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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 371283 |
Time | |
Date | 199706 |
Day | Thu |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : iah |
State Reference | TX |
Altitude | agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tower : cun |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | MD-88 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Navigation In Use | Other Other |
Flight Phase | climbout : takeoff other |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : flight engineer pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 200 flight time total : 11000 flight time type : 600 |
ASRS Report | 371283 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 200 flight time total : 4000 flight time type : 250 |
ASRS Report | 371524 |
Events | |
Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : critical non adherence : far non adherence : published procedure other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | aircraft equipment other aircraft equipment : unspecified other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | flight crew : declared emergency flight crew : rejected takeoff |
Consequence | other Other |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Aircraft |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Narrative:
Flight was on takeoff roll (9401 ft long runway). Approaching V1, master warning light illuminated. Takeoff was rejected and aircraft was brought to a stop on runway. A PA was made to advise the passenger to remain seated, and ATC was advised of our status. We checked with the flight attendant in charge, on the forward jump seat, by opening the cockpit door and made sure all the passenger were still seated. The event causing the master warning light was a 'tail compartment temperature high' annunciation which extinguished during the abort. We followed-up with the applicable procedure and the light remained extinguished. Aircraft was taxied clear of runway onto parallel taxiway and kept away from congested areas while we ascertained brake and tire status. We asked for and received emergency vehicles which positioned in front of and behind aircraft to assist if necessary. The taxiway was level and I determined that the aircraft would remain stationary without setting brakes, with both engines shut down. Per procedure, we observed brake temperatures and eventually had fuse plugs melt on 2 of 4 main tires. Passenger were bussed to terminal building (deplaning through aft airstairs) after brakes had cooled. We stayed with aircraft as it was towed a short distance to a maintenance facility. There were no passenger injuries. Decision to reject was an instant reaction. My hand was just leaving the throttles, and I simultaneously saw a red master warning light and a lot of dry pavement remaining in front of me. Aircraft stopped easily, with runway to spare. However, I plan to now incorporate a personal 'buffer' relative to V1 speed for reaction time and go/no-go decision making, even for long runways. It just might save tires, brakes, passenger inconvenience or more, in the future. Supplemental information from acn 371524: on takeoff roll runway 8 at iah. V1 was 133 KTS, vr was 138 KTS and V2 was 142 KTS. We were at 140-145 KTS with nosewheel off the ground. Main wheels had not lifted off yet. A 'tail compartment temperature high' light illuminated with associated master warning. Captain elected to reject the takeoff. Spoilers deployed and autobrakes activated. Nosewheel came back down firmly when autobrakes activated. Aircraft stopped with approximately 2000 ft remaining. Taxied clear. Stopped on taxiway and shut down engines without setting brakes. Brakes continued to heat with temperature peaking at 350-375 degrees C. 2 main wheel deflated when fuse plugs melted. Captain's decision to abort is debatable, but with the advantage of hindsight, I believe it was a mistake. He reacted to the red master warning without knowing its source. Master warning is on the glare shield directly in front of the pilot. 'Tail compartment temperature' is on the overhead panel. Captain did an excellent job controling the aircraft, but we were very lucky the main gear had not lifted off or we would not have been able to stop within the remaining runway.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: THE ACR FLC OF AN MD88 REJECTED THEIR TKOF WELL ABOVE V1 SPD WHEN THE 'MASTER WARNING' AND 'TAIL COMPARTMENT TEMP HIGH' LIGHTS ILLUMINATED. THE REJECT WAS SUCCESSFUL, BUT THE FUSE PLUGS MELTED ON 2 MAIN GEAR TIRES.
Narrative: FLT WAS ON TKOF ROLL (9401 FT LONG RWY). APCHING V1, MASTER WARNING LIGHT ILLUMINATED. TKOF WAS REJECTED AND ACFT WAS BROUGHT TO A STOP ON RWY. A PA WAS MADE TO ADVISE THE PAX TO REMAIN SEATED, AND ATC WAS ADVISED OF OUR STATUS. WE CHKED WITH THE FLT ATTENDANT IN CHARGE, ON THE FORWARD JUMP SEAT, BY OPENING THE COCKPIT DOOR AND MADE SURE ALL THE PAX WERE STILL SEATED. THE EVENT CAUSING THE MASTER WARNING LIGHT WAS A 'TAIL COMPARTMENT TEMP HIGH' ANNUNCIATION WHICH EXTINGUISHED DURING THE ABORT. WE FOLLOWED-UP WITH THE APPLICABLE PROC AND THE LIGHT REMAINED EXTINGUISHED. ACFT WAS TAXIED CLR OF RWY ONTO PARALLEL TXWY AND KEPT AWAY FROM CONGESTED AREAS WHILE WE ASCERTAINED BRAKE AND TIRE STATUS. WE ASKED FOR AND RECEIVED EMER VEHICLES WHICH POSITIONED IN FRONT OF AND BEHIND ACFT TO ASSIST IF NECESSARY. THE TXWY WAS LEVEL AND I DETERMINED THAT THE ACFT WOULD REMAIN STATIONARY WITHOUT SETTING BRAKES, WITH BOTH ENGS SHUT DOWN. PER PROC, WE OBSERVED BRAKE TEMPS AND EVENTUALLY HAD FUSE PLUGS MELT ON 2 OF 4 MAIN TIRES. PAX WERE BUSSED TO TERMINAL BUILDING (DEPLANING THROUGH AFT AIRSTAIRS) AFTER BRAKES HAD COOLED. WE STAYED WITH ACFT AS IT WAS TOWED A SHORT DISTANCE TO A MAINT FACILITY. THERE WERE NO PAX INJURIES. DECISION TO REJECT WAS AN INSTANT REACTION. MY HAND WAS JUST LEAVING THE THROTTLES, AND I SIMULTANEOUSLY SAW A RED MASTER WARNING LIGHT AND A LOT OF DRY PAVEMENT REMAINING IN FRONT OF ME. ACFT STOPPED EASILY, WITH RWY TO SPARE. HOWEVER, I PLAN TO NOW INCORPORATE A PERSONAL 'BUFFER' RELATIVE TO V1 SPD FOR REACTION TIME AND GO/NO-GO DECISION MAKING, EVEN FOR LONG RWYS. IT JUST MIGHT SAVE TIRES, BRAKES, PAX INCONVENIENCE OR MORE, IN THE FUTURE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 371524: ON TKOF ROLL RWY 8 AT IAH. V1 WAS 133 KTS, VR WAS 138 KTS AND V2 WAS 142 KTS. WE WERE AT 140-145 KTS WITH NOSEWHEEL OFF THE GND. MAIN WHEELS HAD NOT LIFTED OFF YET. A 'TAIL COMPARTMENT TEMP HIGH' LIGHT ILLUMINATED WITH ASSOCIATED MASTER WARNING. CAPT ELECTED TO REJECT THE TKOF. SPOILERS DEPLOYED AND AUTOBRAKES ACTIVATED. NOSEWHEEL CAME BACK DOWN FIRMLY WHEN AUTOBRAKES ACTIVATED. ACFT STOPPED WITH APPROX 2000 FT REMAINING. TAXIED CLR. STOPPED ON TXWY AND SHUT DOWN ENGS WITHOUT SETTING BRAKES. BRAKES CONTINUED TO HEAT WITH TEMP PEAKING AT 350-375 DEGS C. 2 MAIN WHEEL DEFLATED WHEN FUSE PLUGS MELTED. CAPT'S DECISION TO ABORT IS DEBATABLE, BUT WITH THE ADVANTAGE OF HINDSIGHT, I BELIEVE IT WAS A MISTAKE. HE REACTED TO THE RED MASTER WARNING WITHOUT KNOWING ITS SOURCE. MASTER WARNING IS ON THE GLARE SHIELD DIRECTLY IN FRONT OF THE PLT. 'TAIL COMPARTMENT TEMP' IS ON THE OVERHEAD PANEL. CAPT DID AN EXCELLENT JOB CTLING THE ACFT, BUT WE WERE VERY LUCKY THE MAIN GEAR HAD NOT LIFTED OFF OR WE WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ABLE TO STOP WITHIN THE REMAINING RWY.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.