Flight crew of a 4 engine widebody transport failed to turn to the SID departure heading after takeo...

Attributes
ACN	367839
Time
Date	199705
Day	Thu
Local Time Of Day	0601 To 1200
Place
Locale Reference	airport : bkk
State Reference	FO
Altitude	agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 1500
Environment
Flight Conditions	VMC
Light	Daylight
Aircraft 1
Controlling Facilities	tracon : 13kk
Operator	common carrier : air carrier
Make Model Name	Commercial Fixed Wing
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 121
Navigation In Use	Other
Flight Phase	climbout : initial climbout : takeoff climbout : intermediate altitude
Route In Use	departure other
Flight Plan	IFR
Person 1
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : first officer
Qualification	pilot : flight engineer pilot : commercial pilot : cfi pilot : atp pilot : instrument
Experience	flight time last 90 days : 220 flight time total : 16000 flight time type : 330
ASRS Report	367839
Person 2
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : captain oversight : pic
Qualification	pilot : atp
Events
Anomaly	non adherence : clearance other anomaly other other spatial deviation
Independent Detector	other controllera
Resolutory Action	controller : issued new clearance other
Consequence	Other
Supplementary
Primary Problem	Flight Crew Human Performance
Air Traffic Incident	Pilot Deviation

Narrative:

Clearance delivery transmission was loud but extremely garbled, so much so that we were unable to copy clearance on 4 initial attempts. Add to that the lack of annunciation that is typical in the pacific rim and you have a potential for disaster. I was still unable to copy clearance but the captain and so copied and the captain read back the clearance. Clearance delivery acknowledged and did not correct the readback. On taxi-out I noticed the captain had a certain departure plate on his clip in front of him. I inquired about the departure to the captain, asked if we were cleared for that particular departure. He said no, he had it out just in case we were cleared for it. (I forgot to mention that immediately after the captain read back the clearance I told the crew that I was unable to copy or understand any of the clearance.) we were cleared into position on runway, then issued clearance for takeoff. When tower was giving takeoff clearance instructions the captain was advancing the thrust, and the so started reading final takeoff checklist. Therefore I only copied the departure frequency. The captain was busy listening to the so. When airborne I contacted departure control and I assumed we were on a radar vector departure. Departure control gave instructions to climb to 1600 ft, but I assumed and read back heading 160 degrees. The captain started the turn and the controller said 'negative climb to 1600 ft.' so the captain turned back to runway heading. At this time we were still accelerating and the captain was calling for proper clean-up of flaps when the controller said to follow cleared climb out/departure. This added to the confusion. I asked if we were to use selka 4A. At this time the controller said we were cleared 'northeast 5A' and asked our heading, then immediately told us to turn to 030 degrees. We were at 11 DME from bkk when starting turn. Our duty day started at XA20 wake-up call. Leave hotel at XB20 in singapore. There wasn't a place to eat breakfast and the company didn't provide a crew meal. Our flight was finally catered in bkk shortly before our departure. I am certain that low blood sugar was a factor in the crew's performance.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OF A 4 ENG WDB FAILED TO TURN TO THE SID DEP HEADING AFTER TKOF DUE TO NOT CLARIFYING THE DEP CLRNC WITH ATC AND THE FOREIGN LANGUAGE BARRIER.

Narrative: CLRNC DELIVERY XMISSION WAS LOUD BUT EXTREMELY GARBLED, SO MUCH SO THAT WE WERE UNABLE TO COPY CLRNC ON 4 INITIAL ATTEMPTS. ADD TO THAT THE LACK OF ANNUNCIATION THAT IS TYPICAL IN THE PACIFIC RIM AND YOU HAVE A POTENTIAL FOR DISASTER. I WAS STILL UNABLE TO COPY CLRNC BUT THE CAPT AND SO COPIED AND THE CAPT READ BACK THE CLRNC. CLRNC DELIVERY ACKNOWLEDGED AND DID NOT CORRECT THE READBACK. ON TAXI-OUT I NOTICED THE CAPT HAD A CERTAIN DEP PLATE ON HIS CLIP IN FRONT OF HIM. I INQUIRED ABOUT THE DEP TO THE CAPT, ASKED IF WE WERE CLRED FOR THAT PARTICULAR DEP. HE SAID NO, HE HAD IT OUT JUST IN CASE WE WERE CLRED FOR IT. (I FORGOT TO MENTION THAT IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE CAPT READ BACK THE CLRNC I TOLD THE CREW THAT I WAS UNABLE TO COPY OR UNDERSTAND ANY OF THE CLRNC.) WE WERE CLRED INTO POS ON RWY, THEN ISSUED CLRNC FOR TKOF. WHEN TWR WAS GIVING TKOF CLRNC INSTRUCTIONS THE CAPT WAS ADVANCING THE THRUST, AND THE SO STARTED READING FINAL TKOF CHKLIST. THEREFORE I ONLY COPIED THE DEP FREQ. THE CAPT WAS BUSY LISTENING TO THE SO. WHEN AIRBORNE I CONTACTED DEP CTL AND I ASSUMED WE WERE ON A RADAR VECTOR DEP. DEP CTL GAVE INSTRUCTIONS TO CLB TO 1600 FT, BUT I ASSUMED AND READ BACK HDG 160 DEGS. THE CAPT STARTED THE TURN AND THE CTLR SAID 'NEGATIVE CLB TO 1600 FT.' SO THE CAPT TURNED BACK TO RWY HEADING. AT THIS TIME WE WERE STILL ACCELERATING AND THE CAPT WAS CALLING FOR PROPER CLEAN-UP OF FLAPS WHEN THE CTLR SAID TO FOLLOW CLRED CLBOUT/DEP. THIS ADDED TO THE CONFUSION. I ASKED IF WE WERE TO USE SELKA 4A. AT THIS TIME THE CTLR SAID WE WERE CLRED 'NE 5A' AND ASKED OUR HEADING, THEN IMMEDIATELY TOLD US TO TURN TO 030 DEGS. WE WERE AT 11 DME FROM BKK WHEN STARTING TURN. OUR DUTY DAY STARTED AT XA20 WAKE-UP CALL. LEAVE HOTEL AT XB20 IN SINGAPORE. THERE WASN'T A PLACE TO EAT BREAKFAST AND THE COMPANY DIDN'T PROVIDE A CREW MEAL. OUR FLT WAS FINALLY CATERED IN BKK SHORTLY BEFORE OUR DEP. I AM CERTAIN THAT LOW BLOOD SUGAR WAS A FACTOR IN THE CREW'S PERFORMANCE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.

Flight crew of a 4 engine widebody transport failed to turn to the SID departure heading after takeoff due to not clarifying the departure clearance with ATC and the foreign language barrier.