Narrative:

Of my companies 30+ DC8's, only 1 has a glass cockpit. This was the aircraft I had. The capts are required to be checked on this aircraft by a check airman and are then required to teach the first officer's. I had a new (in the company) first officer and I had not flown this aircraft in several months. The confign as to switches, etc is totally different, location wise, than any other aircraft we have. The first officer was flying. Even though he is new to the DC8 I have flown with him for several months and he has good pilot skills and has flown consistently very good approachs in an IMC environment. The approach (on ILS to runway 16R at sea) was started in a normal and uneventful manner. Approach said to contact tower at the marker. The VHF was of a dual head type with 2 frequencys showing, each being selected by a push button. I remember dialing in tower and noticing that the first officer was getting quite high on GS. I saw that the flight director was not giving the correct information and that he was not xchking raw data. As we were IMC my attention went to the aircraft and to guiding his return to the GS. The descent was not steep and there was no GPWS activation. I had to stay with him as he continually wanted to lessen his rate of descent prior to GS capture. He recovered nicely and continued on to a nice landing. However, I don't remember ever talking to the tower or getting cleared to land. The last 800 ft of the approach was visual and I insured that the runway was clear, etc. I just don't remember talking to the tower. I usually turn on the nosegear landing lights when cleared to land as a reminder, however the switches in this aircraft are not in the same position and I did not want to divert attention from the approach to find them. I believe a prime contributing factor was the aircraft confign, as I have been in it maybe 4 times in the past yr, and this was my first officer's first time. Having to monitor the approach as well as not having the switches in a familiar place obviously led to the communication breakdown. My attention became focused on the safe operation of the aircraft. Other factors were that we had been flying the last 5 nights and had been up more than 12 hours. This was our last leg. Day-sea, about 4 hours 20 mins en route. Bottom line: unfamiliar aircraft, long hours, night flying, new first officer. Even the engineer who backs us up admitted he was tired and was concentrating on the approach (he is a pilot). I have been flying over 31 yrs and have always stated that you can always learn something at any given moment. This scenario was a good lesson to us all as to what can happen when the right combinations cause us to narrow our focus.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DC8-73 CARGO ACFT WITH A GLASS COCKPIT ON AN ILS APCH RWY 16R. FO, PF, NEW TO THE COMPANY AND THE CAPT HAD NOT FLOWN THIS ACFT IN SEVERAL MONTHS. CLRED FOR THE APCH TO CONTACT THE TWR AT THE OM. FO GOT HIGH ON GS AND CAPT DISTR HELPING HIM GET DOWN TO GS FORGOT TO CALL TWR FOR LNDG CLRNC. NO CONFLICT.

Narrative: OF MY COMPANIES 30+ DC8'S, ONLY 1 HAS A GLASS COCKPIT. THIS WAS THE ACFT I HAD. THE CAPTS ARE REQUIRED TO BE CHKED ON THIS ACFT BY A CHK AIRMAN AND ARE THEN REQUIRED TO TEACH THE FO'S. I HAD A NEW (IN THE COMPANY) FO AND I HAD NOT FLOWN THIS ACFT IN SEVERAL MONTHS. THE CONFIGN AS TO SWITCHES, ETC IS TOTALLY DIFFERENT, LOCATION WISE, THAN ANY OTHER ACFT WE HAVE. THE FO WAS FLYING. EVEN THOUGH HE IS NEW TO THE DC8 I HAVE FLOWN WITH HIM FOR SEVERAL MONTHS AND HE HAS GOOD PLT SKILLS AND HAS FLOWN CONSISTENTLY VERY GOOD APCHS IN AN IMC ENVIRONMENT. THE APCH (ON ILS TO RWY 16R AT SEA) WAS STARTED IN A NORMAL AND UNEVENTFUL MANNER. APCH SAID TO CONTACT TWR AT THE MARKER. THE VHF WAS OF A DUAL HEAD TYPE WITH 2 FREQS SHOWING, EACH BEING SELECTED BY A PUSH BUTTON. I REMEMBER DIALING IN TWR AND NOTICING THAT THE FO WAS GETTING QUITE HIGH ON GS. I SAW THAT THE FLT DIRECTOR WAS NOT GIVING THE CORRECT INFO AND THAT HE WAS NOT XCHKING RAW DATA. AS WE WERE IMC MY ATTN WENT TO THE ACFT AND TO GUIDING HIS RETURN TO THE GS. THE DSCNT WAS NOT STEEP AND THERE WAS NO GPWS ACTIVATION. I HAD TO STAY WITH HIM AS HE CONTINUALLY WANTED TO LESSEN HIS RATE OF DSCNT PRIOR TO GS CAPTURE. HE RECOVERED NICELY AND CONTINUED ON TO A NICE LNDG. HOWEVER, I DON'T REMEMBER EVER TALKING TO THE TWR OR GETTING CLRED TO LAND. THE LAST 800 FT OF THE APCH WAS VISUAL AND I INSURED THAT THE RWY WAS CLR, ETC. I JUST DON'T REMEMBER TALKING TO THE TWR. I USUALLY TURN ON THE NOSEGEAR LNDG LIGHTS WHEN CLRED TO LAND AS A REMINDER, HOWEVER THE SWITCHES IN THIS ACFT ARE NOT IN THE SAME POS AND I DID NOT WANT TO DIVERT ATTN FROM THE APCH TO FIND THEM. I BELIEVE A PRIME CONTRIBUTING FACTOR WAS THE ACFT CONFIGN, AS I HAVE BEEN IN IT MAYBE 4 TIMES IN THE PAST YR, AND THIS WAS MY FO'S FIRST TIME. HAVING TO MONITOR THE APCH AS WELL AS NOT HAVING THE SWITCHES IN A FAMILIAR PLACE OBVIOUSLY LED TO THE COM BREAKDOWN. MY ATTN BECAME FOCUSED ON THE SAFE OP OF THE ACFT. OTHER FACTORS WERE THAT WE HAD BEEN FLYING THE LAST 5 NIGHTS AND HAD BEEN UP MORE THAN 12 HRS. THIS WAS OUR LAST LEG. DAY-SEA, ABOUT 4 HRS 20 MINS ENRTE. BOTTOM LINE: UNFAMILIAR ACFT, LONG HRS, NIGHT FLYING, NEW FO. EVEN THE ENGINEER WHO BACKS US UP ADMITTED HE WAS TIRED AND WAS CONCENTRATING ON THE APCH (HE IS A PLT). I HAVE BEEN FLYING OVER 31 YRS AND HAVE ALWAYS STATED THAT YOU CAN ALWAYS LEARN SOMETHING AT ANY GIVEN MOMENT. THIS SCENARIO WAS A GOOD LESSON TO US ALL AS TO WHAT CAN HAPPEN WHEN THE RIGHT COMBINATIONS CAUSE US TO NARROW OUR FOCUS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.