Narrative:

On departure on runway 32R (iah) at intersection week, we were cleared for immediate takeoff. Aircraft was not properly configured for takeoff. After noticing an unusual slow speed, an abort (rejected takeoff) was initiated. I believe this situation could have been avoided had we not rushed our takeoff checks. In the future I'll take my time or reject an expedited intersection departure. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated that he was in an ATR42. Reporter and PIC had also been used to flying the ATR42-500 with larger engines such as found on the ATR72. With the larger engined confign the pilot taxiing has to ride the brakes with both engines running, so the practice on the line is to taxi with 1 engine shut down. The #2 engine would then be started prior to takeoff. The air carrier in question does not sponsor this procedure, and indeed, frowns on this single engine taxi procedure. Since it is not a recognized procedure the position or status of the propeller position is not on an after engine start, taxi or before takeoff checklist. The pilots also tend to taxi in with #2 engine shut down to expedite baggage compartment access by ground crews rushing to unload the cargo. In the subject event the aircraft was in a long line of aircraft awaiting takeoff. The tower controller asked the ATR42 crew if they could make an expedited intersection takeoff. They concurred with this offer and, in the rush for takeoff, they failed to check the position of the propeller. It was still in the feather position versus the required 100% position for takeoff. After the abort they got back into line for a delayed takeoff. During this time they conferred with maintenance personnel and discussed the event. The flight crew was fairly new on the aircraft with about 700 hours and 500 hours respectively for the PIC and first officer. After the incident the crew was interviewed by their pilot supervisor who 'scolded' them severely for the 1 engine taxi incident.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ATR42 FLC ABORTS TKOF AFTER NOTING A SLOWER THAN EXPECTED AIRSPD INDICATION. CREW FINDS THAT #2 PROP WAS IN THE FEATHER POS ON THE TKOF RATHER THAN THE 100% POS THAT WAS MANDATED FOR TKOF.

Narrative: ON DEP ON RWY 32R (IAH) AT INTXN WK, WE WERE CLRED FOR IMMEDIATE TKOF. ACFT WAS NOT PROPERLY CONFIGURED FOR TKOF. AFTER NOTICING AN UNUSUAL SLOW SPD, AN ABORT (REJECTED TKOF) WAS INITIATED. I BELIEVE THIS SIT COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED HAD WE NOT RUSHED OUR TKOF CHKS. IN THE FUTURE I'LL TAKE MY TIME OR REJECT AN EXPEDITED INTXN DEP. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT HE WAS IN AN ATR42. RPTR AND PIC HAD ALSO BEEN USED TO FLYING THE ATR42-500 WITH LARGER ENGS SUCH AS FOUND ON THE ATR72. WITH THE LARGER ENGINED CONFIGN THE PLT TAXIING HAS TO RIDE THE BRAKES WITH BOTH ENGS RUNNING, SO THE PRACTICE ON THE LINE IS TO TAXI WITH 1 ENG SHUT DOWN. THE #2 ENG WOULD THEN BE STARTED PRIOR TO TKOF. THE ACR IN QUESTION DOES NOT SPONSOR THIS PROC, AND INDEED, FROWNS ON THIS SINGLE ENG TAXI PROC. SINCE IT IS NOT A RECOGNIZED PROC THE POS OR STATUS OF THE PROP POS IS NOT ON AN AFTER ENG START, TAXI OR BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST. THE PLTS ALSO TEND TO TAXI IN WITH #2 ENG SHUT DOWN TO EXPEDITE BAGGAGE COMPARTMENT ACCESS BY GND CREWS RUSHING TO UNLOAD THE CARGO. IN THE SUBJECT EVENT THE ACFT WAS IN A LONG LINE OF ACFT AWAITING TKOF. THE TWR CTLR ASKED THE ATR42 CREW IF THEY COULD MAKE AN EXPEDITED INTXN TKOF. THEY CONCURRED WITH THIS OFFER AND, IN THE RUSH FOR TKOF, THEY FAILED TO CHK THE POS OF THE PROP. IT WAS STILL IN THE FEATHER POS VERSUS THE REQUIRED 100% POS FOR TKOF. AFTER THE ABORT THEY GOT BACK INTO LINE FOR A DELAYED TKOF. DURING THIS TIME THEY CONFERRED WITH MAINT PERSONNEL AND DISCUSSED THE EVENT. THE FLC WAS FAIRLY NEW ON THE ACFT WITH ABOUT 700 HRS AND 500 HRS RESPECTIVELY FOR THE PIC AND FO. AFTER THE INCIDENT THE CREW WAS INTERVIEWED BY THEIR PLT SUPVR WHO 'SCOLDED' THEM SEVERELY FOR THE 1 ENG TAXI INCIDENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.