Narrative:

We were to operate a cargo flight from tpe-khv-anc on apr/wed/97. On arrival at the aircraft, I began my normal preflight duties. Additionally, since it was the first officer's leg and his first time operating this particular aircraft, we discussed the differences between this aircraft and the rest of our fleet aircraft (switch operation is reversed, different location of equipment, etc). During the preflight, tpe maintenance and my flight engineer discussed the MEL's on the aircraft using the logbook and the computer flight plan list. At this time tpe maintenance informed him of a missing gear 'panel.' the flight engineer asked tpe maintenance if it was ok to fly the aircraft with the missing 'panel' and tpe maintenance said yes. This panel turned out to be the right main body gear outboard shock strut door. After this, the flight engineer left to inspect the missing door and complete his preflight. After his preflight was complete, we returned and we discussed the MEL's and told me there were no problems operating the aircraft. The computer flight plans contain a list of the applicable MEL's and confign deviation list items. Normally, they are all located in the same location on the computer flight plan. However, the confign deviation list for the missing door was not with the MEL's but was added as an amendment and located in the header along with the sita addresses. As a result of this nonstandard location of the confign deviation list, it was not discovered on the computer flight plan by any of us until I was discussing the flight with the chief pilot after arrival in anc. Even then, when specifically looking for it, I did not immediately see it. The confign deviation list contains airspeed restrs of 270 KIAS/ mach .73 and modifications to the aircraft airspeed indicating system. Both computer flight plans did not reflect these limitations as tpe-khv was mach .84 and khv-anc was mach .82. Nor were the changes made to the airspeed indicating system. The flts to khv and anc were routine. After the fact we found out that we exceeded the limitations set forth in the confign deviation list -- this was unintentional. After an inspection of the aircraft in anc, no damage was found. Several functions missed the limitations -- maintenance control at headquarters, dispatch, tpe maintenance, as well as us (the flight crew). Supplemental information from acn 366375: results were action by company and FAA. Company's policy to push aircraft and on time performance. Also we were flying an aircraft new to the fleet and have not been given any differences training or information of a formal nature.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC B747-100 CARGO ACFT FAILED TO NOTE ON THE FLT PLAN A CONFIGN DEV LIST NOTE REF SPD RESTR ACCOUNT LNDG GEAR FAIRING MISSING. DISCOVERED ON ARR DEST.

Narrative: WE WERE TO OPERATE A CARGO FLT FROM TPE-KHV-ANC ON APR/WED/97. ON ARR AT THE ACFT, I BEGAN MY NORMAL PREFLT DUTIES. ADDITIONALLY, SINCE IT WAS THE FO'S LEG AND HIS FIRST TIME OPERATING THIS PARTICULAR ACFT, WE DISCUSSED THE DIFFERENCES BTWN THIS ACFT AND THE REST OF OUR FLEET ACFT (SWITCH OP IS REVERSED, DIFFERENT LOCATION OF EQUIP, ETC). DURING THE PREFLT, TPE MAINT AND MY FE DISCUSSED THE MEL'S ON THE ACFT USING THE LOGBOOK AND THE COMPUTER FLT PLAN LIST. AT THIS TIME TPE MAINT INFORMED HIM OF A MISSING GEAR 'PANEL.' THE FE ASKED TPE MAINT IF IT WAS OK TO FLY THE ACFT WITH THE MISSING 'PANEL' AND TPE MAINT SAID YES. THIS PANEL TURNED OUT TO BE THE R MAIN BODY GEAR OUTBOARD SHOCK STRUT DOOR. AFTER THIS, THE FE LEFT TO INSPECT THE MISSING DOOR AND COMPLETE HIS PREFLT. AFTER HIS PREFLT WAS COMPLETE, WE RETURNED AND WE DISCUSSED THE MEL'S AND TOLD ME THERE WERE NO PROBS OPERATING THE ACFT. THE COMPUTER FLT PLANS CONTAIN A LIST OF THE APPLICABLE MEL'S AND CONFIGN DEV LIST ITEMS. NORMALLY, THEY ARE ALL LOCATED IN THE SAME LOCATION ON THE COMPUTER FLT PLAN. HOWEVER, THE CONFIGN DEV LIST FOR THE MISSING DOOR WAS NOT WITH THE MEL'S BUT WAS ADDED AS AN AMENDMENT AND LOCATED IN THE HEADER ALONG WITH THE SITA ADDRESSES. AS A RESULT OF THIS NONSTANDARD LOCATION OF THE CONFIGN DEV LIST, IT WAS NOT DISCOVERED ON THE COMPUTER FLT PLAN BY ANY OF US UNTIL I WAS DISCUSSING THE FLT WITH THE CHIEF PLT AFTER ARR IN ANC. EVEN THEN, WHEN SPECIFICALLY LOOKING FOR IT, I DID NOT IMMEDIATELY SEE IT. THE CONFIGN DEV LIST CONTAINS AIRSPD RESTRS OF 270 KIAS/ MACH .73 AND MODIFICATIONS TO THE ACFT AIRSPD INDICATING SYS. BOTH COMPUTER FLT PLANS DID NOT REFLECT THESE LIMITATIONS AS TPE-KHV WAS MACH .84 AND KHV-ANC WAS MACH .82. NOR WERE THE CHANGES MADE TO THE AIRSPD INDICATING SYS. THE FLTS TO KHV AND ANC WERE ROUTINE. AFTER THE FACT WE FOUND OUT THAT WE EXCEEDED THE LIMITATIONS SET FORTH IN THE CONFIGN DEV LIST -- THIS WAS UNINTENTIONAL. AFTER AN INSPECTION OF THE ACFT IN ANC, NO DAMAGE WAS FOUND. SEVERAL FUNCTIONS MISSED THE LIMITATIONS -- MAINT CTL AT HEADQUARTERS, DISPATCH, TPE MAINT, AS WELL AS US (THE FLC). SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 366375: RESULTS WERE ACTION BY COMPANY AND FAA. COMPANY'S POLICY TO PUSH ACFT AND ON TIME PERFORMANCE. ALSO WE WERE FLYING AN ACFT NEW TO THE FLEET AND HAVE NOT BEEN GIVEN ANY DIFFERENCES TRAINING OR INFO OF A FORMAL NATURE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.