Narrative:

We called mrb tower 7 mi south, inbound for landing. Tower told us to report 3 mi final for runway 35. Tower gave our position, aircraft type, and color to a beech king air that was farther out. The beech acknowledged. At 3 mi final (by GPS) we reported to the tower and were cleared to land runway 35. At 2 mi out the beech king air overran our slower AA1B missing us laterally and vertically by an estimated 250 ft. I immediately took evasive action. The beech then reported 3 mi final for runway 35. I requested a 360 degree left turn for spacing. The tower asked if the beech was ahead of us. When I responded 'affirmative,' the tower approved our turn, canceled our landing clearance, and cleared the beech to land on runway 35. After our turn we were cleared to land and proceeded without incident. On landing we found that the beech had been a training flight practicing an instrument approach, VFR. Ceiling and visibility were unlimited. Several factors contributed. First, the beech king air crew was making a practice instrument approach under VFR and may have been preoccupied inside the cockpit. Second, we did not know how far out the beech was and could not estimate if he might overtake us. Once we were cleared to land ahead of them, we assumed the beech would be cautious about flying through our reported position. They may not have been listening to the tower communications. Third, the visibility from our AA1B is restr to the rear. My copilot and I were looking for the beech but could not see it until it was already alongside us. If it had hit us from the rear, we would never have seen it. It passed above and to our right. It appeared the visibility from the beech down and to the side, in our direction, was likewise poor. To avoid such occurrences, I suggest special emphasis on watchfulness for traffic on the part of those cleared to land in class D airspace, and especially for those conducting training flts and practice IFR approachs under VFR conditions. Once we were cleared to land on 3 mi final, clearing turns were no longer practical. But turns to look for reported traffic might be a good idea for those not cleared first to land. Listening to the tower communications with the other aircraft might also help identify traffic conflict. If I or the other aircraft had asked the tower for an update on the position of other traffic, we might have realized that a conflict existed. Pilots should be encouraged to do this. Extra caution should be taken by faster traffic overtaking the reported position of other traffic without first making visual contact. I would recommend making a spacing turn until visual contact is made or radio report indicates there is no conflict.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A BEECH KING AIR OVERTOOK AN AA1B ON FINAL APCH CAUSING AN NMAC.

Narrative: WE CALLED MRB TWR 7 MI S, INBOUND FOR LNDG. TWR TOLD US TO RPT 3 MI FINAL FOR RWY 35. TWR GAVE OUR POS, ACFT TYPE, AND COLOR TO A BEECH KING AIR THAT WAS FARTHER OUT. THE BEECH ACKNOWLEDGED. AT 3 MI FINAL (BY GPS) WE RPTED TO THE TWR AND WERE CLRED TO LAND RWY 35. AT 2 MI OUT THE BEECH KING AIR OVERRAN OUR SLOWER AA1B MISSING US LATERALLY AND VERTLY BY AN ESTIMATED 250 FT. I IMMEDIATELY TOOK EVASIVE ACTION. THE BEECH THEN RPTED 3 MI FINAL FOR RWY 35. I REQUESTED A 360 DEG L TURN FOR SPACING. THE TWR ASKED IF THE BEECH WAS AHEAD OF US. WHEN I RESPONDED 'AFFIRMATIVE,' THE TWR APPROVED OUR TURN, CANCELED OUR LNDG CLRNC, AND CLRED THE BEECH TO LAND ON RWY 35. AFTER OUR TURN WE WERE CLRED TO LAND AND PROCEEDED WITHOUT INCIDENT. ON LNDG WE FOUND THAT THE BEECH HAD BEEN A TRAINING FLT PRACTICING AN INST APCH, VFR. CEILING AND VISIBILITY WERE UNLIMITED. SEVERAL FACTORS CONTRIBUTED. FIRST, THE BEECH KING AIR CREW WAS MAKING A PRACTICE INST APCH UNDER VFR AND MAY HAVE BEEN PREOCCUPIED INSIDE THE COCKPIT. SECOND, WE DID NOT KNOW HOW FAR OUT THE BEECH WAS AND COULD NOT ESTIMATE IF HE MIGHT OVERTAKE US. ONCE WE WERE CLRED TO LAND AHEAD OF THEM, WE ASSUMED THE BEECH WOULD BE CAUTIOUS ABOUT FLYING THROUGH OUR RPTED POS. THEY MAY NOT HAVE BEEN LISTENING TO THE TWR COMS. THIRD, THE VISIBILITY FROM OUR AA1B IS RESTR TO THE REAR. MY COPLT AND I WERE LOOKING FOR THE BEECH BUT COULD NOT SEE IT UNTIL IT WAS ALREADY ALONGSIDE US. IF IT HAD HIT US FROM THE REAR, WE WOULD NEVER HAVE SEEN IT. IT PASSED ABOVE AND TO OUR R. IT APPEARED THE VISIBILITY FROM THE BEECH DOWN AND TO THE SIDE, IN OUR DIRECTION, WAS LIKEWISE POOR. TO AVOID SUCH OCCURRENCES, I SUGGEST SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON WATCHFULNESS FOR TFC ON THE PART OF THOSE CLRED TO LAND IN CLASS D AIRSPACE, AND ESPECIALLY FOR THOSE CONDUCTING TRAINING FLTS AND PRACTICE IFR APCHS UNDER VFR CONDITIONS. ONCE WE WERE CLRED TO LAND ON 3 MI FINAL, CLRING TURNS WERE NO LONGER PRACTICAL. BUT TURNS TO LOOK FOR RPTED TFC MIGHT BE A GOOD IDEA FOR THOSE NOT CLRED FIRST TO LAND. LISTENING TO THE TWR COMS WITH THE OTHER ACFT MIGHT ALSO HELP IDENT TFC CONFLICT. IF I OR THE OTHER ACFT HAD ASKED THE TWR FOR AN UPDATE ON THE POS OF OTHER TFC, WE MIGHT HAVE REALIZED THAT A CONFLICT EXISTED. PLTS SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO DO THIS. EXTRA CAUTION SHOULD BE TAKEN BY FASTER TFC OVERTAKING THE RPTED POS OF OTHER TFC WITHOUT FIRST MAKING VISUAL CONTACT. I WOULD RECOMMEND MAKING A SPACING TURN UNTIL VISUAL CONTACT IS MADE OR RADIO RPT INDICATES THERE IS NO CONFLICT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.