Narrative:

This report pertains to air carrier flight xx eastbound on B212 from pek to dfw on jul/bb/97. At CC00Z and about 50 mi west of uhmm, nikolaevsk control (134.6) advised our flight to leave 10100 meters and climb to 10600 meters. This was a very clear directive from a very understandable controller. We had not requested an altitude change and thought the climb must be for conflicting traffic. Twice we verified, 'nikolaevsk control, understand you want air carrier X to climb to and maintain 10600 meters.' twice he replied, 'yes, air carrier X climb to and maintain 10600 meters.' then we advised 'nikolaevsk control, air carrier X leaving 10100 meters for 10600 meters.' first officer was doing the communications and I (captain of air carrier X) was PF. After initiating our climb and somewhere before reaching FL340 we got a TA. I immediately took the aircraft off autoplt and stopped our climb. Then TCASII advised us to descend. I immediately initiated a descent of about 1500 FPM. After descending about 400-500 ft we saw another aircraft approaching us from the opposite direction almost directly on our course. It was cloudy and hazy and the aircraft (air carrier Y) was not visible until just a few seconds before they passed over us. We were now again near 10100 meter altitude. We called nikolaevsk control and asked about the aircraft. The controller now seemed confused and at first would not answer us. He first talked to air carrier Y. We asked if we should now maintain 10100 meters and he replied 'yes!' he later handed us off to magadan control. We called air carrier Y on frequency 128.95. They said they had gotten a TCASII alert to climb and had done so. We both briefly addressed the incident and cordially advised each other we would file a report about the situation. TCASII on both aircraft very likely prevented an unfortunate mishap or at least a closer near miss. The russian controller might have thought we were past each other, and that 10600 meters was where he wanted us to be. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter saw the oncoming aircraft only when the aircraft was passing directly above his aircraft. Each aircraft received a TCASII alert and took action as commanded by their respective TCASII RA. Reporter feels the controller made a mistake as the controller became perplexed in what to say after the 2 aircraft passed one another. Before that time the controller talked in clear understandable english. After that incident, all the following controllers were very attentive and patronizing as the air carrier continued through this airspace. Reporter was not certain if they were in radar contact or not. Position reports were being given every 10-15 mins. Reporter called the passing air carrier to learn how much change in altitude they made as a result of their TCASII RA. Total altitude difference was estimated to be about 1000 ft.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B747-400 FLYING IN RUSSIAN AIRSPACE IS GIVEN COMMAND TO CLB TO A HIGHER ALT. WHEN THE ACR CLBS, AS IT APCHS THE CRUISE ALT, IT RECEIVES A TCASII RA AND DSNDS TO COMPLY. THE CONFLICTING TFC ALSO RECEIVES A TCASII RA AND CLBS. PLT RPTR FEELS CONFLICTING TFC IS A RESULT OF A CTLR ERROR.

Narrative: THIS RPT PERTAINS TO ACR FLT XX EBOUND ON B212 FROM PEK TO DFW ON JUL/BB/97. AT CC00Z AND ABOUT 50 MI W OF UHMM, NIKOLAEVSK CTL (134.6) ADVISED OUR FLT TO LEAVE 10100 METERS AND CLB TO 10600 METERS. THIS WAS A VERY CLR DIRECTIVE FROM A VERY UNDERSTANDABLE CTLR. WE HAD NOT REQUESTED AN ALT CHANGE AND THOUGHT THE CLB MUST BE FOR CONFLICTING TFC. TWICE WE VERIFIED, 'NIKOLAEVSK CTL, UNDERSTAND YOU WANT ACR X TO CLB TO AND MAINTAIN 10600 METERS.' TWICE HE REPLIED, 'YES, ACR X CLB TO AND MAINTAIN 10600 METERS.' THEN WE ADVISED 'NIKOLAEVSK CTL, ACR X LEAVING 10100 METERS FOR 10600 METERS.' FO WAS DOING THE COMS AND I (CAPT OF ACR X) WAS PF. AFTER INITIATING OUR CLB AND SOMEWHERE BEFORE REACHING FL340 WE GOT A TA. I IMMEDIATELY TOOK THE ACFT OFF AUTOPLT AND STOPPED OUR CLB. THEN TCASII ADVISED US TO DSND. I IMMEDIATELY INITIATED A DSCNT OF ABOUT 1500 FPM. AFTER DSNDING ABOUT 400-500 FT WE SAW ANOTHER ACFT APCHING US FROM THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION ALMOST DIRECTLY ON OUR COURSE. IT WAS CLOUDY AND HAZY AND THE ACFT (ACR Y) WAS NOT VISIBLE UNTIL JUST A FEW SECONDS BEFORE THEY PASSED OVER US. WE WERE NOW AGAIN NEAR 10100 METER ALT. WE CALLED NIKOLAEVSK CTL AND ASKED ABOUT THE ACFT. THE CTLR NOW SEEMED CONFUSED AND AT FIRST WOULD NOT ANSWER US. HE FIRST TALKED TO ACR Y. WE ASKED IF WE SHOULD NOW MAINTAIN 10100 METERS AND HE REPLIED 'YES!' HE LATER HANDED US OFF TO MAGADAN CTL. WE CALLED ACR Y ON FREQ 128.95. THEY SAID THEY HAD GOTTEN A TCASII ALERT TO CLB AND HAD DONE SO. WE BOTH BRIEFLY ADDRESSED THE INCIDENT AND CORDIALLY ADVISED EACH OTHER WE WOULD FILE A RPT ABOUT THE SIT. TCASII ON BOTH ACFT VERY LIKELY PREVENTED AN UNFORTUNATE MISHAP OR AT LEAST A CLOSER NEAR MISS. THE RUSSIAN CTLR MIGHT HAVE THOUGHT WE WERE PAST EACH OTHER, AND THAT 10600 METERS WAS WHERE HE WANTED US TO BE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR SAW THE ONCOMING ACFT ONLY WHEN THE ACFT WAS PASSING DIRECTLY ABOVE HIS ACFT. EACH ACFT RECEIVED A TCASII ALERT AND TOOK ACTION AS COMMANDED BY THEIR RESPECTIVE TCASII RA. RPTR FEELS THE CTLR MADE A MISTAKE AS THE CTLR BECAME PERPLEXED IN WHAT TO SAY AFTER THE 2 ACFT PASSED ONE ANOTHER. BEFORE THAT TIME THE CTLR TALKED IN CLR UNDERSTANDABLE ENGLISH. AFTER THAT INCIDENT, ALL THE FOLLOWING CTLRS WERE VERY ATTENTIVE AND PATRONIZING AS THE ACR CONTINUED THROUGH THIS AIRSPACE. RPTR WAS NOT CERTAIN IF THEY WERE IN RADAR CONTACT OR NOT. POS RPTS WERE BEING GIVEN EVERY 10-15 MINS. RPTR CALLED THE PASSING ACR TO LEARN HOW MUCH CHANGE IN ALT THEY MADE AS A RESULT OF THEIR TCASII RA. TOTAL ALT DIFFERENCE WAS ESTIMATED TO BE ABOUT 1000 FT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.