Narrative:

We were operating an MD11. On takeoff at approximately 100 ft AGL, the master caution light illuminated. The #2 engine egt was rising. At 1000 ft AGL it had risen past the red line and we shut it down. After confirming engine out on the FMS we received a message on the FMS scratch pad of multiple engine failure. However, the other 2 engines were operating normally. Expecting an impending second engine failure, the captain took control of the aircraft. We never experienced any problems with the other 2 engines. At this time the autothrottles reduced power, and the airspeed fell to foot plus 5 KTS. The captain disconnected the autoplt and pushed the throttles forward. He hand flew it to re-establish V2 and a climb. He re-engaged the autoplt, and again the autothrottles started to retard. He disconnected the autoplt a second time and hand flew the aircraft through clean-up and climb to 10000 ft. The autoplt was engaged a third time. It operated normally to our takeoff alternate of manila. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: this MD11 had a catastrophic failure of #2 engine during takeoff from subic bay. First officer was flying, when at 100 ft AGL the #2 egt was in the amber temperature range. Captain told him that #2 engine throttle was being retarded to keep egt in limits. Shortly thereafter the amber indications turned red. Captain decided to shut down engine. As engine was shut down, they heard a bang and then felt a shudder of the aircraft. Captain took over flying the aircraft and engaged the autoplt, which soon disengaged. First officer noted low airspeed and throttles were retarding. He was not certain why all this was happening. He surmised that clean-up altitude was 800 ft and the aircraft was descending down to that altitude. He also stated that none of the automatic indications were making any sense to him. He was confused at seeing the marking of 'foot plus 5' on the CDU. But, the autothrottles were retarding. Power was added when captain manually set the autoflt to a pitch and level change mode. Power went to maximum continuous thrust, aircraft was light (480000 pounds) and 2 engine climb out performance resumed. With the failed engine shutdown, flight crew made decision to go to manila to land. Flight crew was apprehensive about making a night approach into subic bay on 2 engines. Aircraft was light enough that performance was good and no fuel had to be dumped. When they were on the ground the flight crew found out they had a catastrophic engine failure. Many fan blades were missing, but none had penetrated the engine casing. The engine failure was completely contained inside the engine casing. Supplemental information from acn 368967: I advised him I was retarding the #2 throttle to try to keep egt within limits. At idle, the egt turned red. I elected to shut the engine off immediately in an effort to minimize damage. At shutdown there was a bang and the aircraft shook. I took over flying at that point. I engage the autoplt and it immediately disconnected. We were at about 1200 ft MSL. At the same time I noticed the #1 and #3 throttles retarding. I also saw an amber speed target below minimum maneuvering speed and a white speed target 5 KTS above minimum maneuvering speed. These were uncommanded FMS anomalies. The speed mode apparently reverted to speed on thrust, causing #1 and #3 throttles to retard, trying to slow to the erroneous speed targets. I then manually selected 255 KIAS and level change to FL100. This put the aircraft into speed on pitch and resumed mct on #1 and #3 engines. Altitude was traded for airspeed while I sorted all of this out. In addition we kept getting mcdu scratchpad alerts indicating we had had a multiple engine failure. This was a very distracting false alert. I re-engaged the autoplt. The first officer had already confirmed engine out on the #2 mcdu. The autoplt engaged in prof/navigation/FMS speed (speed on pitch), once again the altitude, roll and speed FMA turned white (manual) and flashed. This time I saw speed mode revert to 'thrust.' after fixing the modes again I completed the flight without prof or navigation. I called for the engine severe damage checklist. We cleaned up on schedule and climbed to FL100. There was no fire/indication, so I elected not to evacuate/evacuation.we had de- selected sba VOR for departure. This was an unnecessarily complex emergency due to computer software anomalies. The automation is supposed to help. In this case it made things more complicated.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN MD11 HAS A CATASTROPHIC ENG FAILURE ON TKOF FROM SUBIC BAY, DECLARES AN EMER AND LANDS AT MANILA.

Narrative: WE WERE OPERATING AN MD11. ON TKOF AT APPROX 100 FT AGL, THE MASTER CAUTION LIGHT ILLUMINATED. THE #2 ENG EGT WAS RISING. AT 1000 FT AGL IT HAD RISEN PAST THE RED LINE AND WE SHUT IT DOWN. AFTER CONFIRMING ENG OUT ON THE FMS WE RECEIVED A MESSAGE ON THE FMS SCRATCH PAD OF MULTIPLE ENG FAILURE. HOWEVER, THE OTHER 2 ENGS WERE OPERATING NORMALLY. EXPECTING AN IMPENDING SECOND ENG FAILURE, THE CAPT TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT. WE NEVER EXPERIENCED ANY PROBS WITH THE OTHER 2 ENGS. AT THIS TIME THE AUTOTHROTTLES REDUCED PWR, AND THE AIRSPD FELL TO FOOT PLUS 5 KTS. THE CAPT DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT AND PUSHED THE THROTTLES FORWARD. HE HAND FLEW IT TO RE-ESTABLISH V2 AND A CLB. HE RE-ENGAGED THE AUTOPLT, AND AGAIN THE AUTOTHROTTLES STARTED TO RETARD. HE DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT A SECOND TIME AND HAND FLEW THE ACFT THROUGH CLEAN-UP AND CLB TO 10000 FT. THE AUTOPLT WAS ENGAGED A THIRD TIME. IT OPERATED NORMALLY TO OUR TKOF ALTERNATE OF MANILA. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THIS MD11 HAD A CATASTROPHIC FAILURE OF #2 ENG DURING TKOF FROM SUBIC BAY. FO WAS FLYING, WHEN AT 100 FT AGL THE #2 EGT WAS IN THE AMBER TEMP RANGE. CAPT TOLD HIM THAT #2 ENG THROTTLE WAS BEING RETARDED TO KEEP EGT IN LIMITS. SHORTLY THEREAFTER THE AMBER INDICATIONS TURNED RED. CAPT DECIDED TO SHUT DOWN ENG. AS ENG WAS SHUT DOWN, THEY HEARD A BANG AND THEN FELT A SHUDDER OF THE ACFT. CAPT TOOK OVER FLYING THE ACFT AND ENGAGED THE AUTOPLT, WHICH SOON DISENGAGED. FO NOTED LOW AIRSPD AND THROTTLES WERE RETARDING. HE WAS NOT CERTAIN WHY ALL THIS WAS HAPPENING. HE SURMISED THAT CLEAN-UP ALT WAS 800 FT AND THE ACFT WAS DSNDING DOWN TO THAT ALT. HE ALSO STATED THAT NONE OF THE AUTOMATIC INDICATIONS WERE MAKING ANY SENSE TO HIM. HE WAS CONFUSED AT SEEING THE MARKING OF 'FOOT PLUS 5' ON THE CDU. BUT, THE AUTOTHROTTLES WERE RETARDING. PWR WAS ADDED WHEN CAPT MANUALLY SET THE AUTOFLT TO A PITCH AND LEVEL CHANGE MODE. PWR WENT TO MAX CONTINUOUS THRUST, ACFT WAS LIGHT (480000 LBS) AND 2 ENG CLBOUT PERFORMANCE RESUMED. WITH THE FAILED ENG SHUTDOWN, FLC MADE DECISION TO GO TO MANILA TO LAND. FLC WAS APPREHENSIVE ABOUT MAKING A NIGHT APCH INTO SUBIC BAY ON 2 ENGS. ACFT WAS LIGHT ENOUGH THAT PERFORMANCE WAS GOOD AND NO FUEL HAD TO BE DUMPED. WHEN THEY WERE ON THE GND THE FLC FOUND OUT THEY HAD A CATASTROPHIC ENG FAILURE. MANY FAN BLADES WERE MISSING, BUT NONE HAD PENETRATED THE ENG CASING. THE ENG FAILURE WAS COMPLETELY CONTAINED INSIDE THE ENG CASING. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 368967: I ADVISED HIM I WAS RETARDING THE #2 THROTTLE TO TRY TO KEEP EGT WITHIN LIMITS. AT IDLE, THE EGT TURNED RED. I ELECTED TO SHUT THE ENG OFF IMMEDIATELY IN AN EFFORT TO MINIMIZE DAMAGE. AT SHUTDOWN THERE WAS A BANG AND THE ACFT SHOOK. I TOOK OVER FLYING AT THAT POINT. I ENGAGE THE AUTOPLT AND IT IMMEDIATELY DISCONNECTED. WE WERE AT ABOUT 1200 FT MSL. AT THE SAME TIME I NOTICED THE #1 AND #3 THROTTLES RETARDING. I ALSO SAW AN AMBER SPD TARGET BELOW MINIMUM MANEUVERING SPD AND A WHITE SPD TARGET 5 KTS ABOVE MINIMUM MANEUVERING SPD. THESE WERE UNCOMMANDED FMS ANOMALIES. THE SPD MODE APPARENTLY REVERTED TO SPD ON THRUST, CAUSING #1 AND #3 THROTTLES TO RETARD, TRYING TO SLOW TO THE ERRONEOUS SPD TARGETS. I THEN MANUALLY SELECTED 255 KIAS AND LEVEL CHANGE TO FL100. THIS PUT THE ACFT INTO SPD ON PITCH AND RESUMED MCT ON #1 AND #3 ENGS. ALT WAS TRADED FOR AIRSPD WHILE I SORTED ALL OF THIS OUT. IN ADDITION WE KEPT GETTING MCDU SCRATCHPAD ALERTS INDICATING WE HAD HAD A MULTIPLE ENG FAILURE. THIS WAS A VERY DISTRACTING FALSE ALERT. I RE-ENGAGED THE AUTOPLT. THE FO HAD ALREADY CONFIRMED ENG OUT ON THE #2 MCDU. THE AUTOPLT ENGAGED IN PROF/NAV/FMS SPD (SPD ON PITCH), ONCE AGAIN THE ALT, ROLL AND SPD FMA TURNED WHITE (MANUAL) AND FLASHED. THIS TIME I SAW SPD MODE REVERT TO 'THRUST.' AFTER FIXING THE MODES AGAIN I COMPLETED THE FLT WITHOUT PROF OR NAV. I CALLED FOR THE ENG SEVERE DAMAGE CHKLIST. WE CLEANED UP ON SCHEDULE AND CLBED TO FL100. THERE WAS NO FIRE/INDICATION, SO I ELECTED NOT TO EVAC.WE HAD DE- SELECTED SBA VOR FOR DEP. THIS WAS AN UNNECESSARILY COMPLEX EMER DUE TO COMPUTER SOFTWARE ANOMALIES. THE AUTOMATION IS SUPPOSED TO HELP. IN THIS CASE IT MADE THINGS MORE COMPLICATED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.