON AN OUTBOUND FLT, THESE WERE OBSERVED BY FAA INTL SECURITY TEAM SPECIALIST X AND HIS ASSISTANT. GRAFFITI WAS PLASTERED ALONG THE FUSELAGE AT GIG, AT THE GATE, DURING THE TIME THE ACFT WAS ON THE GND. NO ONE OBSERVED THE INCIDENT, AND THE GUILTY PARTY WAS NOT CHALLENGED, THEREFORE THE PARTY HAD ACCESS TO THE ENTIRE ACFT AND COCKPIT. CHILDREN WERE OBSERVED, UNSUPERVISED AND UNCHALLENGED, ON THE JETBRIDGE DURING THE ACFT'S STAY IN GIG, PRIOR TO OUR ARR AT THE ACFT. WE KNOW THIS BECAUSE THE CHILDREN WERE SEEN BY THE FO AND INTL OFFICER UPON THEIR ARR AT THE FORWARD ENTRY DOOR. CIRCUIT BREAKERS WERE FOUND PULLED DURING PREFLT. SWITCHES WERE FOUND IN POS THAT THEY SHOULD NOT BE IN, IE, IGNITION SWITCHES. FLASHLIGHTS FOUND SITTING ON THE PURSER'S JUMPSEAT, LATER FOUND TO HAVE BELONGED TO SECURITY PERSONNEL WHO HAD ALREADY LEFT THE ACFT. STATION PERSONNEL CLOSED THE FORWARD ENTRY DOOR, AND PULLED THE JETBRIDGE, NEVER HAVING PROVIDED THE CAPT WITH THE REQUIRED SECURITY FORM TO SIGN. IT TOOK ME 15 MINS TO HAVE THEM RETURN THE JETBRIDGE TO THE ACFT AND PROVIDE THE FORM FOR ME TO SIGN AS REQUIRED BY FAA/ACR OPS MANUAL. WE DEPARTED GIG AFTER DOING ALL WE COULD TO ENSURE THE SAFETY OF THE FLT. GIG IS INCAPABLE OF DOING SO. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR FLIES THE B767-300ER. HE HAS FOUND THAT RIO DE JANEIRO AND CARACAS ARE VERY LAX IN THEIR SECURITY PROGRAMS. THE FAA MONITORS THAT HE MENTIONED MADE AN ANNOUNCED VISIT. THEY, AND THE RPTR, FEEL THAT THE RIO STATION PERSONNEL 'WERE PUTTING ON A SHOW' FOR THEM, AS THEY HAD FOUND LITTLE ELSE ON THEIR INVESTIGATION. THE FAA TEAM DID NOT RETURN WITH THE RPTR. THE RPTR'S DEBRIEF WAS MOSTLY DONE IN FRUSTRATION AS THE RIO STATION PERSONNEL WERE TOTALLY UNRESPONSIVE TO THE RPTR'S SUGGESTIONS. THE RPTR HAS GOTTEN NO RESPONSE FROM HIS ACR OR THE FAA ON THIS MATTER AND WILL CALL THE FAA HOTLINE. THE RPTR HAD TO ANSWER TO HIS ACR FOR A 'CREW DELAY' FOR THE WAIT FOR THE SECURITY FORM THAT THE CAPT IS REQUIRED TO SIGN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.