A B76734-300 flight crew mistakes minimums for GS out at hunda, on the ILS runway 25L approach at la...

Attributes
ACN	369208
Time
Date	199705
Day	Mon
Local Time Of Day	1801 To 2400
Place
Locale Reference	airport : lax
State Reference	CA
Altitude	msl bound lower : 3320 msl bound upper : 3500
Environment
Flight Conditions	IMC
Light	Night
Aircraft 1
Controlling Facilities	tower : lax
Operator	common carrier : air carrier
Make Model Name	B767-300 and 300 ER
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 121
Navigation In Use	Other Other
Flight Phase	descent : approach
Flight Plan	IFR
Person 1
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : first officer
Qualification	pilot : flight engineer pilot : atp
Experience	flight time last 90 days : 200 flight time total : 17500 flight time type : 1025
ASRS Report	369208
Person 2
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : captain oversight : pic
Qualification	pilot : atp
Events
Anomaly	other anomaly other other anomaly other
Independent Detector	other flight crewa
Resolutory Action	none taken : detected after the fact
Consequence	Other
Supplementary
Primary Problem	Flight Crew Human Performance
Air Traffic Incident	other

Narrative:

On the civet arrival to lax runway 25L, we were cleared, after arnes intersection, for the ILS runway 25L approach. After complying with altitude restrs at suzzi and fuelr intxns, we intercepted the ILS GS at gaate (16.6 ILS DME) at 5000 ft MSL which is the published GS intercept altitude and fix. The published approach shows the on the glide path altitude over hunda intersection of 3499 ft MSL. Approach control advised us, after we had passed gaate, to cross hunda at or above 3500 ft. Our autoplts were engaged in the approach mode (FMS's programmed for the approach), computed and raw data xchk showed us on course and on GS. There was no reason to think the hunda restr would be a problem. By the time we realized we were going to be lower than the 3500 ft restr at hunda, it was too late to do anything about it safely. We crossed hunda at 3320 ft MSL, on GS (published approach said 3500 ft). We crossed limma (7.4 ILS DME) at 1890 ft MSL just as published. To try to meet the hunda restr would have meant dangerously unstabilizing the approach in IMC conditions, at night and unnecessarily increasing the workload to re-establish the on GS condition and re-engaging the autoplts in the approach mode, all the while configuring, running checklists, complying with approach control speed restrs, receiving TA's and frequency change instructions. 3 questions occur to me: 1) can approach control issue an altitude restr on an ILS GS after the aircraft has a) been cleared for the approach, and B) passed the GS intercept point? 2) if the published procedure does not depict accurately what will occur, why is its use permitted to continue? 3) if complying with a published approach procedure, flcs risk violating an altitude restr, why is the procedure even certified? Flcs can do everything correctly and still miss an altitude restr. Other places this is called entrapment. Such a situation is absurd and outrageous. Possible solutions: 1) stop issuing the hunda restr. 2) change the published procedure. 3) suspend the ILS runway 25L until it has been flight tested and corrected. 4) start from scratch and build a new approach with new ground equipment that can radiate signals which allow aircraft to comply with all necessary restrs.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B76734-300 FLC MISTAKES MINIMUMS FOR GS OUT AT HUNDA, ON THE ILS RWY 25L APCH AT LAX. FLC DOESN'T REALIZE THE GS OUT MINIMUMS ARE A DASHED LINE ON THE APCH PROFILE.

Narrative: ON THE CIVET ARR TO LAX RWY 25L, WE WERE CLRED, AFTER ARNES INTXN, FOR THE ILS RWY 25L APCH. AFTER COMPLYING WITH ALT RESTRS AT SUZZI AND FUELR INTXNS, WE INTERCEPTED THE ILS GS AT GAATE (16.6 ILS DME) AT 5000 FT MSL WHICH IS THE PUBLISHED GS INTERCEPT ALT AND FIX. THE PUBLISHED APCH SHOWS THE ON THE GLIDE PATH ALT OVER HUNDA INTXN OF 3499 FT MSL. APCH CTL ADVISED US, AFTER WE HAD PASSED GAATE, TO CROSS HUNDA AT OR ABOVE 3500 FT. OUR AUTOPLTS WERE ENGAGED IN THE APCH MODE (FMS'S PROGRAMMED FOR THE APCH), COMPUTED AND RAW DATA XCHK SHOWED US ON COURSE AND ON GS. THERE WAS NO REASON TO THINK THE HUNDA RESTR WOULD BE A PROB. BY THE TIME WE REALIZED WE WERE GOING TO BE LOWER THAN THE 3500 FT RESTR AT HUNDA, IT WAS TOO LATE TO DO ANYTHING ABOUT IT SAFELY. WE CROSSED HUNDA AT 3320 FT MSL, ON GS (PUBLISHED APCH SAID 3500 FT). WE CROSSED LIMMA (7.4 ILS DME) AT 1890 FT MSL JUST AS PUBLISHED. TO TRY TO MEET THE HUNDA RESTR WOULD HAVE MEANT DANGEROUSLY UNSTABILIZING THE APCH IN IMC CONDITIONS, AT NIGHT AND UNNECESSARILY INCREASING THE WORKLOAD TO RE-ESTABLISH THE ON GS CONDITION AND RE-ENGAGING THE AUTOPLTS IN THE APCH MODE, ALL THE WHILE CONFIGURING, RUNNING CHKLISTS, COMPLYING WITH APCH CTL SPD RESTRS, RECEIVING TA'S AND FREQ CHANGE INSTRUCTIONS. 3 QUESTIONS OCCUR TO ME: 1) CAN APCH CTL ISSUE AN ALT RESTR ON AN ILS GS AFTER THE ACFT HAS A) BEEN CLRED FOR THE APCH, AND B) PASSED THE GS INTERCEPT POINT? 2) IF THE PUBLISHED PROC DOES NOT DEPICT ACCURATELY WHAT WILL OCCUR, WHY IS ITS USE PERMITTED TO CONTINUE? 3) IF COMPLYING WITH A PUBLISHED APCH PROC, FLCS RISK VIOLATING AN ALT RESTR, WHY IS THE PROC EVEN CERTIFIED? FLCS CAN DO EVERYTHING CORRECTLY AND STILL MISS AN ALT RESTR. OTHER PLACES THIS IS CALLED ENTRAPMENT. SUCH A SIT IS ABSURD AND OUTRAGEOUS. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS: 1) STOP ISSUING THE HUNDA RESTR. 2) CHANGE THE PUBLISHED PROC. 3) SUSPEND THE ILS RWY 25L UNTIL IT HAS BEEN FLT TESTED AND CORRECTED. 4) START FROM SCRATCH AND BUILD A NEW APCH WITH NEW GND EQUIP THAT CAN RADIATE SIGNALS WHICH ALLOW ACFT TO COMPLY WITH ALL NECESSARY RESTRS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.

A B76734-300 flight crew mistakes minimums for GS out at hunda, on the ILS runway 25L approach at lax. Flight crew doesn't realize the GS out minimums are a dashed line on the approach profile.