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Attributes | |
ACN | 371237 |
Time | |
Date | 199706 |
Day | Mon |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : rdu |
State Reference | NC |
Altitude | agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tower : rdu |
Make Model Name | Citation V |
Operating Under FAR Part | other : unknown |
Flight Phase | ground : holding |
Aircraft 2 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | descent : approach |
Route In Use | arrival other |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | government : faa |
Qualification | controller : radar |
ASRS Report | 371237 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | government : faa |
Function | controller : local |
Qualification | controller : radar |
Events | |
Anomaly | other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other controllera |
Resolutory Action | other |
Consequence | Other |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Navigational Facility |
Air Traffic Incident | other |
Situations | |
ATC Facility | other physical facility |
Narrative:
There is a long standing, intermittent problem at the rdu airport that is a severe impediment to safety. The problem deals with a 'blank spot' on the approach end of runway 5R. We have sits when a departing aircraft is taxied into position to hold, and when the takeoff clearance is issued, we have lost communications with the aircraft. The problem is recognized as serious enough to be addressed in our local SOP order rdu 7110.65 as a potential problem area (attachment 2). This issue has been addressed on and off for yrs with no permanent resolution. While the application of ATC procedures should, in theory, prevent any mishaps, this particular problem is a disaster waiting to happen. When you clear an aircraft for takeoff and your actions are based on anticipated pilot action, and the pilot does not do what you expected, any diversion of attention could result, in this case, in an arriving aircraft landing on top of the aircraft sitting on the runway. But for the loss of communications, the aircraft would not be sitting on the runway. An incident that occurred on jun/xa/97 exemplifies this scenario. At approximately XX02Z a C560 was taxied into position to hold on runway 5R. An air carrier MD80 was on a 7 mi final to runway 5R and cleared to land. When the preceding arrival cleared the runway, the C560 was cleared for takeoff. No response was received. After several xmissions attempting to establish communications, the local controller attempted to use the backup radio in the tower (this has become standard procedure for this situation). The backup radio did not work because the antenna cable had been broken off. By this time, the air carrier was 2.5 mi final, and changed to runway 5L to prevent a go around. With safety now ensured, a relay between the local controller and another departing aircraft was established, and the C560 received and acknowledged his takeoff clearance through a BA31 at the approach end of runway 5R. Once again, luck was on our side. Visual approachs were in use. There was another aircraft in the vicinity to assist the local controller. There was no other aircraft on final for runway 5L. There was no other aircraft on runway 5L waiting departure. The controller's attention was not diverted and the situation was recognized immediately. These are just too many uncontrolled variables that we are depending on to ensure a safe operation. One other factor that is consistent throughout each of these incidents is that we are always (at least when the equipment is not physically broken) able to establish communications, with the aircraft on runway 5R, using the backup transceivers located in the tower cabin attendant. The antenna for this transceiver is located on the top of the tower. Airways facilities at rdu ATCT has indicated that a possible remedy to the problem is to relocate the transmitter involved (tower frequency 119.3) to the top of the tower cabin attendant. Yrs ago when dealing with the problem, an airways facilities technician indicated that placing a remote transmitter/receiver (rtr) at the approach end of runway 5R should also resolve the problem.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: RPTR CLAIMS THERE IS AN INTERMITTENT PROB WHEN THE LCL CTLR LOSES COM WITH ACFT IN POS ON RWY 5R. RPTR STATES IN THE RPTED INCIDENT THAT ANOTHER ACFT NEAR THE APCH END OF THE RWY WAS USED TO RELAY THE TKOF CLRNC FROM THE TWR. TFC ON FINAL FOR RWY 5R HAD TO BE SWITCHED TO RWY 5L BECAUSE OF THE COM PROB. PROB IS ONGOING AND IS ADDRESSED IN THE LCL SOP.
Narrative: THERE IS A LONG STANDING, INTERMITTENT PROB AT THE RDU ARPT THAT IS A SEVERE IMPEDIMENT TO SAFETY. THE PROB DEALS WITH A 'BLANK SPOT' ON THE APCH END OF RWY 5R. WE HAVE SITS WHEN A DEPARTING ACFT IS TAXIED INTO POS TO HOLD, AND WHEN THE TKOF CLRNC IS ISSUED, WE HAVE LOST COMS WITH THE ACFT. THE PROB IS RECOGNIZED AS SERIOUS ENOUGH TO BE ADDRESSED IN OUR LCL SOP ORDER RDU 7110.65 AS A POTENTIAL PROB AREA (ATTACHMENT 2). THIS ISSUE HAS BEEN ADDRESSED ON AND OFF FOR YRS WITH NO PERMANENT RESOLUTION. WHILE THE APPLICATION OF ATC PROCS SHOULD, IN THEORY, PREVENT ANY MISHAPS, THIS PARTICULAR PROB IS A DISASTER WAITING TO HAPPEN. WHEN YOU CLR AN ACFT FOR TKOF AND YOUR ACTIONS ARE BASED ON ANTICIPATED PLT ACTION, AND THE PLT DOES NOT DO WHAT YOU EXPECTED, ANY DIVERSION OF ATTN COULD RESULT, IN THIS CASE, IN AN ARRIVING ACFT LNDG ON TOP OF THE ACFT SITTING ON THE RWY. BUT FOR THE LOSS OF COMS, THE ACFT WOULD NOT BE SITTING ON THE RWY. AN INCIDENT THAT OCCURRED ON JUN/XA/97 EXEMPLIFIES THIS SCENARIO. AT APPROX XX02Z A C560 WAS TAXIED INTO POS TO HOLD ON RWY 5R. AN ACR MD80 WAS ON A 7 MI FINAL TO RWY 5R AND CLRED TO LAND. WHEN THE PRECEDING ARR CLRED THE RWY, THE C560 WAS CLRED FOR TKOF. NO RESPONSE WAS RECEIVED. AFTER SEVERAL XMISSIONS ATTEMPTING TO ESTABLISH COMS, THE LCL CTLR ATTEMPTED TO USE THE BACKUP RADIO IN THE TWR (THIS HAS BECOME STANDARD PROC FOR THIS SIT). THE BACKUP RADIO DID NOT WORK BECAUSE THE ANTENNA CABLE HAD BEEN BROKEN OFF. BY THIS TIME, THE ACR WAS 2.5 MI FINAL, AND CHANGED TO RWY 5L TO PREVENT A GAR. WITH SAFETY NOW ENSURED, A RELAY BTWN THE LCL CTLR AND ANOTHER DEPARTING ACFT WAS ESTABLISHED, AND THE C560 RECEIVED AND ACKNOWLEDGED HIS TKOF CLRNC THROUGH A BA31 AT THE APCH END OF RWY 5R. ONCE AGAIN, LUCK WAS ON OUR SIDE. VISUAL APCHS WERE IN USE. THERE WAS ANOTHER ACFT IN THE VICINITY TO ASSIST THE LCL CTLR. THERE WAS NO OTHER ACFT ON FINAL FOR RWY 5L. THERE WAS NO OTHER ACFT ON RWY 5L WAITING DEP. THE CTLR'S ATTN WAS NOT DIVERTED AND THE SIT WAS RECOGNIZED IMMEDIATELY. THESE ARE JUST TOO MANY UNCTLED VARIABLES THAT WE ARE DEPENDING ON TO ENSURE A SAFE OP. ONE OTHER FACTOR THAT IS CONSISTENT THROUGHOUT EACH OF THESE INCIDENTS IS THAT WE ARE ALWAYS (AT LEAST WHEN THE EQUIP IS NOT PHYSICALLY BROKEN) ABLE TO ESTABLISH COMS, WITH THE ACFT ON RWY 5R, USING THE BACKUP TRANSCEIVERS LOCATED IN THE TWR CAB. THE ANTENNA FOR THIS TRANSCEIVER IS LOCATED ON THE TOP OF THE TWR. AIRWAYS FACILITIES AT RDU ATCT HAS INDICATED THAT A POSSIBLE REMEDY TO THE PROB IS TO RELOCATE THE XMITTER INVOLVED (TWR FREQ 119.3) TO THE TOP OF THE TWR CAB. YRS AGO WHEN DEALING WITH THE PROB, AN AIRWAYS FACILITIES TECHNICIAN INDICATED THAT PLACING A REMOTE XMITTER/RECEIVER (RTR) AT THE APCH END OF RWY 5R SHOULD ALSO RESOLVE THE PROB.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.