Narrative:

About 5 mins after departure, flight attendant #1 called and indicated that there was a slight burning odor in the cabin. We could faintly smell it in the cockpit and it smelled like the air conditioning 'smoke' that we seem to have experienced more often recently and, in fact had occurred on a flight earlier in the rotation. I briefed flight attendant #1 that if it was cabin wide and was only faint -- it was the air conditioning, if there was smoke from the vents or strong odor persisting -- we needed to know, and if the smoke or odor were localized -- we needed to know immediately. Flight attendant #1 indicated the smell went away and both I, and a jump seat rider (back in coach) agree that this was air conditioning and not the problem that occurred next. But the briefing was a factor. Shortly after level off, we were proceeding direct iso. Flight attendant #1 came up to the cockpit and advised us that flight attendant #2 smelled an odor like 'burning hair' in the coach cabin from the emergency exit row and aft with no smoke. The first officer with more experience, volunteered to go back and check it out. I asked flight attendant #1 to go back if she was uncertain about the severity of the situation. She called and said the odor was strong and she was concerned because she had difficulty contacting me from the mid interphone (the chime wasn't ringing, but the call light did come on). The first officer had already started back. During that time, I had checked all the electrical loads and engine instruments. They were all normal. I began looking for suitable airports and had decided to go to rdu, depending on what first officer said when he came back. That's when things got exciting. Flight attendant #1 called and said 'we have sparks coming from the floor below the left over-wing exit!' the concern in her voice was clear. The decision at this point was simple and straightforward. I abandoned the idea of rdu, and asked ATC for the nearest airport. I indicated we had fire on board and simultaneously began a maximum speed/speed brake descent. Rather than explain the whole situation, I wanted immediate and expeditious handling. And that's exactly what we got. The controller said iso was the closest airport, and that they had a 7500 ft runway. As I was pressing him for more information, he said seymour johnson was 10 or 15 mi further, with a longer runway and rescue equipment. I opted for seymour for those reasons and the fact that our descent would get us there without spiraling down (iso was actually a little too close). I figured if things got worse, I still had the option to do whatever it took to get down to iso. In the meantime, the first officer had seen the commotion in back and immediately returned to the cockpit. We had originally briefed that in a serious emergency the pilot flying the airplane would continue and would run the radios. The PNF would take care of the problem, the flight attendants, passenger, etc. And that's what we did. The only thing we didn't have time to do, that we had briefed, was to discuss what each of us was doing. It happened too fast. Thank heaven for training, because everyone did their job perfectly. All this, while the flight attendants were removing the passenger from the exit row, firing 1 halon bottle, standing by with another, and preparing to don the pbe, if necessary. Jump seat rider came to the cockpit to help, and to open a seat for the displaced passenger. At that point, we were on final with only time to take a breath and land. Ascertaining that we were not obviously burning, we turned off the runway and stopped. Because the fire seemed to be out, I made the decision not to emergency evacuate. The passenger were remarkably calm. Probably because flight attendants had kept them informed and the flight attendants never panicked, setting a professional tone throughout the incident. We were going to exit down the aft stairs but the military quickly came up with stairs that were adequate for the front door. The passenger were loaded in busses and taken to a community center while we commandeered a cell phone from 2 government officials on board so we could call the company (we were out of radio range). The firemen boarded as the passenger deplaned and found the floor vent area still smoldering and used their extinguishers on it. It began sparking again and we shut off power to the aircraft temporarily. With the help of 3 military technicians, we found that the wall panel by the vent and near the emergency exit light had been scorched and charred, but that the wires appeared ok. Meter readings indicated a short but it couldn't be located in the area of the burns. We then found that the emergency light system could not be turned off. The lights were off with power on the airplane and the system armed, but any other confign and they came on. Obviously a problem, but we were unable to isolate it any further. Flight control provided excellent support lining up another airplane and keeping us informed (it wasn't easy -- we went through several cell phone batteries), which allowed us to keep the passenger informed. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter said that the maintenance personnel were unable to find the cause of the electrical short during their initial investigation. Some of those technicians speculated that the short was caused by something that a passenger brought on the aircraft. The captain rejects this speculation. He said that he and a number of other witnesses saw the sparks and the smoke and several crew members used fire extinguishers on the sparks and smoke. He also said that this same phenomenon was witnessed and acted upon by military personnel later at gsb. The captain said that he was very disappointed by his company's maintenance performance, but very pleased by his flight crew, his flight attendants, ATC and the passenger during this emergency.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR MD88 HAS AN ELECTRICAL SHORT IN THE PAX CABIN NEAR AN OVER WING EXIT. THE FLC DECLARES AN EMER AND DIVERTS INTO GSB.

Narrative: ABOUT 5 MINS AFTER DEP, FLT ATTENDANT #1 CALLED AND INDICATED THAT THERE WAS A SLIGHT BURNING ODOR IN THE CABIN. WE COULD FAINTLY SMELL IT IN THE COCKPIT AND IT SMELLED LIKE THE AIR CONDITIONING 'SMOKE' THAT WE SEEM TO HAVE EXPERIENCED MORE OFTEN RECENTLY AND, IN FACT HAD OCCURRED ON A FLT EARLIER IN THE ROTATION. I BRIEFED FLT ATTENDANT #1 THAT IF IT WAS CABIN WIDE AND WAS ONLY FAINT -- IT WAS THE AIR CONDITIONING, IF THERE WAS SMOKE FROM THE VENTS OR STRONG ODOR PERSISTING -- WE NEEDED TO KNOW, AND IF THE SMOKE OR ODOR WERE LOCALIZED -- WE NEEDED TO KNOW IMMEDIATELY. FLT ATTENDANT #1 INDICATED THE SMELL WENT AWAY AND BOTH I, AND A JUMP SEAT RIDER (BACK IN COACH) AGREE THAT THIS WAS AIR CONDITIONING AND NOT THE PROB THAT OCCURRED NEXT. BUT THE BRIEFING WAS A FACTOR. SHORTLY AFTER LEVEL OFF, WE WERE PROCEEDING DIRECT ISO. FLT ATTENDANT #1 CAME UP TO THE COCKPIT AND ADVISED US THAT FLT ATTENDANT #2 SMELLED AN ODOR LIKE 'BURNING HAIR' IN THE COACH CABIN FROM THE EMER EXIT ROW AND AFT WITH NO SMOKE. THE FO WITH MORE EXPERIENCE, VOLUNTEERED TO GO BACK AND CHK IT OUT. I ASKED FLT ATTENDANT #1 TO GO BACK IF SHE WAS UNCERTAIN ABOUT THE SEVERITY OF THE SIT. SHE CALLED AND SAID THE ODOR WAS STRONG AND SHE WAS CONCERNED BECAUSE SHE HAD DIFFICULTY CONTACTING ME FROM THE MID INTERPHONE (THE CHIME WASN'T RINGING, BUT THE CALL LIGHT DID COME ON). THE FO HAD ALREADY STARTED BACK. DURING THAT TIME, I HAD CHKED ALL THE ELECTRICAL LOADS AND ENG INSTS. THEY WERE ALL NORMAL. I BEGAN LOOKING FOR SUITABLE ARPTS AND HAD DECIDED TO GO TO RDU, DEPENDING ON WHAT FO SAID WHEN HE CAME BACK. THAT'S WHEN THINGS GOT EXCITING. FLT ATTENDANT #1 CALLED AND SAID 'WE HAVE SPARKS COMING FROM THE FLOOR BELOW THE L OVER-WING EXIT!' THE CONCERN IN HER VOICE WAS CLR. THE DECISION AT THIS POINT WAS SIMPLE AND STRAIGHTFORWARD. I ABANDONED THE IDEA OF RDU, AND ASKED ATC FOR THE NEAREST ARPT. I INDICATED WE HAD FIRE ON BOARD AND SIMULTANEOUSLY BEGAN A MAX SPD/SPD BRAKE DSCNT. RATHER THAN EXPLAIN THE WHOLE SIT, I WANTED IMMEDIATE AND EXPEDITIOUS HANDLING. AND THAT'S EXACTLY WHAT WE GOT. THE CTLR SAID ISO WAS THE CLOSEST ARPT, AND THAT THEY HAD A 7500 FT RWY. AS I WAS PRESSING HIM FOR MORE INFO, HE SAID SEYMOUR JOHNSON WAS 10 OR 15 MI FURTHER, WITH A LONGER RWY AND RESCUE EQUIP. I OPTED FOR SEYMOUR FOR THOSE REASONS AND THE FACT THAT OUR DSCNT WOULD GET US THERE WITHOUT SPIRALING DOWN (ISO WAS ACTUALLY A LITTLE TOO CLOSE). I FIGURED IF THINGS GOT WORSE, I STILL HAD THE OPTION TO DO WHATEVER IT TOOK TO GET DOWN TO ISO. IN THE MEANTIME, THE FO HAD SEEN THE COMMOTION IN BACK AND IMMEDIATELY RETURNED TO THE COCKPIT. WE HAD ORIGINALLY BRIEFED THAT IN A SERIOUS EMER THE PLT FLYING THE AIRPLANE WOULD CONTINUE AND WOULD RUN THE RADIOS. THE PNF WOULD TAKE CARE OF THE PROB, THE FLT ATTENDANTS, PAX, ETC. AND THAT'S WHAT WE DID. THE ONLY THING WE DIDN'T HAVE TIME TO DO, THAT WE HAD BRIEFED, WAS TO DISCUSS WHAT EACH OF US WAS DOING. IT HAPPENED TOO FAST. THANK HEAVEN FOR TRAINING, BECAUSE EVERYONE DID THEIR JOB PERFECTLY. ALL THIS, WHILE THE FLT ATTENDANTS WERE REMOVING THE PAX FROM THE EXIT ROW, FIRING 1 HALON BOTTLE, STANDING BY WITH ANOTHER, AND PREPARING TO DON THE PBE, IF NECESSARY. JUMP SEAT RIDER CAME TO THE COCKPIT TO HELP, AND TO OPEN A SEAT FOR THE DISPLACED PAX. AT THAT POINT, WE WERE ON FINAL WITH ONLY TIME TO TAKE A BREATH AND LAND. ASCERTAINING THAT WE WERE NOT OBVIOUSLY BURNING, WE TURNED OFF THE RWY AND STOPPED. BECAUSE THE FIRE SEEMED TO BE OUT, I MADE THE DECISION NOT TO EMER EVACUATE. THE PAX WERE REMARKABLY CALM. PROBABLY BECAUSE FLT ATTENDANTS HAD KEPT THEM INFORMED AND THE FLT ATTENDANTS NEVER PANICKED, SETTING A PROFESSIONAL TONE THROUGHOUT THE INCIDENT. WE WERE GOING TO EXIT DOWN THE AFT STAIRS BUT THE MIL QUICKLY CAME UP WITH STAIRS THAT WERE ADEQUATE FOR THE FRONT DOOR. THE PAX WERE LOADED IN BUSSES AND TAKEN TO A COMMUNITY CTR WHILE WE COMMANDEERED A CELL PHONE FROM 2 GOV OFFICIALS ON BOARD SO WE COULD CALL THE COMPANY (WE WERE OUT OF RADIO RANGE). THE FIREMEN BOARDED AS THE PAX DEPLANED AND FOUND THE FLOOR VENT AREA STILL SMOLDERING AND USED THEIR EXTINGUISHERS ON IT. IT BEGAN SPARKING AGAIN AND WE SHUT OFF PWR TO THE ACFT TEMPORARILY. WITH THE HELP OF 3 MIL TECHNICIANS, WE FOUND THAT THE WALL PANEL BY THE VENT AND NEAR THE EMER EXIT LIGHT HAD BEEN SCORCHED AND CHARRED, BUT THAT THE WIRES APPEARED OK. METER READINGS INDICATED A SHORT BUT IT COULDN'T BE LOCATED IN THE AREA OF THE BURNS. WE THEN FOUND THAT THE EMER LIGHT SYS COULD NOT BE TURNED OFF. THE LIGHTS WERE OFF WITH PWR ON THE AIRPLANE AND THE SYS ARMED, BUT ANY OTHER CONFIGN AND THEY CAME ON. OBVIOUSLY A PROB, BUT WE WERE UNABLE TO ISOLATE IT ANY FURTHER. FLT CTL PROVIDED EXCELLENT SUPPORT LINING UP ANOTHER AIRPLANE AND KEEPING US INFORMED (IT WASN'T EASY -- WE WENT THROUGH SEVERAL CELL PHONE BATTERIES), WHICH ALLOWED US TO KEEP THE PAX INFORMED. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR SAID THAT THE MAINT PERSONNEL WERE UNABLE TO FIND THE CAUSE OF THE ELECTRICAL SHORT DURING THEIR INITIAL INVESTIGATION. SOME OF THOSE TECHNICIANS SPECULATED THAT THE SHORT WAS CAUSED BY SOMETHING THAT A PAX BROUGHT ON THE ACFT. THE CAPT REJECTS THIS SPECULATION. HE SAID THAT HE AND A NUMBER OF OTHER WITNESSES SAW THE SPARKS AND THE SMOKE AND SEVERAL CREW MEMBERS USED FIRE EXTINGUISHERS ON THE SPARKS AND SMOKE. HE ALSO SAID THAT THIS SAME PHENOMENON WAS WITNESSED AND ACTED UPON BY MIL PERSONNEL LATER AT GSB. THE CAPT SAID THAT HE WAS VERY DISAPPOINTED BY HIS COMPANY'S MAINT PERFORMANCE, BUT VERY PLEASED BY HIS FLC, HIS FLT ATTENDANTS, ATC AND THE PAX DURING THIS EMER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.