37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 371290 |
Time | |
Date | 199706 |
Day | Fri |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : lga |
State Reference | NY |
Altitude | msl bound lower : 22 msl bound upper : 3000 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | IMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tracon : n90 tower : lga tower : ict |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | B727 Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | descent : approach landing other |
Route In Use | approach : circling |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | observation : observer |
Qualification | pilot : flight engineer pilot : cfi pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 180 flight time total : 7700 flight time type : 3500 |
ASRS Report | 371290 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Events | |
Anomaly | inflight encounter : weather non adherence : published procedure non adherence : far other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa other other : unspecified |
Resolutory Action | none taken : detected after the fact |
Consequence | Other |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Narrative:
ILS to lga runway 22 was inoperative. All other approachs could not be used because of 'jfk and ewr runway configns' so the lda-a to runway 22 was in use. I was on the jump seat and not an active crew member. The first call to approach gave us a visibility of 2 mi (2 1/4 mi required for our CAT D). But after holding instructions, etc, we were suckered into the approach. When approach control called that there was now 2 1/2 mi visibility at lga, the crew responded by heading for the approach as it now was above the published minimums. However, since our airline does not require training on circle-to- land maneuvers, we are required to have 1000 ft ceiling and 3 mi visibility. The crew proceeded to lga and landed. We had the entire runway clearly in sight at 4 1/2 mi so we did have the required visibility (plate) in-flight, but not 3 mi. I think that the best visibility report the crew got was 2 1/2 mi. Once we were on the ground, we all realized the mistake, but in the heat of the approach, nobody remembered the 1000 ft and 3 mi rule -- just checking the approach plates was not good enough. We now have so many 'exemptions' and 'waivers' to our operations that it is very easy to forget or miss one of these rules in the heat of battle. It would enhance safety to have all air carrier approach plates with only the correct information that can be glanced at quickly and have the necessary safety information readily available.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: AN ACR B727 FLC MAKES A CIRCLE-TO-LAND APCH WITH THE RPTED VISIBILITY BELOW THEIR REQUIRED MINIMUMS. THEIR ACR DOES NOT TRAIN FOR CIRCLE-TO-LAND APCHS SO THEIR MINIMUMS ARE 1000 FT CEILING AND 3 MI VISIBILITY.
Narrative: ILS TO LGA RWY 22 WAS INOP. ALL OTHER APCHS COULD NOT BE USED BECAUSE OF 'JFK AND EWR RWY CONFIGNS' SO THE LDA-A TO RWY 22 WAS IN USE. I WAS ON THE JUMP SEAT AND NOT AN ACTIVE CREW MEMBER. THE FIRST CALL TO APCH GAVE US A VISIBILITY OF 2 MI (2 1/4 MI REQUIRED FOR OUR CAT D). BUT AFTER HOLDING INSTRUCTIONS, ETC, WE WERE SUCKERED INTO THE APCH. WHEN APCH CTL CALLED THAT THERE WAS NOW 2 1/2 MI VISIBILITY AT LGA, THE CREW RESPONDED BY HDG FOR THE APCH AS IT NOW WAS ABOVE THE PUBLISHED MINIMUMS. HOWEVER, SINCE OUR AIRLINE DOES NOT REQUIRE TRAINING ON CIRCLE-TO- LAND MANEUVERS, WE ARE REQUIRED TO HAVE 1000 FT CEILING AND 3 MI VISIBILITY. THE CREW PROCEEDED TO LGA AND LANDED. WE HAD THE ENTIRE RWY CLRLY IN SIGHT AT 4 1/2 MI SO WE DID HAVE THE REQUIRED VISIBILITY (PLATE) INFLT, BUT NOT 3 MI. I THINK THAT THE BEST VISIBILITY RPT THE CREW GOT WAS 2 1/2 MI. ONCE WE WERE ON THE GND, WE ALL REALIZED THE MISTAKE, BUT IN THE HEAT OF THE APCH, NOBODY REMEMBERED THE 1000 FT AND 3 MI RULE -- JUST CHKING THE APCH PLATES WAS NOT GOOD ENOUGH. WE NOW HAVE SO MANY 'EXEMPTIONS' AND 'WAIVERS' TO OUR OPS THAT IT IS VERY EASY TO FORGET OR MISS ONE OF THESE RULES IN THE HEAT OF BATTLE. IT WOULD ENHANCE SAFETY TO HAVE ALL ACR APCH PLATES WITH ONLY THE CORRECT INFO THAT CAN BE GLANCED AT QUICKLY AND HAVE THE NECESSARY SAFETY INFO READILY AVAILABLE.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.