Narrative:

Cleared to descend to 7000 ft at kayoh intersection for an eastside arrival to the sna airport. Passing approximately 8500 ft, center reported traffic at 2 O'clock, 8 NM climbing through 7500 ft. We reported no contact. At 7800 ft TCASII issued an RA to 'climb.' the climb RA continued until approximately 9000 ft when 'increase climb' was annunciated. We increased climb and about 10200 ft an MD80 passed slightly beneath our flight path from about a 2 O'clock position. Immediately after passing traffic, we were given a frequency change to approach control and cleared to descend via the 'eastside arrival.' due to the RA, we were considerably above altitude for the arrival. We complied with the arrival constrictions as rapidly as possible for a normal approach to runway 19R at sna. Neither pilot can ascertain why TCASII would command a 'climb' and an increase climb in this situation. From what we know, it appears that a normal or 'increase descent' would have provided clearance. It appears to us as though we climbed into a conflict. No other traffic was reported or sighted in the vicinity. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter said that he had never had a TCASII system tell him to increase climb before. He said that he would have been better off if he had continued his descent, but neither he nor the TCASII knew that the MD80 was going to continue its climb and, in fact, increase its climb rate. When he saw the MD80 climbing toward him while he was evading, using a maximum performance climb, he was afraid to turn because any roll would have lost some of his available lift and he felt that there was none to spare. He said that he could see everything about the MD80 as it passed, including the rivets. He said that he called the number that the controller gave him for the center. He told the supervisor that he was the captain of the B737-300 that had the near midair collision near kayoh. The supervisor, apparently, admitted that the controller erred and would receive further training along with several other personnel. The supervisor said that the error was not due to equipment problems, according to the reporter.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR B737 FLC DSNDING ON A STAR GETS A TCASII RA TO CLB WHEN AN ACR MD80 CLBS THROUGH 7500 FT AS THE B737 DSNDS TO 7800 FT. THE CLB RA CHANGES TO INCREASE CLB AS THE MD80 CONTINUES ITS CLB. THE ACFT PASS VERY CLOSE TO EACH OTHER.

Narrative: CLRED TO DSND TO 7000 FT AT KAYOH INTXN FOR AN EASTSIDE ARR TO THE SNA ARPT. PASSING APPROX 8500 FT, CTR RPTED TFC AT 2 O'CLOCK, 8 NM CLBING THROUGH 7500 FT. WE RPTED NO CONTACT. AT 7800 FT TCASII ISSUED AN RA TO 'CLB.' THE CLB RA CONTINUED UNTIL APPROX 9000 FT WHEN 'INCREASE CLB' WAS ANNUNCIATED. WE INCREASED CLB AND ABOUT 10200 FT AN MD80 PASSED SLIGHTLY BENEATH OUR FLT PATH FROM ABOUT A 2 O'CLOCK POS. IMMEDIATELY AFTER PASSING TFC, WE WERE GIVEN A FREQ CHANGE TO APCH CTL AND CLRED TO DSND VIA THE 'EASTSIDE ARR.' DUE TO THE RA, WE WERE CONSIDERABLY ABOVE ALT FOR THE ARR. WE COMPLIED WITH THE ARR CONSTRICTIONS AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE FOR A NORMAL APCH TO RWY 19R AT SNA. NEITHER PLT CAN ASCERTAIN WHY TCASII WOULD COMMAND A 'CLB' AND AN INCREASE CLB IN THIS SIT. FROM WHAT WE KNOW, IT APPEARS THAT A NORMAL OR 'INCREASE DSCNT' WOULD HAVE PROVIDED CLRNC. IT APPEARS TO US AS THOUGH WE CLBED INTO A CONFLICT. NO OTHER TFC WAS RPTED OR SIGHTED IN THE VICINITY. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR SAID THAT HE HAD NEVER HAD A TCASII SYS TELL HIM TO INCREASE CLB BEFORE. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER OFF IF HE HAD CONTINUED HIS DSCNT, BUT NEITHER HE NOR THE TCASII KNEW THAT THE MD80 WAS GOING TO CONTINUE ITS CLB AND, IN FACT, INCREASE ITS CLB RATE. WHEN HE SAW THE MD80 CLBING TOWARD HIM WHILE HE WAS EVADING, USING A MAX PERFORMANCE CLB, HE WAS AFRAID TO TURN BECAUSE ANY ROLL WOULD HAVE LOST SOME OF HIS AVAILABLE LIFT AND HE FELT THAT THERE WAS NONE TO SPARE. HE SAID THAT HE COULD SEE EVERYTHING ABOUT THE MD80 AS IT PASSED, INCLUDING THE RIVETS. HE SAID THAT HE CALLED THE NUMBER THAT THE CTLR GAVE HIM FOR THE CTR. HE TOLD THE SUPVR THAT HE WAS THE CAPT OF THE B737-300 THAT HAD THE NMAC NEAR KAYOH. THE SUPVR, APPARENTLY, ADMITTED THAT THE CTLR ERRED AND WOULD RECEIVE FURTHER TRAINING ALONG WITH SEVERAL OTHER PERSONNEL. THE SUPVR SAID THAT THE ERROR WAS NOT DUE TO EQUIP PROBS, ACCORDING TO THE RPTR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.