Narrative:

Air carrier flight ind-dfw apr/xx/97. In preparation for departure so prepared the takeoff data card with a temperature of 3 degrees C and dewpoint of 1 degree C, utilizing aplc (laptop computer) maximum power/engine anti-ice on. During the taxi out for takeoff, the captain directed that we were not going to use engine anti-ice. I questioned his decision which was in contradiction to our aircraft flight manual at which time he told me to look outside and we did not need it. When cleared for takeoff runway 23L, captain gave me control of the aircraft and I verbally commanded 'set maximum power.' from the start of power application #2 engine was not accelerating normally and brought on the engine fail lights at the beginning of the takeoff roll. The captain was working with the #2 power lever trying to set power with the engine fail light illuminated until approximately 80 KTS at which time he announced he was going to pull back these power levers. At that time I announced the reject/abort on tower frequency. The captain took control of the aircraft, closed out the power levers slowly, decelerated and turned off the runway. He criticized my calling abort on the radios at which time I informed him that was the worst performance by a captain I had ever seen and if he did not like my performance as an first officer to taxi back in and replace me. With the lack of standard callouts, ie, continue or reject, the so and I both thought he was aborting the takeoff. The captain directed I get taxi clearance back for takeoff (I did) and the so asked what he was planning on doing. The captain said I'm going back and takeoff. (No rejected takeoff checklist performed.) when I suggested that it might be prudent to have me hold the brakes and have the captain push up the #2 power lever to see if it would make power before we begin another takeoff roll. When cleared for second takeoff, I held brakes. Captain pushed up #2 power lever and could only get approximately 90 percent N1 when he directed release the brakes. He applied power on #1 and #3 engines which spooled up to the forecast approximately 109 percent N1 bringing on the engine fail light. The so and I both thought he would reject but hecontinued the entire takeoff with the engine fail lights on and #2 engine not making full power. When we got airborne the captain informed us that 'that's what he got paid the big bucks for to get the freight there and his suitcase was in dfw.' in-flight the engine would only go to a maximum fuel flow of approximately 4200 pounds per hour with full throttle. When we landed at dfw the engine would not make any power. Use of standard callouts and procedures would have helped! Ie, an expectation to use engine anti-ice. An expectation for the captain to announce continue or reject (in this case reject). Human factors involved -- fourth night in a row flying all night, tired/irritated, question captain's judgement. Corrective actions: I plan on utilizing company's 'negative airman list' to never fly with this individual again. This is the first time I feel this measure is necessary in my 7 yrs at air carrier. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: first officer called the abort during the first takeoff. He reported the captain was angry that he announced the abort over tower frequency. As the captain taxied the aircraft for another takeoff he did not want to do a rejected takeoff checklist. He simply wanted to perform takeoff only. The first officer talked him into running #2 engine up to see what power would be available. Upon runup #2 engine would only produce 90 percent of N1. Captain advanced the other thrust levers and began the takeoff roll. As the aircraft was moving down the runway, and #2 engine producing less than required thrust, the engine fail lights came on. Captain ignored them and flew rest of flight with reduced thrust on #2 engine. At landing, the flight crew could only get idle thrust from #2 engine. First officer was very upset with the captain's arrogance and refusal to follow company safety procedures. First officer is planning on putting captain's name in negative airman's list, so he would never have to fly with him again. Supplemental information from acn 367117: engine fail light illuminated and we took off and flew to dallas with malfunctioning engine. Crew concerns were countered by captain comments that he was responsible for deliveringcargo. I fault myself for not protesting more forcefully or asking to be relieved prior to taking off in that aircraft.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DC10-30 TKOF WITH ENG FAIL LIGHTS ILLUMINATED FROM IND.

Narrative: ACR FLT IND-DFW APR/XX/97. IN PREPARATION FOR DEP SO PREPARED THE TKOF DATA CARD WITH A TEMP OF 3 DEGS C AND DEWPOINT OF 1 DEG C, UTILIZING APLC (LAPTOP COMPUTER) MAX PWR/ENG ANTI-ICE ON. DURING THE TAXI OUT FOR TKOF, THE CAPT DIRECTED THAT WE WERE NOT GOING TO USE ENG ANTI-ICE. I QUESTIONED HIS DECISION WHICH WAS IN CONTRADICTION TO OUR ACFT FLT MANUAL AT WHICH TIME HE TOLD ME TO LOOK OUTSIDE AND WE DID NOT NEED IT. WHEN CLRED FOR TKOF RWY 23L, CAPT GAVE ME CTL OF THE ACFT AND I VERBALLY COMMANDED 'SET MAX PWR.' FROM THE START OF PWR APPLICATION #2 ENG WAS NOT ACCELERATING NORMALLY AND BROUGHT ON THE ENG FAIL LIGHTS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE TKOF ROLL. THE CAPT WAS WORKING WITH THE #2 PWR LEVER TRYING TO SET PWR WITH THE ENG FAIL LIGHT ILLUMINATED UNTIL APPROX 80 KTS AT WHICH TIME HE ANNOUNCED HE WAS GOING TO PULL BACK THESE PWR LEVERS. AT THAT TIME I ANNOUNCED THE REJECT/ABORT ON TWR FREQ. THE CAPT TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT, CLOSED OUT THE PWR LEVERS SLOWLY, DECELERATED AND TURNED OFF THE RWY. HE CRITICIZED MY CALLING ABORT ON THE RADIOS AT WHICH TIME I INFORMED HIM THAT WAS THE WORST PERFORMANCE BY A CAPT I HAD EVER SEEN AND IF HE DID NOT LIKE MY PERFORMANCE AS AN FO TO TAXI BACK IN AND REPLACE ME. WITH THE LACK OF STANDARD CALLOUTS, IE, CONTINUE OR REJECT, THE SO AND I BOTH THOUGHT HE WAS ABORTING THE TKOF. THE CAPT DIRECTED I GET TAXI CLRNC BACK FOR TKOF (I DID) AND THE SO ASKED WHAT HE WAS PLANNING ON DOING. THE CAPT SAID I'M GOING BACK AND TKOF. (NO REJECTED TKOF CHKLIST PERFORMED.) WHEN I SUGGESTED THAT IT MIGHT BE PRUDENT TO HAVE ME HOLD THE BRAKES AND HAVE THE CAPT PUSH UP THE #2 PWR LEVER TO SEE IF IT WOULD MAKE PWR BEFORE WE BEGIN ANOTHER TKOF ROLL. WHEN CLRED FOR SECOND TKOF, I HELD BRAKES. CAPT PUSHED UP #2 PWR LEVER AND COULD ONLY GET APPROX 90 PERCENT N1 WHEN HE DIRECTED RELEASE THE BRAKES. HE APPLIED PWR ON #1 AND #3 ENGS WHICH SPOOLED UP TO THE FORECAST APPROX 109 PERCENT N1 BRINGING ON THE ENG FAIL LIGHT. THE SO AND I BOTH THOUGHT HE WOULD REJECT BUT HECONTINUED THE ENTIRE TKOF WITH THE ENG FAIL LIGHTS ON AND #2 ENG NOT MAKING FULL PWR. WHEN WE GOT AIRBORNE THE CAPT INFORMED US THAT 'THAT'S WHAT HE GOT PAID THE BIG BUCKS FOR TO GET THE FREIGHT THERE AND HIS SUITCASE WAS IN DFW.' INFLT THE ENG WOULD ONLY GO TO A MAX FUEL FLOW OF APPROX 4200 LBS PER HR WITH FULL THROTTLE. WHEN WE LANDED AT DFW THE ENG WOULD NOT MAKE ANY PWR. USE OF STANDARD CALLOUTS AND PROCS WOULD HAVE HELPED! IE, AN EXPECTATION TO USE ENG ANTI-ICE. AN EXPECTATION FOR THE CAPT TO ANNOUNCE CONTINUE OR REJECT (IN THIS CASE REJECT). HUMAN FACTORS INVOLVED -- FOURTH NIGHT IN A ROW FLYING ALL NIGHT, TIRED/IRRITATED, QUESTION CAPT'S JUDGEMENT. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: I PLAN ON UTILIZING COMPANY'S 'NEGATIVE AIRMAN LIST' TO NEVER FLY WITH THIS INDIVIDUAL AGAIN. THIS IS THE FIRST TIME I FEEL THIS MEASURE IS NECESSARY IN MY 7 YRS AT ACR. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: FO CALLED THE ABORT DURING THE FIRST TKOF. HE RPTED THE CAPT WAS ANGRY THAT HE ANNOUNCED THE ABORT OVER TWR FREQ. AS THE CAPT TAXIED THE ACFT FOR ANOTHER TKOF HE DID NOT WANT TO DO A REJECTED TKOF CHKLIST. HE SIMPLY WANTED TO PERFORM TKOF ONLY. THE FO TALKED HIM INTO RUNNING #2 ENG UP TO SEE WHAT PWR WOULD BE AVAILABLE. UPON RUNUP #2 ENG WOULD ONLY PRODUCE 90 PERCENT OF N1. CAPT ADVANCED THE OTHER THRUST LEVERS AND BEGAN THE TKOF ROLL. AS THE ACFT WAS MOVING DOWN THE RWY, AND #2 ENG PRODUCING LESS THAN REQUIRED THRUST, THE ENG FAIL LIGHTS CAME ON. CAPT IGNORED THEM AND FLEW REST OF FLT WITH REDUCED THRUST ON #2 ENG. AT LNDG, THE FLC COULD ONLY GET IDLE THRUST FROM #2 ENG. FO WAS VERY UPSET WITH THE CAPT'S ARROGANCE AND REFUSAL TO FOLLOW COMPANY SAFETY PROCS. FO IS PLANNING ON PUTTING CAPT'S NAME IN NEGATIVE AIRMAN'S LIST, SO HE WOULD NEVER HAVE TO FLY WITH HIM AGAIN. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 367117: ENG FAIL LIGHT ILLUMINATED AND WE TOOK OFF AND FLEW TO DALLAS WITH MALFUNCTIONING ENG. CREW CONCERNS WERE COUNTERED BY CAPT COMMENTS THAT HE WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR DELIVERINGCARGO. I FAULT MYSELF FOR NOT PROTESTING MORE FORCEFULLY OR ASKING TO BE RELIEVED PRIOR TO TAKING OFF IN THAT ACFT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.